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Abstract 
This thesis deals with the role of American philanthropic foundations in promoting an 
expert-led approach to international politics in Europe between the two world wars. 
Harking back to earlier forms of transatlantic elite internationalism, American 
foundations financed a number of institutions for the ‘scientific’ study of international 
relations, and constructed a transnational network of international relations specialists. 
 
The organisations at the heart of this study, the Rockefeller Foundation and the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, funded a variety of think tanks, 
academies and research institutes, some of which had international and some of which 
had national constituencies. Institutions supported by the foundations included the 
Hague Academy of International Law, the Geneva Graduate Institute of International 
Studies, the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Deutsche Hochschule für 
Politik. Efforts to promote the cooperation between these institutions culminated in the 
funding of the International Studies Conference, a federation of institutes for the study 
of international relations organised under the auspices of the League of Nations in 1928. 
 
The philanthropic project to promote a ‘scientific’ approach to international relations 
turned the foundations into actors in a new international politics which they sought to 
rationalise at the same time. This new international politics was marked by the post-
1919 intertwining of governmental, intergovernmental and nongovernmental structures. 
Adopting a transnational approach which avoids conventional bilateral perspectives, 
this dissertation explores foundation activity in a variety of contexts. It analyses the 
foundations’ role as promoters of international expert exchange and internationalist 
education; as protagonists of American cultural diplomacy and targets of the cultural 
diplomacy of other countries; and finally, as nongovernmental organisations which 
undermined intergovernmental structures.  
 
Ultimately, this thesis contributes to the transnational history of American philanthropic 
foundations and sheds light on the role of nongovernmental organisations as actors in 
20th century international politics. 
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Introduction 
 
On 26 April 1917, twenty days after the American declaration of war against Imperial 
Germany, Elihu Root, the President of the American Society of International Law, 
addressed his peers at their 11th annual meeting. In an attempt to rouse enthusiasm for 
the United States’ war against autocracy and Prussian militarism, Root chose the effect 
of democracy on international relations as the theme of his address. Echoing Woodrow 
Wilson’s ‘democratic peace theory’, Root claimed that autocratic regimes were 
inherently warlike, due to “the deep and settled purpose of a ruling family or a ruling 
aristocratic class to enlarge its power”, whereas democracies held no such “sinister 
policies of ambition” because of their aversion to secret diplomacy and large military 
spending.1 Of course, Root admitted, a democratically controlled foreign policy had its 
own pitfalls: “The peoples who govern themselves frequently misunderstand their 
international rights, and ignore their international duties. They are often swayed by 
prejudice, and blinded by passion. They are swift to decide in their own favor the most 
difficult questions upon which they are totally ignorant.” Here, Root stayed true to his 
conservative convictions and his patrician suspicion of popular participation in 
government. But he also claimed that the defects of a democratic foreign policy could 
be cured “by reason, by appeal to better instincts, by public discussion, by the 
ascertainment and dissemination of the true facts”, which were all practices that were 
honed in democratically governed polities. 2 
Root’s address represented an attempt to spell out the conditions for a modern 
foreign policy fit for an age of mass democracy. Like many other liberal theorists of 
                                                 
1 Elihu Root, “The Effect of Democracy on International Law”, International Conciliation 4, no. 117 
(1917/18): 160, 163; U.S. presidents have also embraced the democratic peace theory. Joan Hoff, A 
Faustian Foreign Policy From Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush: Dreams of Perfectibility 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 143. 
2 Root, “Effect of Democracy”: 161, 162, 163. 
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international relations, Root assumed that a well-thought-out framework for the conduct 
of the foreign relations of democratic states would lead to harmonious international 
relations and the absence of conflict. Democracy alone was not enough. Certain 
processes had to underpin the making of foreign policy, certain institutions had to be in 
place to “reason” and ascertain “the true facts”. Root did not spell out the exact shape of 
these processes and institutions but implied that a democracy needed to have a forum in 
which international relations could be rationally discussed. 
A successful Wall Street lawyer, Elihu Root was not just the president of the 
American Society of International Law but shuttled between his private practice in New 
York City and high political offices in Washington D.C. which included Secretary of 
War, Secretary of State and United States Senator. But next to his corporate and his 
public duties, Root also made space in his life for a third kind of career, that of 
philanthropic leader. As the first president of the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Root presided over just the kind of organisation that, in his opinion, would fulfil 
the function of mediator, educator and voice of reason in the creation of a democratic 
foreign policy. The Carnegie Endowment was one of several American philanthropic 
foundations that took a strong interest in international relations, starting from the 1910s. 
In the course of the 20th century, these transnationally operating foundations were 
instrumental in shaping debates on international relations in several countries, both on 
the level of academic discourse and among foreign policy-making elites. They enjoyed 
intimate links with government officials, international organisations, and both local and 
international nongovernmental organisations. They were also involved in humanitarian 
missions and fostered the transfer of technologies, research practices and ideas in many 
disciplines. Most importantly, they were key players in a ‘politics of knowledge’ that 
determined which fields and approaches would become most relevant to policy making, 
  9
how knowledge-creating elites would be constituted and what the relationship between 
experts and non-experts would look like.3 
This dissertation investigates the attempt of American philanthropic foundations 
to create a modern, scientific model for the formation of foreign policy and to promote 
it in Europe during the 1920s and the 1930s. This they did by supporting the study of 
international relations which was, at least before the Second World War, a 
multidisciplinary field of inquiry. The organisations at the heart of the dissertation, the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, fostered a 
network of international affairs institutes in Europe with the aim of shaping a 
transatlantic expert elite capable of generating foreign policy ideas and transporting 
them into the political sphere.4 Strengthening international and national institutes in 
Europe, for example the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies, the 
Deutsche Hochschule für Politik in Berlin, and the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs in London, the foundations hoped that scientific exchange would depoliticise 
international conflicts. Their efforts culminated in the funding of the International 
Studies Conferences, organised under the auspices of the League of Nations between 
1928 and 1940. American philanthropic foundations aimed at a reform of the 
international system, based on a belief in the possibility of progressive change in 
international relations. Therefore, their attempts to shape the emerging discipline of 
international relations deserve special attention. 
The chronological scope of this study ranges from the creation of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace in 1910 to the wartime closure of the Paris offices 
                                                 
3 Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, The Politics of Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation, Philanthropy, and 
Public Policy (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), 4-5. 
4 A note on terminology: this dissertation is chiefly concerned with ‘experts’ and not ‘intellectuals’, 
although quite a few of the individuals under discussion could be described as intellectuals. Alfred 
Zimmern, an interwar international relations specialist discussed in this study, defined experts as those 
who put specialist knowledge to practical use, while intellectuals deal in abstract thought. Alfred 
Zimmern, “Democracy and the Expert”, Political Quarterly 1, no. 1 (1930): 24; for a concise and 
systematic discussion of recent literature on intellectuals see Gangolf Hübinger, Gelehrte, Politik und 
Öffentlichkeit: Eine Intellektuellengeschichte (Göttingen: 2006), chapter 1. 
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of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment in 1940. While an attempt 
has been made to emphasise continuities that linked the periods before and after the 
Great War, the focus of this study rests on the years between the First and the Second 
World War, for several reasons. First, relatively little has been published on the nexus 
between foundation philanthropy and foreign policy during the interwar years, at least 
in comparison to the post-1945 period.5 Second, the interwar years saw fundamental but 
gradual shifts in state-society relations. It was during this period that the large corporate 
foundation came of age in the United States and funding practices and patterns were 
established, especially with regard to overseas programmes. But the ways in which the 
American nation and the American state related to the rest of the world also underwent 
a transformation between the wars. Before 1914, as has been argued by Ian Tyrrell, 
Americans maintained close private ties with the rest of the world, mainly due to the 
salience of the immigration experience, but the American state remained detached from 
the international community. By the mid-20th century, however, the American people 
had become more insular, while their state had integrated much more closely with 
global structures.6 This larger shift is mirrored in developments that affected the 
relations between philanthropic foundations on the one hand and theorists and 
practitioners in the field of international relations on the other. In the early 20th century, 
American foundations were intent on building private networks across national 
boundaries. Towards the late 1930s, foundation officers increasingly coordinated their 
policies with governmental agencies, and finally cooperated with the State Department 
during the Second World War.  
                                                 
5 Historians of philanthropic foundations have noted a relative paucity of systematic studies on the 
interwar years. Oliver Schmidt, “Small Atlantic World: U.S. Philanthropy and the Expanding 
International Exchange of Scholars after 1945”, in Culture and International History, ed. Jessica C. E. 
Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (New York: Berghahn, 2003), 129 n. 
6 Ian Tyrrell, Transnational Nation: United States History in Global Perspective since 1789 (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 185-186. 
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Third, the 1920s and 1930s also provided a specific environment for 
transnationally operating non-governmental organisations, harbingers of what may be 
called a global civil society.7 Structures established through the League of Nations gave 
those groups a novel prominence and expanded field of action. Some, including the 
foundations, became key nongovernmental players in the milieu around the League. The 
borders between an official sphere, dominated by states, and the nongovernmental 
sector were not as robust, however, as they became after World War II. Careers such as 
that of Elihu Root, who moved freely between the spheres of market, state and ‘third 
sector’, were not uncommon.8 The relationship of NGOs to the international community 
of states changed when it was, for the first time, formally set out in Article 71 of the UN 
Charter in 1945. A clear definition of nongovernmental organisations was put forward 
which spelled out the conditions under which they could acquire consultative status and 
thereby participate in the UN system. This, however, implied more governmental 
control.9 Philanthropic foundations form a distinct sub-group of third sector or non-
governmental organisations and can be defined as independent non-profit organisations 
which have financial endowments and primarily make grants to other organisations.10 In 
the interwar years, American foundations were unique in their global remit and 
broadness of vision and did not have equivalents outside the United States. 
                                                 
7 John Boli and George M. Thomas, eds., Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental 
Organizations Since 1875 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); see also Akira Iriye, Cultural 
Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 
8 The concept of the ‘third sector’ was first formulated by U.S. sociologist Amitai Etzioni in the 1970s. 
Third sector organisations are rooted in civil society, are non-governmental and do not pursue profit-
driven interests. Etzioni regarded the third sector as instrumental in bringing about social reform. For an 
overview of the third sector see Helmut K. Anheier and Wolfgang Seibel, eds., The Third Sector: 
Comparative Studies of Nonprofit Organizations (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990). 
9 The inclusion of NGOs in the UN can be interpreted both as a recognition of their work during the 
interwar years and the attempt of governments to control and use those organisations. Christy Jo Snider, 
“The Influence of Transnational Peace Groups on U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-Makers during the 1930s: 
Incorporating NGOs into the UN”, Diplomatic History 27, no. 3 (2003); for a recent assessment of NGOs 
in the UN see Kerstin Martens, NGOs and the United Nations: Institutionalization, Professionalization 
and Adaptation (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
10 This definition closely follows Stefan Toepler, “Foundations and Their Institutional Context: Cross-
Evaluating Evidence from Germany and the United States”, Voluntas 9, no. 2 (1998): 153 n. 
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Fourth, the interwar years were also a formative period for the study of 
international relations. This was a time when the discipline began to be institutionalised 
at universities but scientific discourses on international topics were not yet monopolised 
by academia. Nongovernmental organisations and think tanks played an important role 
in defining what the scientific study of international relations would look like. Only 
after 1945 did international relations become a rather narrow subfield of political 
science, and historians of the discipline have only started to inquire why this came 
about.11 
Maybe more than other nongovernmental organisations, foundations face a 
complex relationship with democratic accountability. Political scientist Robert Arnove 
even asserts that “foundations like Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford have a corrosive 
influence on a democratic society”.12 Therefore, examining their vision for the conduct 
of international politics in democratic states might shed light on what is, in Matthew 
Connelly’s words, “[o]ne of the key problems of contemporary history”, namely “to 
understand how world politics is becoming more pluralistic without becoming more 
democratic”.13 This study contributes to the existing historiography on American 
philanthropic foundations which has for more than twenty years engaged with the 
question of how foundations shape national societies but also the international sphere. 
However, this dissertation tries to reformulate these questions by introducing new 
methodological tools, perspectives and archival resources to the study of the subject. In 
the following, recent trends in the literature on American foundations will be reviewed 
and different methodological approaches will be evaluated. A final section is dedicated 
                                                 
11 David Long, “Who Killed the International Studies Conference?”, Review of International Studies 32, 
no. 4 (2006); Nicolas Guilhot, “The Realist Gambit: Postwar American Political Science and the Birth of 
IR Theory”, International Political Sociology 2, no. 4 (2008). 
12 Robert F. Arnove, “Introduction”, in Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at 
Home and Abroad, ed. Robert F. Arnove (Boston, Mass.: G.K. Hall & Co., 1980), 1. For a discussion of 
this interpretation of foundations see infra. 
13 C.A. Bayly et al., “AHR Conversation: On Transnational History”, American Historical Review 111, 
no. 5 (2006): 1461;  on the relevance of NGOs see also Akira Iriye, “A Century of NGOs”, Diplomatic 
History 23, no. 3 (1999). 
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to current debates on the history of international relations as a discipline, as they also 
influence the design of this study.  
 
The Historiography of Foundation Philanthropy: Institutional Histories, Peace History 
and the Debate on Hegemony  
The first institutional histories of American foundations were produced by members of 
the close-knit philanthropic circles made up of former staff and trustees. Although these 
accounts remain valuable and offer an insider’s perspective, they generally lack 
scholarly rigour.14 In the 1980s, the systematic study of philanthropy and the third 
sector in general took off in the United States. Specialized interdisciplinary research 
centres and networks were set up, such as the Independent Research Sector Committee, 
the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action, the 
International Society for Third Sector Research, or the Center on Philanthropy at 
Indiana University. During that time, philanthropic foundations also started to ask 
professional historians to write scholarly histories of their institutions and thereby 
opened the way for an assessment of foundation philanthropy from a broader historical 
perspective. Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, the author of monographs on the Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and the Carnegie Corporation, chose to 
put foundation activity in the context of the development of social policy in the United 
States. A similar approach was taken in two influential essays by Barry Karl and 
Stanley Katz. Recently, Judith Sealander’s work on ‘scientific philanthropy’, which has 
the merit of analysing lesser-known organizations such as the Commonwealth Fund, has 
also investigated philanthropic contributions to the making of American social policy.15 
                                                 
14 Examples include Raymond B. Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation (New York: Harper, 
1952); Robert H. Bremner, American Philanthropy, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988 
[1960]); Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Big Foundations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). 
15 Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, Private Power for the Public Good: A History of the Carnegie Foundation 
for the Advancement of Teaching (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1983); Lagemann, 
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It is noteworthy that all these authors restricted themselves to the domestic 
history of American philanthropy. Lagemann explained this limited focus by claiming 
that foundations’ overseas programmes were simply “extensions of domestic programs 
and program rationales”.16 However, Lagemann’s own study of the Carnegie 
Corporation suggests that such a view of foundation activity might be too reductive. In a 
chapter on the Carnegie Corporation’s grant to Gunnar Myrdal for the writing of An 
American Dilemma, one of the most influential book on U.S. race relations in the 20th 
century, Lagemann herself makes the point that foundation officers regarded former 
colonial administrators in Africa as experts on race relations. However, she does not 
enquire how the Carnegie Corporation’s previous educational programmes in Africa or 
its sponsoring of an African Survey compiled by the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs shaped the foundation’s actions and expectations when it commissioned An 
American Dilemma. By assuming that foundations simply copied domestic templates 
when they went abroad, Lagemann precludes the possibility of a different dynamic, 
namely policy being shaped at home and abroad at the same time.17 This example 
suggests that by blanking out either the foreign or the domestic dimension of 
philanthropic policies historians risk leaving out large parts of the story. Nevertheless, 
foundation history continues to be written with these biases.18  
This is not to say that there is a dearth of histories dealing with the overseas 
programmes of American philanthropic foundations. Merle Curti’s ground-breaking 
monograph on U.S. philanthropy abroad remains a standard account, although it makes 
scant conceptual distinction between foundation philanthropy, charity, humanitarian 
                                                                                                                                               
Politics of Knowledge; Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz, “The American Private Philanthropic 
Foundation and the Public Sphere, 1890-1930”, Minerva 19, no. 2 (1981); Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. 
Katz, “Foundations and Ruling Class Elites”, Daedalus 116 (1987); Sealander, Private Wealth. 
16 Lagemann, Politics of Knowledge, 329. 
17 Ibid., 134. 
18 See a recent edited collection of articles which only contains one contribution on the overseas 
dimensions of American philanthropic activity: Emily Rosenberg, “Missions to the World: Philanthropy 
Abroad”, in Charity, Philanthropy and Civility in American History, ed. Lawrence J. Friedman and Mark 
D. McGarvie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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organisations such as the Red Cross, and individual fundraising. Nor is there much 
source material on the reception of American philanthropy abroad. Curti speculates that 
overseas recipients in general showed gratitude for American help, but he has little to 
say about specific forms of cooperation between American philanthropic groups and 
local beneficiaries.19 Studies on foundation philanthropy which were published in the 
1980s and 1990s have generally tried to analyse in greater detail how programmes were 
received abroad. Much of this more recent work has focused on Rockefeller-funded 
organisations and their activities in Latin America, South-East Asia and the Far East, 
with a special focus on medicine and agriculture.20 Mary Brown Bullock, for example, 
assessed the local impact of the Rockefeller Foundation’s support for Peking Union 
Medical College by tracing the careers of the College’s Chinese alumni, and by 
chronicling the successes, failures and unintended outcomes of the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s policies. Crucially, she also used Chinese primary sources. An insightful 
article by Steven Palmer captured the complexity of ‘philanthropic encounters’ in an 
analysis of the Rockefeller Foundation’s public health programme in Costa Rica. 
Underlining the importance of local dynamics, Palmer argued that foundation officers 
were “double agents”, furthering the interests of American “imperial medicine” but also 
taking the side of certain groups within the host country. In addition, foundation 
officers, who were often trained in the sciences they promoted abroad, felt an allegiance 
to a transnational scientific community.21 
                                                 
19 Merle Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad: A History (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1963). 
20 On Spanish-speaking America see Marcos Cueto, ed., Missionaries of Science: The Rockefeller 
Foundation and Latin America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Bruce H. Jennings, 
Foundations of International Agricultural Research: Science and Politics in Mexican Agriculture 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1988); on China see Randall S. Stross, The Stubborn Earth: American 
Agriculturalists on Chinese Soil, 1898-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), chapters 6 
and 8; on South-East Asia see Soma Hewa, Colonialism, Tropical Disease and Imperial Medicine: 
Rockefeller Philanthropy in Sri Lanka (New York: University Press of America, 1995). 
21 Mary Brown Bullock, An American Transplant: The Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union 
Medical College (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Steven Palmer, “Central American 
Encounters with Rockefeller Public Health, 1914-1921”, in Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the 
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In the late 1980s, European historians also started to use systematically the 
archives of the Rockefeller Foundation in studies on the development of academic 
institutions and disciplines. Pioneering work was published by Giuliana Gemelli and 
Brigitte Mazon, who both focused on French academia before and after World War II. 
Mazon in particular concluded that success or failure of Rockefeller social science 
projects in France was determined by local institutional structures and not by the 
intentions of the American donors.22  
The impact of foundation philanthropy in a number of European countries has 
been explored further in several collections of articles, edited or co-edited by Gemelli. 
These studies have covered the disciplines of economics, philosophy, sociology and 
political science—though not specifically international relations.23 Some of these 
articles developed alternative ways of conceptualising the complex donor-recipient 
relationships created by foundation philanthropy, emphasising the importance of 
foundation officers’ perceptions of prospective donors instead of outside factors.24 
However, many studies collected in the volumes mentioned above rely on foundation 
archives and focus narrowly on particular scholars and institutions. More recently, 
scholars have adopted prosopographical approaches to assess the impact of foundation 
                                                                                                                                               
Cultural History Of U.S.-Latin American Relations, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. LeGrand, and 
Ricardo D. Salvatore (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998). 
22 Brigitte Mazon, Aux origines de l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales: le rôle du mécénat 
américain, 1920-1960 (Paris: Cerf, 1988), 165-167; Giuliana Gemelli, Fernand Braudel, trans. Brigitte 
Pasquet and Béatrice Propetto Marzi (Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1995). 
23 Giuliana Gemelli, ed., The Ford Foundation and Europe (1950's-1970's): Cross-Fertilization of 
Learning in Social Science and Management, Memoirs Of Europe (Brussels: European Interuniversity 
Press, 1998); Giuliana Gemelli, Jean-François Picard, and William H. Schneider, eds., Managing Medical 
Research in Europe: The Role of the Rockefeller Foundation (1920-1950's) (Bologna: CLUEB, 1999); 
Giuliana Gemelli, ed., The “Unacceptables”: American Foundations and Refugee Scholars between the 
Two Wars and After (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press - Peter Lang, 2000); Giuliana Gemelli, ed., 
American Foundations and Large-Scale Research: Construction and Transfer of Knowledge (Bologna: 
Clueb, 2001); the Rockefeller Foundation's support for institutes of international affairs and the 
International Studies Conference is only briefly mentioned in another edited collection, see Malcolm 
Richardson, “The Humanities and International Understanding: Some Reflections on the Experience of 
the Rockefeller Foundation”, in Philanthropy and Culture: The International Foundation Perspective, ed. 
Kathleen D. McCarthy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 26. 
24 Susan Gross Solomon, “The Power of Dichotomies: The Rockefeller Foundation’s Division of Medical 
Education, Medical Literature, and Russia, 1921-1925”, in American Foundations in Europe: Grant-
Giving Policies, Cultural Diplomacy and Trans-Atlantic Relations, 1920-1980, ed. Giuliana Gemelli and 
Roy MacLeod (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press - Peter Lang, 2003). 
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support.25 Several ongoing or recently completed research projects on American 
foundations in Europe also seek to connect foundation history with general debates on 
the European-American relationship in the 20th century.26 Nevertheless, the specifics of 
American philanthropic work in Europe are rarely connected to themes within U.S. 
history and American foreign relations.27 Also, there remains a strong bias towards 
Rockefeller and Ford philanthropy. This can be partly explained by the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s pre-eminence in overseas philanthropy due to its financial prowess, 
geographical reach and disciplinary diversity. This role was taken over by the Ford 
Foundation after 1945. 
Historical accounts of the Carnegie Endowment have often been written from a 
very different theoretical perspective. Founded in 1910, the Carnegie Endowment was 
created as a grant-giving institution for peace groups. Thus, in the scholarly literature, 
the Endowment received systematic treatment first by historians of the American peace 
movement, notably David S. Patterson, Michael Lutzker and C. Roland Marchand, 
whose research questions were shaped by the then emerging field of peace history. 
Despite the occasional exploring of transnational links to peace movements abroad, the 
focus of these studies remained firmly on the United States and on the years between 
                                                 
25 Ludovic Tournès, “Le réseau des boursiers Rockefeller et la recomposition des savoirs biomédicaux en 
France (1920-1970)”, French Historical Studies 29, no. 1 (2006); Ludovic Tournès, “Les élites françaises 
et l’américanisation: le réseau des boursiers de la Fondation Rockefeller (1917-1970)”, Relations 
Internationales, no. 116 (2003); Christian Fleck, Transatlantische Bereicherungen: Zur Erfindung der 
empirischen Sozialforschung (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2007). 
26 In October 2008, the French historian Ludovic Tournès completed a habilitation à diriger des 
recherches on American foundations and the Americanisation of Europe in the 20th century, entitled “La 
philanthropie américaine et l'Europe: contribution à une histoire transnationale de l’américanisation”. 
While it has not been possible to consult this work for this dissertation, several of Tournès’s articles on 
the topic have been taken into account. Helke Rausch, based at the University of Leipzig, is working on a 
German Habilitation on American foundations and the social sciences in Britain, France and Germany 
between the First World War and the 1960s. An outline of her approach, which is based on the history of 
cultural transfers and comparative history, can be gleaned from a recently published article. Helke 
Rausch, “US-amerikanische “Scientific Philanthropy” in Frankreich, Deutschland und Großbritannien 
zwischen den Weltkriegen”, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 33, no. 1 (2007). 
27 See, however, a recent article on the Rockefeller Foundation and German émigré scholars which links 
their role in U.S. intelligence work during World War II to the intellectual foundations of the New Left. 
Tim B. Müller, “Die gelehrten Krieger und die Rockefeller-Revolution: Intellektuelle zwischen 
Geheimdienst, Neuer Linken und dem Entwurf einer neuen Ideengeschichte”, Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft 33 (2007). 
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the Endowment’s foundation and the end of the Great War.28 Two dissertations on the 
Endowment, one of which has been completed recently, analyse the 1920s and 1930s. 
While both are valuable and succeed in sifting through the expansive institutional 
archives, they also focus narrowly on the Endowment, in particular on its propaganda 
division under Nicholas Murray Butler, and do not explore its links with other 
American foundations. Neither do they consult archival material housed outside the 
United States. Foreign-language literature is generally not discussed.29  
This can lead to misplaced emphases. John Greco, for example, organises an 
entire chapter around the so-called Chatham House Conference that the Endowment 
organised at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1935 to promote economic 
internationalism. Nicholas Murray Butler, the Endowment’s president at the time, 
termed the conference a “brilliant success”, and Greco does not significantly challenge 
this assessment.30 However, as British archival records reveal, the conference led to bad 
feelings between the Endowment and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The 
British Institute was so “embarrassed” by the propagandistic character of the conference 
that it sought to distance itself from it.31 Given the importance of Chatham House as the 
premier British foreign policy think tank in the interwar years, this episode was a severe 
set-back in the context of the Endowment’s plan to promote closer Anglo-American 
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30 Greco, “A Foundation for Internationalism”, 128-136. 
31 Ivison Macadam to Malcolm Davis, 5 February 1936, Royal Institute of International Affairs Registry 
Files, Chatham House Library and Archive, London (hereafter RIIA), 10/1.5a 
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relations, even if the conference received much publicity in the press. Greco ultimately 
makes external circumstances responsible for the limited impact of the ideas promoted 
at the Chatham House Conference—the nations of the world were not ready for the 
Endowment’s message.32 But possibly the reasons for the Endowment’s failures can be 
found more locally, and not in vague circumstantial evidence. 
For almost thirty years one constant feature in the writing on American 
philanthropic foundations has been the debate on their role in promoting the hegemony 
of ruling elites in a capitalist system. Building on Antonio Gramsci’s Marxist 
methodology, which proposes that ruling classes achieve domination not by coercion 
but by convincing the rest of society that they deserve to rule, one side of this debate 
argues that the foundations’ programmes were designed to maintain an unequal and 
unjust status quo. Accordingly, as Donald Fisher has claimed, the foundations promoted 
empirical research designed to facilitate “social control” in its practical applications. 
Other scholars, notably Edward Berman, surveyed the international programmes of 
American foundations after 1945 and came to the conclusion that they supported U.S. 
foreign policy and global capitalism by “encouraging certain ideals congruent with their 
objectives and by supporting those educational institutions which specialize in the 
production and dissemination of these ideas”.33 The Gramscian literature on foundations 
frequently cites two arguments, first, that foundation trustees and staff come from a 
small and powerful section of society which seeks to defend its vested interests, and 
                                                 
32 Greco, “A Foundation for Internationalism”, 134. 
33 Donald Fisher, “American Philanthropy and the Social Sciences in Britain, 1919-1959: The 
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second, that foundations are very adept at controlling ideas and culture, thereby 
perpetuating structures of domination in the United States and abroad. 
Scholars sceptical of such an approach have generally tried to undermine these 
arguments. Martin Bulmer, whose exchange with Donald Fisher in the pages of 
Sociology sums up the fault lines in the debate on foundations in the 1980s, claimed that 
the links between founder families such as the Rockefellers and foundation staff were 
vastly exaggerated, and that there was no conclusive proof that foundation funding, and 
not internal developments, determined scholarly trends within the social sciences.34 
Some of Bulmer’s criticism was justified, especially regarding the claim that foundation 
policies were drawn up by a hermetically shielded, close-knit elite in New York City. 
Considering the numerous and varied inputs into foundation policies, also those of 
potential grant recipients with whom foundation staff often forged a cooperative 
relationship, this seems indeed misleading.35 Another outcome of this early debate 
between scholars favouring a Gramscian analysis and those who did not was a shift in 
focus from the founders of philanthropic organisations to foundation officers who were 
in charge of the day-to-day running of grant programmes.36  
But the question of whether the relationship between foundations and grant 
recipients was one marked by control or autonomy remains a valid one. Some scholars 
in the United States have shown a tendency to evade this question, mostly by taking 
issue with the use of a Gramscian framework. Barry Karl and Stanley Katz argued that 
                                                 
34 Martin Bulmer, “Philanthropic Foundations and the Development of the Social Sciences in the Early 
Twentieth Century: A Reply to Donald Fisher”, Sociology 18, no. 4 (1984);  for a comment on the 
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36 However, it must be said that founder intervention did happen and has to be acknowledged, which is 
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“the application of European theories such as Gramsci’s” to American politics was 
“problematic”, due to the uniqueness of the American political system.37 Judith 
Sealander equally dismissed the content of the Bulmer-Fisher debate: “Gramsci 
exaggerated the influence exercised by upper classes, but the most interesting question 
is not “Is Gramsci right?” It is Why has the debate about the policy-making role of 
early-twentieth-century foundations remained so static?”38  
This focus on methodology, however, obscures important issues that are at stake 
in the study of the history of foundations. Defining them as ‘American’ phenomena, 
despite their transnational entanglements, and claiming that they cannot be captured by 
‘European’ theories is inadequate. Besides, the debate on foundations and hegemony 
has recently been reinvigorated and expanded, in the context of discussions on the role 
of American philanthropy in the ‘Cultural Cold War’. During the 1940s and 1950s the 
previously tenuous alliances between foundation philanthropy and the American 
government solidified into what Volker Berghahn has termed a “symbiotic 
relationship”.39 For many historians, the most salient example of this relationship 
remains the Congress for Cultural Freedom which was publicly supported by the Ford 
Foundation and covertly financed by the CIA.40 Again, those writing on the topic 
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generally fall into two camps: some claim that European scholars and intellectuals who 
accepted American funding had a large degree of autonomy in what they thought and 
wrote. The CIA may have paid for publications and meetings but that did not mean that 
it was able to control cultural messages. Others, often using a Gramscian framework, 
deny this and argue that the Ford Foundation became an effective vehicle for CIA 
propaganda, lending its own reputation to the compromised enterprise that was the 
Congress for Cultural Freedom. As the Cold War was waged on all fronts, so this 
argument goes, philanthropic foundations disregarded the ideal of intellectual freedom 
and acted in the interest of the American state.41 
This point of view has recently received a nuanced reinterpretation, in a 
monograph by John Krige which examines the nexus between American philanthropy, 
Cold War foreign policy in Europe and the natural sciences.42 Krige uses the concept of 
“consensual hegemony”, a term coined by Charles Maier, to analyse how American 
foreign policy makers and foundations rebuilt European science to reflect American 
concerns. This they did not through coercion but with the help of European partners 
who shared core values and, by accepting American leadership, were able to further 
their own personal and political goals.43 Interpreting the relationship between the 
American government, foundations and European scientists as hegemonic but 
consensual has the advantage that the term allows for a certain openness of outcomes. It 
emphasises that collaboration was brought about by negotiation but still underlines that 
there were differentials in power. The disadvantage of this concept is that it is firmly 
rooted in a Cold War framework. Krige is not the only scholar to claim that cultural 
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influence, broadly defined, is a function of military and economic power.44 As the 
United States emerged as the leader of the ‘West’ in a bipolar world, it naturally sought 
to build a transatlantic community of values, norms and beliefs, modelled on those it 
possessed itself. 
But how did these dynamics play out before the Cultural Cold War? What was 
the relationship between the American government and civil society groups that 
engaged in cross-border cultural and scientific activities in the interwar years? During 
that time the United States may have maintained an informal empire in the Western 
hemisphere but its relations with European states, notably Britain, were marked by 
competition and collaboration.45 Moreover, the United States was a relative latecomer in 
terms of establishing a formal infrastructure for the conduct of cultural diplomacy. The 
French Service des œuvres françaises à l’étranger and the Kulturabteilung of the 
German Auswärtige Amt were both established in 1920, and both had pre-war roots. 
Even in Britain where, similar to the United States, private initiatives dominated the 
field of cultural relations, the Foreign Office set up the British Council as a vehicle for 
cultural propaganda in 1934 and integrated it fully into British foreign policy.46 Once 
the State Department created its Division of Cultural Relations in 1938, it still relied 
heavily on the ideas and personnel of those agencies that had unofficially steered 
American cultural relations before. These included professional academic associations 
such as the American Council of Learned Societies and the American Library 
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Association, think tanks, notably the Council on Foreign Relations and, most 
importantly, some of the large philanthropic foundations.47  
Only during the Second World War were the foundations actively and 
systematically encouraged to coordinate their programmes with official U.S. foreign 
policy and in turn the collaboration between foundations officers and the State 
Department became close. For example, Malcolm Davis, acting director of the Carnegie 
Endowment’s education department, worked for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
from 1941, dedicating his mornings to philanthropy and his afternoons to affairs of 
state.48 But does the late onset of governmental management of international cultural 
relations in the United States automatically mean that “The US was a newcomer to 
culture wars” in the Cold War, as Tony Judt has implied?49 
For most of the 1920s and 1930s the relationship between foreign policy makers 
and foundations was marked by ambivalence, as foundation staff simply could not be 
sure whether having the official backing of their government would be an asset or a 
liability abroad. The following letter from George E. Vincent, then president of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, to Alanson B. Houghton, U.S. ambassador to Germany, 
illustrates this dilemma:  
We desire to avoid undue publicity. We work with many countries and it is our 
policy to keep the Foundation and its personnel in the background. It would 
seriously interfere with our work if it were regarded as a form of nationalistic 
propaganda. We shall count, therefore, upon your co-operation in helping us to 
avoid anything which might seem to involve us in international politics or might 
prove embarrassing to our work throughout the world.  
 
In effect, in this letter Vincent is asking for governmental cooperation to produce the 
appearance of non-cooperation. The unspoken assumption is that some level of state-
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private coordination is expected. This is underlined by Vincent’s promise to keep 
Houghton informed: “Our representatives when they go to Berlin will make a point of 
calling upon you and letting you know how things are going.”50 
Foreign governments also regarded American foundations as an important factor 
in transatlantic diplomatic relations. The Carnegie Endowment, for example, paid a 
number of foreign “correspondents” to furnish its trustees with confidential reports from 
abroad. Its German correspondents were outspoken pacifists who criticised the Weimar 
government in their missives. In a letter to the Auswärtige Amt, a German diplomat 
posted in Washington complained about their impact: “You cannot imagine the effect of 
these reports. One carries them to the President, to Congress, to the Administration, and 
takes them to be the gospel.”51 Thus, foundations certainly were players in the 
international ‘culture wars’, if they can be called that, of the interwar years, even if the 
collaboration with American government agencies took on a different quality than in 
later periods. Moreover, it seems that foundation activity as cultural diplomacy should 
also be viewed from the receiving end in order to be adequately assessed. 
  Three broad conclusions can be drawn from a review of the existing literature 
on American foundations. First, the international activities of American foundations 
should be traced using multi-archival research, possibly including governmental 
archives and those of international organisations. Only then can conclusions on the 
creation and outcomes of particular policies be drawn. Second, there are several 
imbalances in the current scholarship: the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
has been neglected, more systematic accounts of the interwar years are required, and 
little is known about foundation activity on the margins of, or outside of, academia. The 
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study of international relations is especially interesting with regard to the latter point as 
it was pioneered in independent think tanks and research institutes. Finally, writing the 
history of American foundations purely as part of American social, cultural or political 
history entails the risks of omission and distortion. Writing it from a purely disciplinary 
perspective, as historians of science tend to do, results in narrow studies that contribute 
little to our understanding of how nongovernmental organisations function in 
international politics. Writing this history as international history risks clinging too 
much to a Cold War framework. In the following section, possible methodological 
approaches will be discussed. 
 
Methodological Considerations: Transnational History and Cultural Diplomacy 
The history of American foundations cannot be written as national history. These 
organisations were deeply involved with local academic milieus outside the United 
States which they shaped through the active building of institutions and the furthering of 
individual careers. Professional biographies which included foundation patronage often 
spanned several countries—especially in the interwar years which were marked by the 
large-scale phenomenon of refugee scholars. Jewish and left-wing intellectuals fleeing 
fascism often received foundation aid, which helped them to find university 
appointments in the democratic states of Europe and, increasingly, in the United 
States.52 But the links established by philanthropic foundations also had repercussions 
in the United States. In fact, it has long been acknowledged that the “American” 
discipline of international relations was heavily influenced by the pre-1945 influx of 
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scholars and ideas from Europe. Arnold Wolfers is only one example of a foundation 
protégé who went on to become an influential IR scholar in the United States.53  
Not just academic milieus were shaped, the foundations themselves were 
transnational organisations moulded by the way they operated. Both the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment maintained European branch offices. Policies 
and funding practices were not developed remotely in American headquarters but in 
discussions with potential or former grant recipients or other advisers to the 
foundations. Moreover, the foundations cooperated among themselves, sharing 
expertise but also engaging in conflict and competition. Apart from academic and 
philanthropic milieus, governmental agencies, both in the United States and abroad, 
played a role in the making, executing and sometimes the breaking of philanthropic 
programmes. It is important to note that these different milieus were not strictly 
separated—far from it. A ‘foundation insider’ could also be an academic and a 
government advisor.54 American foundations also participated in the shaping of 
intergovernmental structures, notably in their dealings with the League of Nations. In 
the field of international relations, they were involved with the League milieu through 
major projects, first by founding the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies 
and then by bankrolling much of the League’s Intellectual Cooperation Organisation.55 
Finally, the foundations created transnational spaces for scholarly discussion, even 
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though national loyalties could and frequently did interfere with intellectual 
universalism.56 
Foundation activity in the interwar years can only be captured adequately if 
these different levels and the resulting dynamics are taken into account. This 
necessitates a transnational approach. Due to their multiple entanglements abroad, 
American foundations can be interpreted as transnational nongovernmental 
organisations, the agendas and behaviours of which were shaped in numerous places in 
different parts of the world.57 Political scientists have defined transnational relations as 
“regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state 
agent”.58 This definition is useful as a starting point, though one may ask whether 
analytical divisions between state and non-state actors and correspondingly between 
international relations, i.e. state-to-state relations, and transnational relations can be so 
neatly upheld on the empirical level. After all, ‘public’ and ‘private’ are socially 
constructed categories and historical variables that do not remain stable over time. In 
many domestic arenas in which foundations were active, public and private intersected. 
As social historians have long pointed out, the modern welfare state has always relied 
on a mixed economy of state and private, not just in the United States but also in 
Europe.59  
Historians have, for several years now, attempted to come to terms with these 
complexities and engaged in substantial reflection on the significance of transnational 
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approaches to the writing of history.60 This debate has stimulated research agendas in 
different subfields: in social and cultural history it has drawn attention to the role of 
networks and transmission processes and shifted the emphasis from structure to agency. 
In the area of international history, it has highlighted the role of non-state actors.61 More 
recently, and somewhat paradoxically, transnational perspectives have informed the 
writing of national history, as seen in the work of Thomas Bender and Ian Tyrrell. Both 
writers build on established methodological tools: comparative history, employed by 
Bender, and the history of transfers, in the case of Tyrrell.62  
But the ‘transnational turn’ has not just effected a shift in perspective, subject 
matters and interpretation, it has also inspired methodological innovation. One such 
novel approach is histoire croisée. Formulated by Michael Werner and Bénédicte 
Zimmermann, it is the result of a methodological critique of comparative history as well 
as of the history of cultural transfers. Werner and Zimmermann argue that historical 
comparisons tend to be overly abstract. They construct stable analytical categories of 
comparison, for example ‘secondary education’, and then proceed to apply them to 
different national settings. This, however, denies the historicity of such categories. 
Moreover, relations between the objects of comparison are generally neglected. The 
history of transfers does take such links into account but also relies on fixed starting 
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points which are often located in stable national references such as ‘the American 
system of higher education’. Histoire croisée represents the attempt to view national 
categories as essentially fluid by considering the objects of historical research in relation 
to one another, emphasising how they are transformed in processes of interrelation, 
mutual constitution, influence or rejection. On the empirical level, histoire croisée 
traces actors, objects and interactions and their intertwining in multiple and often 
contradictory dynamics, attempting to ‘cross’ multiple perspectives and scales.63 For an 
analysis of the activities of American foundations in the field of international relations, 
this approach seems useful. It certainly fits the empirical basis and may be able to 
elucidate how a multiplicity of synchronic and interwoven processes structured 
discourses on international relations in the interwar years. More importantly, this way of 
writing history offers an opportunity to move the study of foundation activity overseas 
away from ‘bilateral’ approaches which are necessarily reductive.64 But how does 
histoire croisée stand up to criticisms that have been levelled at the transnational history 
project in general? How does it differ from the approaches that international historians 
have commonly adopted when analysing culture and the activities of non-state actors 
across national borders? 
Like other transnational approaches, histoire croisée attempts to deprive the 
nation of its privileged status as the driving force of historical narratives. American 
historians in particular see these new ways of writing history as a probate measure to 
counter exceptionalism. But not all contributors to the debate on transnational history 
have been optimistic. Critics have pointedly asked whether transnational history will not 
                                                 
63 Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung: Der Ansatz der 
Histoire coisée und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen”, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 28, no. 4 
(2002); Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the 
Challenge of Reflexivity”, History and Theory 45, no. 1 (2006). 
64 A classic example of the bilateral approach is Linda Killen, “The Rockefeller Foundation in the First 
Yugoslavia”, East European Quarterly 24, no. 3 (1990); even comparative projects run the risk of 
framing foundation activity abroad as the sum of a number of bilateral relationships with specific 
countries, see e.g. Rausch, “US-amerikanische Scientific Philanthropy”. 
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just provide an apologia of globalisation, writing master narratives of global, U.S.-
dominated capitalism instead of the nation. Louis Pérez warns against consigning “the 
nation … to the dustbin” if only because “[t]he success of the New World Order may be 
measured in global terms, but its failures are experienced in national settings”.65 
Moreover, Pérez makes clear that not all nations are the same, especially with regard to 
the power they are able to exert on others: 
People on the periphery of history, most of whom arrived at the condition of 
nation as a function of their determination to cast off domination, are conscious 
of the global context of their collective well-being. Indeed, their struggle to 
sustain claims of self-determination and sovereignty has been most commonly 
registered by way of the nation … On the contrary, the United States is the 
premier nation among nations, possessed of the means to flout international law, 
abrogate or ignore international agreements, and enact legislation with 
extraterritorial reach—all in defense of sovereignty and national interests. The 
call to enrich the history of the United States by transcending borders—
presumably including the borders of others—is to subsume the global into the 
national. The United States thus becomes the world.66 
 
Pérez’s critique of what he sees as a new historiographical imperialism basks the 
transnational history project in a more ambiguous light. He reminds transnational 
historians not to disregard the role of state power, and it is the sovereign nation-state 
that Pérez is talking about.67 
International history has always emphasised the role of power in relations 
between nation-states. While international history has traditionally focussed on state-to-
state relations, the field has been remarkably open to change for some time. Categories 
and concepts borrowed from cultural and social history have been incorporated into the 
                                                 
65 Louis A. Pérez, Jr., “We Are the World: Internationalizing the National, Nationalizing the 
International”, review of Thomas Bender, ed., Rethinking American History in a Global Age, Journal of 
American History 89, no. 2 (2002): 565, 563. 
66 Ibid.: 561, 564. 
67 However, Pérez could have gone further and reflected why nationhood still remains pivotal to quests 
for political emancipation. This issue is explored in Glenda Sluga, The Nation, Psychology, and 
International Politics, 1870-1919 (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
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international historian’s toolkit, and non-state actors have received more attention.68 
Postcolonial and subaltern studies, and the analysis of relationships between imperial 
centres and peripheries have also received consideration, albeit more reluctantly.69 
Nevertheless, state power and state bureaucracies form the focal point of most 
international history. Likewise, rarely do international historians differentiate between 
state and nation. Transnational approaches, however, do make such distinctions, but do 
not necessarily ignore state power.70 Thus, the approach of histoire croisée can pay 
sufficient attention to questions of state power and cultural diplomacy, even if these are 
interpreted as only one determinant of foundation activity, in conjunction with a variety 
of other dynamics. Nevertheless, Pérez’s critique may be a much-needed call to 
transnational historians to be more reflective and wary of the political implications of 
the kind of history they are writing. Pérez perceives a danger of transnational history 
turning into a celebratory history of globalisation and neo-liberalism, inheritors of the 
liberal internationalism of the 19th and early 20th century. Indeed, at times historians 
betray their normative biases, for example Matthew Connelly, in a panel discussion on 
transnational history: 
If transnational phenomena are transforming an international system premised 
on the principle of state sovereignty, then we might begin to discern what sort of 
system could take its place. This approach would help us to identify both the 
underlying causes of conflict as well as the norms, institutions, and practices 
that may yet bring more stability, if not justice.71 
 
These hopes connected with the transnational history project, uttered by an historian, 
could equally be taken as a description of the normative dimension of liberal 
international relations theory. The parallels are indeed surprising, in particular to the 
                                                 
68 A state of affairs demonstrated by the variety of approaches presented in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas 
G. Paterson, eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
69 Andrew Rotter, “Saidism without Said: Orientalism and U.S. Diplomatic History”, American Historical 
Review 105, no. 4 (2000). 
70 Patricia Clavin, “Defining Transnationalism”, Contemporary European History 14, no. 4 (2005): 436. 
71 Bayly et al., “On Transnational History”: 1461, italics added. 
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political thought of Woodrow Wilson, arguably the most politically influential 
expression of liberal ideas on international order in the 20th century. Wilsonianism aims 
for both stability and justice, transformation and the creation of rigid rules at the same 
time. But these demands are difficult to reconcile. How can self-determination be 
granted to nations or ethnic groups when to do so might threaten the stability of the 
international system? In other words, how can a normative imperative for change in the 
interest of justice be accommodated with rigid rules that are necessary for the 
maintenance of the status quo?72 In a multipolar world, these remain vexing questions 
indeed. 
 
The Historiography of International Relations: Re-evaluating Liberal IR Theory 
Undoubtedly there has been a renewed interest in the history of international relations as 
an academic discipline in recent years. This is partly due to the end of the Cold War 
which forced a discipline that seemed stuck in bipolar paradigms and had completely 
failed to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union to take a critical look at its own 
pedigree. Another incentive has been the interventionist foreign policy of George W. 
Bush which prompted scholars to reinvestigate the genealogy of the ideas and 
ideologies that shape American foreign policy. Some authors have drawn parallels 
between Bush and Woodrow Wilson in the process, often resorting to somewhat 
Manichaean metaphors.73 Wilsonianism has been the subject of critical re-evaluation for 
some time, especially with regards to its alleged claim that democracies are inherently 
                                                 
72 For an insightful account of Wilsonianism’s history and its in-built tensions see John A. Thompson, 
Wilsonianism: The History of a Conflicted Concept, unpublished manuscript, on file with the author. 
73 Tony Smith, A Pact with the Devil: Washington’s Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the 
American Promise (New York: Routledge, 2007); Hoff, A Faustian Foreign Policy From Woodrow 
Wilson to George W. Bush. 
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peaceful (the so-called democratic peace theory)74 and, most recently, from the 
perspective of its relation with race and Empire.75 
 Conventional histories of international relations theory still identify Woodrow 
Wilson as the dominant figure in the interwar years, whose Enlightenment-derived 
ideals shaped the discipline at its birth in the aftermath of World War I.76 This view has 
been much challenged since the mid-1990s when Anglo-American IR scholars started to 
revise the history of their discipline. Until that time, the received wisdom was that 
international relations emerged as a field after the First World War and was then for 20 
years dominated by ‘idealism’, a utopian set of prescriptions for the conduct of 
international relations which relied heavily on the League of Nations and international 
law, until the new paradigm, ‘realism’, first coherently formulated in 1939 by E.H. Carr, 
sent “the spent corpse tumbling into the grave”, as one political scientist has put it.77 
Realism, so this story goes, must be considered the true founding paradigm of 
international relations because it was “the first ‘scientific’ treatment of modern world 
politics”, as Stanley Hoffman has claimed in his much-quoted article on the discipline.78 
 Revisionist scholars of the history of international relations have criticised this 
account on three major points. First, they argue, the discipline was not born in 1939, or 
even in 1919, but had earlier roots. Second, “idealism” is a made-up term and an 
inappropriate label for a diverse array of thinkers who wrote on international politics in 
                                                 
74 See the classic articles by Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs”, Philosophy 
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the interwar years. Third, E.H. Carr was not the founding father of IR who, in a Protean 
effort, successfully refuted everything else that was written on the subject at the time, 
but engaged with other scholars whose views he distorted in his classic Twenty Years’ 
Crisis.79  
The first argument of the revisionists attacks what is in their view an invented, 
post-hoc history of the discipline of international relations that likes to cite Thucydides 
and Machiavelli as its forefathers. While it is true that international relations was only 
institutionalised in the interwar years—the first university chair of international 
relations was founded in Aberystwyth in 1919—it did exist as a distinct field of 
intellectual enquiry beforehand, drawing on several disciplines such as political science, 
international law and public administration. Different authors have emphasised different 
intellectual currents that structured this field. Brian C. Schmidt has identified a 
discourse about the problem of international anarchy as a constituting principle, while 
Lucian Ashworth has highlighted the spread of liberalism beyond national borders as a 
central theme.80 Revisionist authors also agree that studies on imperialism, colonial 
administration and subjugation of “backward peoples” belong to the analytical tradition 
of international relations. Race, not just the nation, was a distinct category of analysis 
for scholars writing on world politics in the first half of the 20th century.81  
                                                 
79 The seminal works of this school are, for Britain, David Long and Peter Wilson, eds., Thinkers of the 
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Secondly, the revisionists have argued that the term “idealism” is  “intellectually 
worthless”.82 In the interwar years themselves, there was no general meaning attached to 
it. It has been used retrospectively as a catch-all phrase, obscuring the true discursive 
fault lines within international relations and lumping together a diverse group of 
theorists whose actual writings, so the revisionists argue, deserve re-examination. This 
has led to the reclaiming of a number of authors who were active roughly between 1900 
and 1945, among them David Mitrany, Norman Angell, Alfred Zimmern, and Leonard 
Woolf. On the American side they include Paul S. Reinsch, Pitman B. Potter, Raymond 
Leslie Buell and Quincy Wright. It is noteworthy that Elihu Root, Nicholas Murray 
Butler and James Brown Scott, the interwar leaders of the Carnegie Endowment, are 
also among the early international relations theorists analysed in Schmidt’s study.83 
The third point of attack that the revisionists have brought to bear against 
conventional histories of international relations centres on the authority of E.H. Carr, 
whose Twenty Years’ Crisis is still cited as a secondary source in the scholarly 
literature.84 Carr’s book was as much a polemic as it was an attempt to map out the 
discipline of international relations. As several revisionists have pointed out, Carr had a 
political axe to grind, which motivated him to caricature the work of others. His main 
point of disagreement with the majority of British international relations theorists was 
their opposition to Chamberlain’s appeasement policy which he supported. His actual 
concept of international relations as a science that should be based on empirical realities 
while striving for positive change was not revolutionary but already there in the works 
of others.85 
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 The revisionist work on the history of international relations has certainly proved 
to be a much-needed corrective to previous accounts. In their insistence that the interwar 
idealists produced works of intellectual substance, the revisionists have been vindicated, 
for example by the renewed interest in the phenomenon of economic nationalism, a 
much-discussed topic in the 1930s. It was long neglected in studies of nationalism until 
the 1990s, when it started to receive more attention as a possible policy response to the 
challenges of globalisation.86 Yet, much work remains to be done. Idealism has not been 
replaced with an alternative label, though sometimes it is used interchangeably with 
“liberal internationalism”. There have been attempts at formulating a classification of 
interwar idealist thought but they remain tentative.87 Furthermore, there is an Anglo-
American bias to this new literature, and we know little about continental theorists of 
international relations in the interwar years. They did exist—Peter Wilson alludes to 
them but decided to focus on the British scene.88 Moreover, much of the current 
scholarship is based on intellectual biographies of individuals, often treated in isolation. 
It is now necessary to situate them in concrete institutional settings, and to trace their 
arguments. Most importantly, those whom the ‘interwar idealists’ were arguing against, 
namely those on the extreme right and on the extreme left, also have to be identified.89 
Some progress has already been made in this direction by jurists of the Critical Legal 
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Studies school who have written on the history of International Law, a discipline that 
was the training ground for many IR scholars.90 Foundation activity is part of the hidden 
story of the discipline of international relations in the interwar years, and it is by 
examining support of institutions and scholars in this field that this thesis aims, 
complementing recent work, to contribute to current debates.91 In particular, it aims to 
shed light on the transnational exchange between IR scholars that took place and that 
has hitherto been neglected.  
 
Organisation of Chapters and Sources 
The chapters in this study follow a loosely chronological order but the material is 
principally arranged according to different perspectives on foundation activity. Chapter 
1 is an investigation into the transatlantic origins of philanthropic internationalism and 
analyses the beginnings and early years of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Laura 
Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and the Carnegie Endowment. Chapter 2 explores one 
strategy developed by the foundations for the field of international relations in the 
1920s, namely the internationalisation of discussions on international politics and the 
creation of international hubs in cities such as The Hague, Paris and Geneva. Moreover, 
the question of which disciplines were prominent in the field of international relations 
will be discussed. Switching the perspective to national contexts in chapter 3, the 
question as to what extent the foundations’ international relations programmes were 
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relevant to national politics and cultural diplomacy is discussed. This chapter relies 
mostly on a case study of Weimar Germany. The demise of the Weimar Republic and 
the increasing attractiveness of ideologies that were competing with liberal 
internationalism motivated the foundations to adapt their strategies. The support of the 
International Studies Conference was the outcome, covered in chapter 4, which analyses 
foundation activity in the context of multilateral intergovernmental structures. Chapter 
5, finally, analyses the rupture of funding networks in the era of World War II but also 
points out the continuities that shaped the foundations’ international relations 
programmes in the 1940s and 1950s. 
The main archival sources for this study are the records of the Rockefeller 
Foundation, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. However, where appropriate, this source base has been 
supplemented by material from the archives of other philanthropic foundations, namely 
the Carnegie Corporation and the Commonwealth Fund, as well as material found in the 
private papers and oral histories of foundation officers and key interlocutors. I have also 
consulted the archives of recipient institutions, notably those of the Council on Foreign 
Relations, the Social Science Research Council, the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Graduate Institute of International 
Studies in Geneva. To cover the cultural diplomacy aspect, I have examined the 
archives of the U.S. State Department as well as those of the German Ministry of 
External Affairs. These form the empirical basis for my conclusions on the role of 
American foundations in the conduct of bilateral cultural diplomacy, whereas the 
archives of international organisations, notably those of the League of Nations and of 
the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, have yielded material which sheds 
light on the foundations’ role in multilateral cultural diplomacy and transnational 
cultural relations. Some documents in the British Foreign Office archives were also 
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consulted. Due to the unforeseen closure of the archives of the Quai d’Orsay in Paris for 
more than an entire year, starting in summer 2008, I was not able to investigate the 
relevant records there and my conclusions on the official French attitude towards 
American philanthropy in the interwar years remain tentative. 
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1 
Philanthropic Internationalism 
 
Philanthropic foundations have always faced public scrutiny. Their attempts to brand 
themselves, and to find a space they could occupy in the public imagination, tell us as 
much about the attacks they sought to ward off as about the aims and values that 
founders and staff held. Anticipating accusations of a deficiency in patriotism, the 
Carnegie Endowment printed the motto pro patria et orbis concordiam on its 
publications and letterheads.1 It self-consciously implied that allegiance to the nation 
and the national interest would always come before obligations to worldwide harmony. 
The Rockefeller Foundation’s mission statement was a pleonastic exercise in universal 
humanism: nothing could be less offensive than For the Well-Being of Mankind 
Throughout the World. This was a rebuke to allegations that the foundation had been 
created for the well-being of the Rockefeller family rather than humanity but it also 
underlined the global reach of its ambitions. Having attracted much less attention than 
its sister institutions at its creation in October 1918, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller 
Memorial started out as a traditional charity, with a focus on the welfare of women and 
children in New York City. However, after the arrival of Beardsley Ruml, the 
Memorial’s new director, in May 1922, the programme changed dramatically until it 
resembled that of the Rockefeller Foundation in scope and outlook but with an emphasis 
on the social sciences. In the 1920s, the Memorial quietly went about its business of 
transforming the institutional landscape of American and European social science. 
Although the foundation lacked a slogan of its own, it came to share the outlook and 
sense of mission that was expressed in the mottos of the Carnegie Endowment and the 
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Rockefeller Foundation. This outlook was marked by a commitment to international 
intellectual exchange and the extension of national reform movements.  
The aim of this chapter is to trace the connections between foundation 
philanthropy and internationalism from the 1900s to the 1920s. This requires analyzing 
the origins of the foundations’ internationalist commitment and placing it within a 
broader context, which is not entirely American but transnational. Soma Hewa and 
Darwin Stapleton are among several scholars who hint at the role of internationalism 
with regard to foundation policies when they claim that “philanthropic leaders … 
recognized the importance of building social and cultural links among nations … to 
overcome the distrust, prejudice and political conflicts which had marked previous 
centuries of international relations”.2 However, this claim remains rather vague and 
needs to be fleshed out. How exactly were these social and cultural links to be 
established? How much importance was attached to national boundaries? Can we go so 
far as to claim that the foundations aimed to create a transnational civil society? Finally, 
exactly which goals did interwar foundation philanthropy share with internationalism? 
Certainly, scientific philanthropy and the large foundations that were its institutional 
manifestation emerged during the heyday of internationalism as a transatlantic social 
movement. Both the Rockefeller and the Carnegie philanthropies were connected to this 
thriving transnational movement, the roots of which lay in political, technological and 
social transformations that took place during the late 19th century. There were numerous 
personal and financial links between American foundations and organised 
internationalism in the United States in the interwar years. Warren Kuehl and Lynn 
Dunn have shown that America’s philanthropic elite overlapped and was interwoven 
with that of the internationalist movement, to the extent that it is almost impossible to 
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examine one without at least having a look at the other.3 The Carnegie Endowment 
participated in pre-1914 bourgeois internationalism by virtue of its direct association 
with the transatlantic peace movement. In the case of the Rockefeller philanthropies the 
connection is less explicit before 1918 but a commitment to border-transcending social 
reform can be detected from the 1910s. Four factors influenced the emergence of 
‘philanthropic internationalism’: the transatlantic bourgeois internationalism of the fin-
de-siècle, the invention of scientific foundation philanthropy in the 1900s, the domestic 
and international consequences of the Great War, and developments within the social 
sciences and the discipline of international law in the United States. 
 
What is Internationalism? 
Internationalism as a term has been used in a variety of contexts and the broadest 
definition so far has been offered by Akira Iriye. He takes into account the different 
manifestations of internationalism when he defines it as “an idea, a movement, or an 
institution that seeks to reformulate the nature of relations among nations through cross-
national cooperation and interchange”. In Iriye’s understanding, this can encompass 
traditional diplomacy in the form of treaties and alliances, attempts to create an 
international legal order through the extension of international law and arbitration, the 
promotion of international trade and economic exchange, efforts to bring about 
solidarity among the world’s working classes, and the encouragement of cross-national 
cultural activities. 4 Although this definition seems too broad to serve as more than a 
starting point, Iriye makes the important claim that the internationalist impulse is 
fundamentally to create networks, links and bonds where there were none before, be 
these links of an economic, social, political or cultural nature. A belief in the possibility 
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4 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, 3. 
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of progressive change in international relations is common to all variants of 
internationalism, even if they differ in the changes they seek to effect and the means 
employed to reach their aims.5  
 Richard Cobden, the British liberal and champion of free trade, first used the 
term ‘internationalism’ in the 1860s in his writings on the federation of states. Marx 
also employed the term in connection with the free traders but chiefly to describe 
material relations between states, in the form of trade, travel or technical agreements. 
Socialists only started to attribute an  ideological component to ‘internationalism’ from 
the 1890s, meaning the border-transcending consciousness of the proletariat.6 But 
socialist internationalism had a bourgeois counterpart, which, under the leadership of 
middle-class activists, transformed European and American peace advocacy in the 
second half of the 19th century and emancipated it from its earlier religious origins. 
Informed by liberal economics and emerging social science paradigms, bourgeois 
internationalists on both sides of the Atlantic constructed a citizen-led, secular, 
humanistic response to the increased economic, political and cultural interdependence 
among nation states. The International Postal Union was an oft-cited example of the 
growing importance of international agreements and institutions during that time.7 
Publicists such as the Austrian Alfred Fried, the American Paul Reinsch and Norman 
Angell, a popular English writer, interpreted the growing interdependence among 
nations as a result of technological innovations and drew from it the imperative to 
campaign for international cooperation and the promotion of peace.8  
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The narrative of modern man living in an interconnected world made smaller by 
technology was accepted by most middle-class internationalists but the responses to it 
differed in emphasis. Warren Kuehl distinguishes three strands of bourgeois 
internationalism: community internationalism, the effort to achieve social reforms on a 
national level that would then lead to universal brotherhood and peace in an 
interdependent world; polity internationalism, which represents the attempt to establish 
an international organisation within the ramifications of the existing system of nation 
states; and liberal internationalism, which emphasised practical measures such as 
armaments control and arbitration and after 1919 became associated with the global 
proliferation of democracy and world organisation.9 Of course Kuehl’s classification is 
open to the contention that polity and liberal internationalism were not mutually 
exclusive. Ultimately, the distinction between internationalists who focused on social 
reform and those primarily concerned with political and institutional change is more 
meaningful, even if the latter ranged from very ambitious endeavours, such as world 
government or a world police force, to rather cautious and traditional projects like 
arbitration. In the American context, community internationalists included social 
reformers like Jane Addams and Thorstein Veblen while the men who led the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace were representative of polity internationalism.10 
Some political scientists have proposed that nationalism and internationalism 
should be conceptualised as two opposite political forces.11 However, this notion has 
been strongly questioned by historians who argue that internationalism served as a 
political strategy to enhance national prestige.12 Internationalism provided states with 
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the opportunity to compensate for a lack of economic and political power by, for 
example, hosting international conferences or providing the site for the headquarters of 
international organisations. Thereby, smaller powers could create a distinct national 
profile, claim a space on the international scene and exercise moral leadership. The 
comparative studies conducted by international organisations also challenged existing 
hierarchies. By focusing on fields like social policy, lesser powers were able to occupy 
roles of leadership that were denied to them in power-political terms. Speaking the 
language of progress, small states like Switzerland or Norway portrayed themselves as 
global leaders in social legislation.13 National governments also sponsored and financed 
internationalist activity, for example the Interparliamentary Union, an association of 
European parliamentarians. After its 1904 meeting in St. Louis the Interparliamentary 
Union managed to established a strong American chapter, comprising over one hundred 
members of Congress.14  
The view that internationalism should be regarded as nationalism’s complement 
and not its counterforce is further supported by internationalism’s frequent connections 
to domestic social reform. One historian of the American peace movement has argued 
that internationalism in the Progressive era served as a rallying point for a variety of 
concerns, temporarily bringing a diverse array of professional and reform groups under 
one umbrella.15 Nevertheless, internationalism’s claim that there was no contradiction 
between forging cross-national connections and patriotism did not always translate 
easily into practical action in times of international tension. This explains why wars 
regularly split internationalist and pacifist movements during the 19th and 20th century.16 
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 Thus three big questions divided the movement during the golden age of 
bourgeois internationalism which lasted from the first Hague Peace Conference of 1899 
until the outbreak of the Great War. First, there was the issue of how much social 
reform at home would be necessary to bring about the emergence of an harmonious 
international community. Second, internationalists wondered what kind of institution 
would best respond to the new economic, administrative and cultural interdependence of 
the world, be it a permanent system for the arbitration of inter-state disputes which had 
been established by the Hague Conferences or an international organisation which could 
ultimately lead to a world state. The creation of the League of Nations after the First 
World War forced internationalists to take sides with regards to this issue, and, 
arguably, weakened the movement as a whole. Finally, in times of crisis 
internationalists had to confront the problem of reconciling the allegiance to the national 
interest of their homeland with the bonds of international friendship. Some, the men 
who made up the American philanthropic elite in the early 20th century among them, felt 
that there should be no contradiction between the two and, despite numerous setbacks, 
were determined to combine international cooperation with patriotic commitment. 
 
Legalist Internationalism and the Transformation of the American Peace Movement 
Two internationalist groups, lawyers and businessmen, assumed the leadership of the 
American peace movement in the early 1900s and transformed it in the process. One 
factor that contributed to this development was the attempt of peace societies to shed 
their sentimentalist image. Around the turn of the century, they started to broaden their 
membership base and to include patrons of a ‘practical’ mindset. Instead of condemning 
war on moral and religious grounds, peace activists began to focus on positive action to 
avoid international conflicts, commonly on the arbitration of international disputes. 
New outlets for peace activism sprang up. Most notable among these were the annual 
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Lake Mohonk conferences which had been set up in an upstate New York holiday resort 
in 1895 and attracted national leaders in politics, academia, business and the legal 
profession for the next twenty-one summers. The conferences consciously addressed the 
concerns of businessmen by discussing economic interdependence and war’s disruptive 
effect on commerce and industry. The issue that received most attention at Lake 
Mohonk, however, remained international arbitration.17 
Arbitration as a new paradigm in international relations had gained prominence 
after the successful settlement of the Alabama Claims by the Geneva Tribunal in 1872. 
Although repeated attempts to negotiate an Anglo-American arbitration treaty failed in 
the 1880s and 1890s, arbitration played a decisive role in the ‘great rapprochement’ 
between Britain and the United States, even if the British mostly gave in to American 
demands for arbitration, notably during the Venezuelan boundary dispute of 1895/97.18 
The formation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the First Hague Peace 
Conference of 1899 marked a high point for the international arbitration movement and 
underlined the importance of legal expertise in the conduct of international relations.19 
For a distinct group of prominent American lawyers, serving with arbitration tribunals 
and commissions became a formative professional experience. Secretary of State Elihu 
Root was among them, as were Oscar Straus, future Secretary of Commerce, David 
Brewer, Justice of the Supreme Court and John Bassett Moore, legal scholar and former 
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Assistant Secretary of State. Robert Lansing made his professional reputation by 
appearing before arbitral tribunals.20  
It was this group of prominent former and future government officials and 
international lawyers who established the American Society for International Law 
(ASIL) at the 1905 Lake Mohonk conference. In 1907 the first issue of ASIL’s 
periodical, the American Journal of International Law (AJIL), was published. On its 
editorial board were Lansing, Straus and Moore but also Leo S. Rowe, director of the 
Pan-American Union. Under the managing editorship of James Brown Scott, the State 
Department’s solicitor for arbitration matters between 1906 and 1911 and author of the 
first American casebook on international law, AJIL swiftly became the most prominent 
English-language periodical in the field of international relations before 1914 and was 
highly regarded among non-lawyers, too. It also provided a vibrant forum for an 
emerging paradigm in Anglo-American international law, international legal 
positivism.21 
Since the late 19th century, American legal scholars in particular had been taking 
issue with the dominant paradigm in Anglo-American jurisprudence, John Austin’s 
command theory, which defined law as a command issued by a sovereign. According to 
Austinian logic, international law did not pass the litmus test of ‘real law’ because a 
superior authority able to impose sanctions on sovereign states did not exist. Austin 
merely conceded the existence of an international morality. This, however, was exactly 
what American international lawyers wanted to move away from. In a conscious 
attempt to leave behind their Grotian natural law heritage and to create a positivist 
science of public international law, the jurists who published in AJIL argued that the 
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facts of international life, namely that states did consent and adhere to treaties and 
agreements, proved that international law did exist. A positivist approach to 
international law had to be based on the actual, observable customs and formal 
conventions between states and eschew philosophical speculation.22  
A seminal article in AJIL by British jurist Lassa Oppenheim in 1908 gave this 
new paradigm a coherent programme which exhorted international lawyers to expose 
and critique the existing rules of law, conduct historical research, prepare codifications, 
maintain the distinction between the old customary and the new conventional law, 
promote arbitration and work for the public understanding of international law.23 Put 
into practice, Oppenheim’s suggestions necessitated a huge amount of research and 
publication activity which, only a few years later, the Carnegie Endowment’s 
International Law Division would embark on by publishing, for example, a series of 
classics in international law.  
But international legal positivism still faced the contention from Austinian 
orthodoxy that international law was not enforceable and therefore not law. Legal 
positivists fought back by proclaiming the centrality of public opinion as a sanction. 
James Brown Scott argued that Austin defined sanctions too narrowly as physical 
compulsion. Nicholas Murray Butler, a political scientist and president of Columbia 
University, proposed that public opinion was the only effective sanction. Elihu Root 
supported this view and claimed that the risk of being ostracised from the international 
community served as an effective sanction due to the growing interdependence among 
nations.24 These arguments tapped into common tropes of contemporary bourgeois 
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internationalism, notably the conflation of ‘nation’ and ‘state’, and turned the 
international legal positivists into natural allies of those who campaigned for increased 
international cooperation. International law was seen as yet another area where a 
functioning framework of cooperation would benefit the constituent members to such a 
degree that exclusion from the network constituted a tangible penalty and acted as 
deterrent.25 
American international lawyers and their intellectual allies thus became part of a 
wider, transatlantic movement of legalistic internationalism and started to cultivate 
contacts with like-minded Europeans. James Brown Scott, for instance, became an 
associate of the Institut de droit international (IDI), a European-dominated association 
of savants and legal practitioners, in 1908 (full member in 1910) and even assumed its 
presidency between 1925 and 1929.26 In 1912, the IDI agreed to act as an advisory body 
to the Carnegie Endowment’s International Law Division.27 Nicholas Murray Butler 
forged a deep friendship with the French aristocrat, former diplomat and 
parliamentarian Paul Henri d’Estournelles de Constant. Butler and d’Estournelles de 
Constant first met during the first Hague Peace Conference which  converted the latter 
to the cause of internationalism. Like Butler, d’Estournelles de Constant was a polity 
internationalist rather than a social reformer, even though he supported good 
governance as means of keeping international socialism at bay. He was close to the 
French legalist-internationalist peace organisation Association pour la paix par le 
droit.28 His own internationalist society Conciliation Internationale, founded in 1905, 
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aimed at bringing together “eminent men of different nationalities” to create an 
internationalist public conscience by example, an endeavour which was similar to 
Butler’s aim of fostering a world public opinion.29 Butler referred to this project as 
creating an “international mind”, which he defined as “that habit of thinking of foreign 
relations and business, and that habit of dealing with them, which regard the several 
nations of the civilized world as friendly and co-operating equals in aiding the progress 
of civilization, in developing commerce and industry and in spreading enlightenment 
and culture throughout the world”.30 
D’Estournelles de Constant regarded the United States’ society and political 
system as a model for Europe and was particularly keen on winning the support of 
Americans of suitable social standing for his organisation.31 Butler’s contacts enabled 
d’Estournelles de Constant to enlist the likes of Andrew D. White, Elihu Root, Oscar S. 
Straus, John Hay, and Andrew Carnegie for the American branch of Conciliation 
Internationale, the American Association for International Conciliation. By 1906, the 
American members outnumbered all but the French in the organisation as a whole. 
Carnegie’s generous gifts financed the American branch as well as some of Conciliation 
Internationale’s work, and this support was continued by the Carnegie Endowment 
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once it was established in 1910.32 Conciliation Internationale’s motto, pro patria per 
orbis concordiam, would become, in slightly altered form, that of the Endowment. 
The timing of Conciliation Internationale’s founding is not insignificant. In 
1905, another voluntary association designed to foster goodwill and international 
harmony was created: the Rotary Club. As Rotary International, the organisation 
exported the ‘service ethic’ of American small-town businessmen to Europe, where it 
was re-appropriated to suit local conditions. Like Conciliation Internationale, Rotary 
International claimed non-partisanship but promoted a certain kind of sociability.33 Its 
expansion into Europe serves as a reminder that social models with the purported aim of 
encouraging international friendship crossed the Atlantic in both directions. If Rotary’s 
weekly lunches originally served small businessmen to bond and forge valuable 
contacts, Conciliation Internationale’s sumptuous society dinners, by far its most 
successful activity, enabled social and political elites to profess their love for peace and 
thereby assert moral leadership in a socially exclusive setting.34 The model of the elite 
peace society thus had its origin in aristo-bourgeois European social mores and was 
successfully introduced across the Atlantic. At the same time, d’Estournelles de 
Constant and Conciliation Internationale were pioneers of transatlantic fundraising. 
Even if they exported their sociability to the New World, European 
internationalists in general acknowledged American leadership in other areas, notably 
international law.35 Lassa Oppenheim himself noted “that America is able to foster the 
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science of international law without being dependent upon the assistance of foreign 
contributors” and that “just as the body of rules which is called “international law” 
shows everywhere the traces of American influence, so the science of international law 
will likewise soon receive new stimuli from America”.36 Indeed, between 1898 and 
1922 the American government championed international law and it was the first to 
refer a dispute to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. As Francis Anthony 
Boyle has argued, a legalistic approach to international affairs and a growing acceptance 
of international law among European states suited traditional U.S. foreign policy aims 
towards Europe which called for isolation in peace and neutrality in war. With the 
emergence of the United States as an imperial power after the Spanish-American war, 
the demands of U.S. foreign policy-making became more complex and provided the 
international lawyers and lawyer-diplomats with an important role in the conduct of 
American foreign relations.37 
This group’s expertise (as demonstrated in the pages of ASIL), its good 
connections to the State Department and its links to philanthropists won its members 
posts and influence in established peace groups such as the American Peace Society.38 
As a group, the lawyers who reinvigorated but also reorganised the American peace 
movement in the early 20th century were conservatives within the broad church that was 
American Progressivism. Like their European counterparts, with whom they maintained 
a number of links, for example through organisations such as the IDI and Conciliation 
Internationale, they rejected radical demands for social reform and supported certain 
liberal ideas which were the heritage of fin-de-siècle bourgeois internationalism, such as 
the promotion of international commerce and a generally positive view on an 
enlightened public opinion.  
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American legalist internationalists had been attracted to peace advocacy, 
previously dominated by provincial and genteel reformers, for several reasons. First, 
international lawyers furthered the standing of their own profession through the peace 
movement. Anti-imperialism, which had briefly caused rifts within peace groups at the 
turn of the century, ceased to be an issue by 1905, so that the movement could 
comfortably accommodate Root, the architect of the American colonial administration 
in the Philippines, and others who had campaigned for expansionism in Hawaii and the 
Caribbean.39 By identifying their own professional concerns with the aims of the peace 
movement, international lawyers in particular were able to pose as reformers while still 
promoting respect for judicial authority and the law. Finally, as judicial supremacy at 
home was targeted by Progressive critics, the lawyers promoted not just arbitration but a 
rule-bound international court as the solution to the problem of international disorder 
and war. Peace activism represented a safe and respectable cause to those who disdained 
Progressivism’s more radical demands at home. At the same time it enabled them to 
profess a sensitivity to the Progressive desire for order and efficiency by championing 
the establishment of stability and the rule of law abroad.40  
 
Origins of Philanthropic Internationalism I: the Carnegie Endowment 
Andrew Carnegie also fits the pattern of the conservative internationalist. Having 
amassed a fortune in steel, Carnegie was an intensely public figure and frequently made 
the headlines with his opinions on a variety of subjects. ‘Merry Andrew’, as he was 
called, was something of a national treasure.41 But Carnegie also became a ‘transatlantic 
liberal’ during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Spending much of his 
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time in Britain, he cultivated friendships with British politicians, notably Gladstone, and 
donated substantial amounts of money to the Liberal Party.42 On both sides of the 
Atlantic, Carnegie pestered politicians with a constant stream of letters and proposals 
regarding international affairs. His main interest was arbitration but he was also an 
ardent supporter of Anglo-American federation and even proposed the establishment of 
a League of Peace in 1905.43 Carnegie supported U.S. expansionism in the Caribbean—
unremarkable among American internationalists who generally saw American power 
abroad as a force for peace. He also believed in the importance of personal relations 
between national leaders and unsuccessfully tried to persuade Theodore Roosevelt to 
discuss the League of Peace plan with the German kaiser. As David Nasaw has argued, 
Carnegie, who happened to be a large donor to the Republican Party, was probably 
responsible for President Taft’s spending so much time on proposals for arbitration. 
Theodore Roosevelt was not so easily bullied, and he once remarked that Carnegie 
would have done much better to have spent his millions on his steelworkers instead of 
on peace societies and laughable attempts at personal diplomacy.44  
There was indeed a dark side to Carnegie’s conduct as a captain of industry, 
evidenced by the violently suppressed Homestead strike of 1892. Nevertheless, 
Carnegie, a staunch defender of big business and opponent of social reform, was 
lionized by the Progressive Herbert Croly.45 Despite the obvious differences between 
Progressives who sought to tackle the social problems caused by the Unites States’ 
industrialisation in the second half of the19th century and men like Carnegie and John D. 
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Rockefeller who had profited tremendously from the very same process, a certain 
affinity between progressivism and the creators of scientific philanthropy existed. Both 
agreed that governments needed help with the task of ordering a rapidly changing and 
often chaotic society. Here wealthy citizens had a special responsibility. Both were 
equally obsessed with social control, and both optimistically believed that social 
betterment was possible if education were given an appropriately important role.46 
Carnegie is often credited with formulating the tenets of ‘scientific philanthropy’ 
in his famous essay “Wealth”.47 Published originally in the North American Review in 
1889, it was re-titled “The Gospel of Wealth” and printed in the British Pall Mall 
Gazette.48 It was under this title that Carnegie’s appeal to the rich to dispose of their 
money during their lifetime received widespread attention.49 Judith Sealander, an 
historian of early 20th century American foundations, defines ‘scientific philanthropy’ as 
philanthropy exercised by organisations structured in a particular way, for a specific 
purpose. Institutionally, ‘scientific philanthropy’ resulted in the creation of large 
foundations, organised and led like business organisations by a professional staff who 
were overseen by a small number of trustees.50 With regard to its purpose, it 
distinguished itself from other charitable activity through its ambition to pursue ‘big 
ideas’ and, ultimately, to shape public policy.51 Nevertheless, according to Sealander, 
scientific giving remained the exception, not the rule. “Only six creators of foundations 
established institutions with broader purpose and more sophisticated, policy-shaping 
goals: Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller Sr., John D. Rockefeller Jr., Edward 
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Harkness, Olivia Sage, and Julius Rosenwald.”52 The foundations set up by the 
Rockefellers, Andrew Carnegie and the Harkness family also engaged in a significant 
amount of activities overseas.53 Charitable giving in the United States had frequently 
crossed national boundaries ever since the early Republic, with the first example of 
widespread and systematic support of an overseas cause being the American aid to the 
Greek freedom struggle in the 1820s.54 However, the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace was the first philanthropic foundation with an explicitly 
international mission and also the first to establish a branch office on non-American 
soil.55 
Despite Carnegie’s role in formulating a new, ‘wholesale’ approach to 
philanthropy, during his lifetime many of his foundations engaged in more traditional 
charity projects, for example the building of libraries and church organs or the provision 
of pensions for college professors.56 However, one Carnegie foundation clearly 
represented a ‘wholesale’ philanthropic project: the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. Founded with an endowment of $10 million in December 1910, its 
explicit goal was the elimination of warfare and its activities had little to do with 
traditional charity.57 The idea for a foundation that would systematise his giving in the 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 12. 
53 The widow of Stephen Harkness established the Commonwealth Fund which sponsored mostly child 
health and educational programmes. Edward Harkness, her son, founded the Pilgrim Trust which mainly 
supported educational activities in Britain. Nielsen, Big Foundations, 254-262; Curti, American 
Philanthropy, 310-312; for a survey of the occasional overseas activities of other American foundations 
see American National Committee on International Intellectual Cooperation, ed., The Study of 
International Relations in the United States: Survey for 1937 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1937), 26-29. 
54 Curti, American Philanthropy, chapter 2. 
55 Berghahn, “Philanthropy and Diplomacy”: 397. 
56 Sealander, Private Wealth, 18; for a list of philanthropic foundations created by Andrew Carnegie see 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, A Manual of the Public Benefactions of Andrew Carnegie 
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1919). Even though Sealander’s 
criticism of the lack of public policy-changing potential of most of Carnegie’s philanthropic creations is 
well founded, at least until the steel magnate’s death in 1919, it must be said that not even the Rockefeller 
Foundation always adhered to the tenets of ‘scientific giving’, often due to founder intervention. 
57 Sealander, “Curing Evils at their Source”, 225. 
  59
cause of peace was first suggested to Carnegie by Nicholas Murray Butler, who himself 
became a leading figure in Carnegie’s new philanthropic organisation.58 
As the leaders of his peace foundation, Carnegie chose the legal internationalists 
who had assumed the guidance of the American peace movement at the time. Elihu 
Root became president of the Endowment, and Nicholas Murray Butler and James 
Brown Scott assumed key roles. The Endowment’s trustees were selected from the 
group of Carnegie’s influential and prominent conservative friends, sidelining 
established peace activists.59 This was a heavy blow to other peace advocates as 
Carnegie had supported the movement on both sides of the Atlantic with substantial 
financial contributions to peace societies, peace journals and ambitious ad-hoc projects 
like the ‘Peace Palace’ at The Hague. Since the 1880s, the steel tycoon had given 
$50,000 annually to peace-related causes.60  
The Endowment pursued a two-fold strategy in its early years, dividing its 
resources between research and public education. It consisted of three divisions: John 
Bates Clark led the Division of Economics and History, concerned with researching the 
causes and effects of war; James Brown Scott, who also served as the Endowment’s 
Secretary-General, was in charge of the Division of International Law which published 
monographs, supported scholarly law journals, funded lectureships in international law 
and also paid John Bassett Moore’s salary for collecting all known arbitrations for the 
State Department; Nicholas Murray Butler directed the Division of Intercourse and 
Education, the Endowment’s propaganda arm.61 The two research divisions were at the 
heart of the Carnegie Endowment’s function as a ‘scientific’ foundation. The 
educational arm of the Endowment circulated peace-oriented publicity and set out to 
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“cultivate friendly feelings” as well as “knowledge and understanding” between 
eminent men from different countries, continuing the project that had been introduced to 
the United States by Baron d’Estournelles de Constant and Conciliation Internationale. 
Butler’s division also subsidised other agencies that furthered the Endowment’s general 
mission.62  
Geographically, the Endowment did not limit itself to the United States and 
Europe. On the contrary, from its very inception, it sought to establish links with Latin 
America and Asia.63 These efforts often took the form of sending “representative” 
American men on unofficial missions to distant places.64 But the Endowment also 
employed a Japanese “special correspondent”, the lawyer Tsunejiro Miyaoka. His 
reports to the Carnegie Endowment’s trustees were published, and in one he argued for 
an abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in favour of closer American-Japanese 
relations. In the same treatise, Miyaoka also subtly put the finger on the implicit racism 
of contemporary movements for international understanding, several years before the 
issue came to the fore in international politics when Japanese attempts to include a 
clause on racial equality in the League of Nations Covenant were rejected: “The 
internationalism which is deeper than the fraternization of different political units of 
affiliated races is the real internationalism.”65 
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Carnegie requested that the Endowment’s Executive Committee continue some 
of his donations to the peace movement, with the American Peace Society and the 
American section of the Interparliamentary Union being the larger ones. In Europe, 
Carnegie asked for the German-language journal Die Friedenswarte as well as several 
British peace societies to be supported.66 The Trustees honoured Carnegie’s request 
initially but were uneasy with some of the more outspoken peace activists he had 
championed.67 After a few years, they cut off many of the traditional peace societies, a 
move that seems to have displeased Carnegie to such an extent that he founded another 
peace foundation, the Church Peace Union, none of whose officers belonged to the 
Endowment.68  
Historians of the American peace movement have not seen the Carnegie 
Endowment in a very positive light: it diverted funds from more progressive activists, 
promoted a very cautious approach to the problem of world peace and weakened older 
societies.69 The largest of those, the American Peace Society, became financially 
dependent on the Endowment. Its leadership was increasingly dominated by legal 
internationalists.70 The establishment of a $10 million peace fund also suggested to 
potential donors to the movement that other causes were in more need of financial 
support and consequently contributions to peace societies decreased.71  
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The Endowment’s involvement with the peace movement in Europe was equally 
problematic. In 1912, the foundation had established a European office in Paris under 
the directorship of d’Estournelles de Constant, the Centre européen de la dotation 
Carnegie pour la paix internationale, commonly referred to as Dotation Carnegie.72 
The French press had hailed this venture as “une œuvre moderne”, a sober and 
enlightened venture and not one of the many eccentricities of a famous American 
billionaire.73 But the Dotation hardly engaged in any activity itself before the war as the 
Carnegie Endowment relied on the Bureau international de la paix in Berne, an 
umbrella organisation for the national peace societies of Europe, to distribute grants to 
European groups. The collaboration with the Berne Bureau, however, broke down 
quickly since the Endowment, as in the United States, preferred to support only the 
most conservative groups such as the German Verband für Internationale 
Verständigung.74 This divided rather than united the European internationalist 
movement. Once the First World War started, the Endowment swiftly pulled out of 
most of its European commitments, which left its former beneficiaries in a financially 
precarious state.75 
The Great War brought lingering tensions within the American peace movement 
to the fore. In 1915, the movement split into liberal-left internationalism and 
conservative internationalism. The liberal-left internationalists aimed to obtain a 
negotiated settlement between the belligerents, and linked social justice at home to 
peace abroad, while the conservative internationalists, including the Endowment, were 
clear about their desire for an Allied victory. They also advocated a post-war 
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international organisation based on international law, and criticized Wilsonian plans for 
a League of Nations.76 Once the United States entered the war, the Carnegie 
Endowment threw its full weight behind the American war effort. In 1919, the 
Endowment made clear that it had finally washed its hands of the peace movement:  
Its attitude in the war has drawn a sharp line between the Endowment and a very 
considerable group of citizens, commonly called pacifists, with whom it was 
formerly in active cooperation, and most of whom have loyally followed its 
example and supported the government in all its undertakings. … In some other 
cases their attitude was such as to make the word “pacifism” a synonym for 
disloyalty.77 
 
With the death of Andrew Carnegie in 1919, the trustees also felt no longer obliged to 
support the former beneficiaries of Carnegie’s generosity. After the war, the 
Endowment, especially Nicholas Murray Butler’s division which had been in charge of 
liaising with peace societies, was in search of a new strategy and a coherent policy in 
Europe. It took until the mid-1920s for the Dotation to acquire a new, more ‘scientific’ 
profile but the Endowment’s other two divisions launched pioneering approaches to the 
study of international relations from the early 1920s. Meanwhile, other organisations, 
mostly those founded by another philanthropist, John D. Rockefeller, entered the 
European field, and established large-scale programmes first in the medical and natural 
sciences, and then also in the social sciences. 
 
Origins of Philanthropic Internationalism II: the Rockefeller philanthropies 
The story of the Rockefeller Foundation and its smaller sister-organisations is well 
known.78 John D. Rockefeller, Sr., a still more successful industrialist than Andrew 
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Carnegie, was a reserved and religious man who, even while he was not particularly 
wealthy, had given a fixed part of his income to charity.79 Contrary to his fellow 
philanthropists, he had never become the figurehead of any reform cause; in fact, in the 
1910s, during the heyday of the conservative peace movement, Rockefeller was the only 
member of New York City’s philanthropic elite who did not belong to the New York 
Peace Society.80 Under the influence of a Baptist preacher, Reverend Frederick T. 
Gates, Rockefeller engaged in systematic charitable giving. Rockefeller’s first large-
scale gift went to the University of Chicago and from the early 1900s, the philanthropist 
founded institutions bearing his own name. The first was the Rockefeller Institute for 
Medical Research in 1901; the General Education Board followed in 1903, and was 
succeeded in 1909 by the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission which aimed to eradicate 
ankylostomiasis (hookworm disease) in the American South. It should be  noted, 
though, that Rockefeller relied heavily on the guidance of his son John D Rockefeller, 
Jr. and Gates with regards to his personal philanthropy. By 1921, “Senior”, as he was 
known within the family (his son was referred to as “Junior”), had ceased to make any 
significant philanthropic gifts.81  
Frederick Gates, who also managed the older Rockefeller’s personal assets, 
intended to promote Rockefeller philanthropy “in all lands” in order to advance 
civilisation. He had surveyed the state of American philanthropy and discovered that, 
while philanthropic activity had increased in the 1890s, little of it went abroad.82 An 
impact-making philanthropic foundation should, as Gates saw it, emulate foreign 
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missionaries who spread not just the Christian gospel but also science and technology, 
and so the first Rockefeller-funded projects abroad were in the fields of medicine and 
public health, covering Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia.83 Historians have 
observed that the early geographical focus of Rockefeller philanthropy overlapped with 
U.S. expansion in the Western Hemisphere, where the American military conducted 
several sanitary campaigns between the 1890s and the 1910s. Rockefeller campaigns in 
these areas also relied on personnel recruited from former military and colonial 
officials.84 Similar to those of the Carnegie Endowment, the Rockefeller activities 
dovetailed with American foreign policy objectives. 
The Rockefeller Foundation’s motto, “the Well-Being of Mankind Throughout 
the World”, reflected this new international orientation. However, during the first years 
of its existence, the relationship between the foundation, the Rockefeller family’s 
largest philanthropic project, and policy makers in Washington was fraught with the 
immense hostility that John D. Rockefeller, Sr.’s business activities aroused. 
Progressive muckrakers such as Ida Tarbell had fashioned an image of the older 
Rockefeller as the head of a ruthless corporate empire. Even after the dissolution of 
Standard Oil in 1911 his personal wealth only increased, much to the disgust of the 
American public. For three years after the older Rockefeller signed over 50 million 
dollars in Standard Oil securities to the nascent Rockefeller Foundation in 1910, the 
foundation petitioned Congress in vain for a federal charter; it failed because 
government endorsement of the Rockefellers was simply deemed too controversial in 
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times of violent labour unrest. In 1913 the New York State Legislature finally passed a 
bill granting the charter but the family and its philanthropies then came under fire 
during the investigations conducted by the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations 
between 1913 and 1915. The Ludlow massacre of 1914, a violently suppressed 
coalminers’ strike in Colorado which resulted in twenty fatalities, further damaged the 
Rockefeller name, as one of the mining companies involved was owned by the family. 
This was to be the high point of congressional and public opposition to Rockefeller 
philanthropy which John D. Rockefeller, Sr. mostly ignored but which had a profound 
impact on his son who made it his mission to improve the family’s reputation.85 
Eager to be perceived as a philanthropist in his own right, and spurred on by 
strong religious commitments, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. took the chance to assume the 
role of social reformer after serving as foreman of a Special Grand Jury on prostitution 
in New York City in 1910. The ‘White Slave’ traffic was an archetypal social concern 
of the Progressive Age, symbolising Americans’ anxieties about the transformation of 
their society. The younger Rockefeller developed a personal interest in the jury’s 
deliberations and supplemented its budget. At the end of the investigations, he 
channelled his reformist zeal into a new philanthropic project, the Bureau of Social 
Hygiene, whose work in sex education and sex research was groundbreaking at the 
time. John D. Rockefeller, Jr. was convinced that ignorance and a lack of available 
knowledge lay at the root of most social ills. The Bureau of Social Hygiene’s matter-of-
fact reports set a model for the production of policy-relevant scientific expertise. 
Impressed with this novel approach, the Carnegie Endowment copied the format.86 As a 
result of his work on the White Slave Grand Jury, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. met 
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Raymond Fosdick, New York City’s commissioner of accounts. This meeting was of 
huge significance for both of them. Fosdick would become the architect of Rockefeller 
internationalism and, finally, in 1936 president of the Rockefeller Foundation. John D. 
Rockefeller, Jr. had found a trusted personal advisor who would, for several decades, 
shape his and his family’s outlook on world politics.87 
Partisan politics separated the two men—Fosdick was a Democrat and a protégé 
of Woodrow Wilson, Rockefeller supported the Republicans. In contrast to the legal 
internationalists who around the same time rallied around Andrew Carnegie to become 
trustees of his peace endowment, Fosdick embraced Progressive social reform. A 
Princeton graduate from a modest background, Fosdick became involved with the social 
reformers of New York City’s Henry Street settlement where he lived and supervised 
two boys’ clubs. After finishing his law degree in 1908, Fosdick went into municipal 
administration. True Progressive that he was, he even created a “bureau of efficiency” 
as a subdivision of his own office.88 The Bureau of Social Hygiene hired him as an 
investigator in 1913 and posted him to Europe, where he compiled an influential report 
on European police systems.89 
This work brought him to the attention of Newton Baker, U.S. Secretary of War. 
In 1916 Fosdick was asked to undertake a survey of conditions in U.S. army training 
camps. He was then appointed Chairman of the wartime Commission on Training Camp 
Activities, a governmental clearinghouse that coordinated the efforts of various civilian 
agencies to make soldiers morally and physically fit for battle. Like so many other 
initiatives of the time, the Commission on Training Camp Activities redirected domestic 
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Progressive idealism towards the war effort.90 And, like other Progressive reformers, 
Fosdick turned his attention to international affairs. He eschewed the pacifism adopted 
by some of his former acquaintances in the settlement movement—after all, his wartime 
job was to produce more efficient soldiers—but, after a stint as Civilian Aide to General 
Pershing during the Paris Peace Conference, he joined the League of Nations as an 
Under-Secretary-General at Woodrow Wilson’s request. After this appointment ended 
in 1920, when it was clear that the United States would not join the League, Fosdick 
returned once more to New York to open a law practice. As John D. Rockefeller, Jr.’s 
personal lawyer, Fosdick also served on the executive committees and boards of trustees 
of all important Rockefeller philanthropies.91 
 
The architecture of both the Rockefeller and the Carnegie foundations owed much to the 
Progressive obsession with efficiency and expert politics. Both Andrew Carnegie and 
John D. Rockefeller, Jr. selectively affiliated with Progressive reform movements. 
While Carnegie popularised the principles of scientific giving, the Rockefeller 
philanthropies may have followed them more rigorously, inducing the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace to copy the Bureau of Social Hygiene’s methods. 
Conversely, by virtue of Andrew Carnegie’s links to the international arbitration 
movement, the Carnegie Endowment was ahead of the Rockefeller Foundation when it 
came to the creation of transnational networks. Both foundations, however, shared a 
global outlook, either due to the interest of the founder or of those in his immediate 
vicinity. The philanthropic activities of both organisations also supplemented official 
U.S. foreign policy, be it through the strengthening of international law or the 
epidemiological management of an American sphere of influence in the Pacific and the 
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Western hemisphere. Thus, certain traits of philanthropic internationalism had already 
become visible before 1917. The Great War changed the environment in which the 
foundations operated. At home, the American war effort co-opted most progressive 
reform energy. Internationally, the outcome of the conflict transformed the global 
balance of power and, due to the establishment of the League of Nations, the 
international system as such. But did the war fundamentally change the foundations’ 
outlook? 
 
World War I as a Turning Point for American Philanthropy Abroad? 
Ludovic Tournès has argued that the Great War constituted a turning point for 
American philanthropy as it changed attitudes towards Europe. European countries who 
used to be regarded as a model for the United States now became a field for reformist 
and reconstructive activity.92 But was the war really the defining moment when the 
progressive search for order became, in Warren Cohen’s words, “a search for world 
order”?93 Certainly, wartime experiences in the areas of relief work, war administration 
and peace making shaped the outlook of foundation employees and founders. Most 
importantly, the increased role of scientific expertise in the shaping of foreign policy 
was impressed on philanthropic leaders. Nevertheless, continuities in the way American 
foundations conceptualised the United States’ role in the world should not be 
overlooked. Ideas that had been prominent before the war did not vanish in its aftermath 
and neither did the transatlantic networks in which they circulated. 
Historians of social reform movements have seen the Great War as the 
beginning of the end of unchallenged European leadership in setting the social policy 
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agenda in the industrialised countries of the North Atlantic. Before, American 
progressives looked to Europe, without receiving much interest in return. After, 
transatlantic exchanges became less one-sided as Fordism and other symbols of the 
American “machine civilisation” travelled eastwards. The American relief workers who 
tested progressive models in town-planning, public health, and education on war-
devastated French civilians were the harbingers of this role reversal.94 Shortly after 
hostilities commenced in 1914, U.S. civilians resident in Paris organised an ambulance 
service. Other American-led voluntary initiatives soon followed. Among these the 
Commission for the Relief of Belgium, which was organised by Herbert Hoover and 
enjoyed unofficial government recognition, remains the best-known. With the American 
entry into the war, the American Red Cross, representative of the U.S. government, 
proceeded to absorb and streamline these various private groups, with a high degree of 
success. In fact, it used the organisational structure of the private American Relief 
Clearing House as a blueprint for its own operation. Consolidation under the Red Cross 
also marked the introduction of large-scale, streamlined and business practices into 
overseas relief operations.95  
Even personal philanthropy became more coordinated. During the war, John D. 
Rockefeller, Jr. orchestrated the United War Work Campaign, an interdenominational 
effort that raised over $170 million. This experience of cooperation across national, 
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religious and social lines further impressed on the young Rockefeller the importance of 
mutual understanding and shaped his ‘personalist’ approach to international relations.96 
The Rockefeller Foundation created its own War Relief Commission and provided over 
$19 million to humanitarian and war-related initiatives between 1914 and 1918. Its first 
large donation, almost one million dollars, benefited Belgian war relief, but more than 
eight million dollars went to the Red Cross in the course of the war. Other major 
beneficiaries included the younger Rockefeller’s United War Work Fund, the YMCA, a 
war demonstration hospital and the Commission on Training Camp Activities, 
Fosdick’s wartime employer.97 Complementing Fosdick’s mission, the foundation 
collaborated with the American Social Hygiene Association in order to prevent soldiers 
from succumbing to the usual dangers that came with duty in foreign lands—alcoholism 
and sexually transmitted diseases.98  
In a further step towards direct involvement in Europe, the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s War Relief Commission decided in 1915 that its future relief efforts 
would best be administered by “agents on the spot”.99 Thus, the war also set a precedent 
for dealing with European governments. For instance, prior to its work in German-
occupied Russian Poland, the Rockefeller Foundation negotiated an understanding with 
the German Ministry of External Affairs through the American ambassador.100 A new 
Rockefeller philanthropy, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, also engaged in 
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relief work similar to that of the Rockefeller Foundation.101 The Memorial had been 
established in 1918 in memory of John D. Rockefeller, Sr.’s late wife and had a capital 
endowment of $79 million. Early on, it aided social welfare and religious organisations, 
but from the 1920s it became active in the social sciences and shaped Rockefeller 
approaches to the study of international relations. 
Public health remained a concern for the Rockefeller Foundation as it expanded 
its programmes in Europe from 1917. The foundation’s anti-tuberculosis campaign in 
France was the first European project and was succeeded by several public health 
programmes in Central Europe.102 It is important to note here that other foundations also 
entered the public health field in Europe in the early 1920s as an indirect result of their 
war relief work. The Commonwealth Fund became involved in Austria through its 
appropriations to the American Relief Administration and, once the Administration 
pulled out, built up a comprehensive child health programme in several Austrian cities 
and districts in the course of the 1920s.103 Special programmes for the professional 
middle classes were a common feature of philanthropic war relief operations in Central 
Europe, showing a particular concern for what American relief organisations hoped 
would become the managerial elites of the new democracies in this part of Europe.104 
The Carnegie Endowment’s position was rather different. Because of its remit—
it did not deal with ‘uncontroversial’ projects like medicine or public health—it 
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prescribed itself a conspicuously neutral stance from August 1914. Most of its grants to 
European peace groups were discontinued and the Dotation Carnegie went into 
hibernation: until the war’s end Carnegie employees in Paris spent their time tending to 
the Dotation’s library.105 Although many of the Endowment’s trustees were privately 
pro-Ally, they concentrated on Pan-American relations and educational activities in the 
United States during the early phase of the war.106 James Brown Scott, head of the 
Endowment’s Division of International Law, was the biggest supporter of Pan-
Americanism within the foundation. Together with the Chilean lawyer Alejandro 
Álvarez and the Argentinean Ernesto Quesada, Scott proposed the creation of a Pan 
American Intellectual Union at the Second Pan American Scientific Congress of 1916, a 
gathering which had also received a subvention of $25,000 from the Carnegie 
Endowment.107 At the same congress, Scott also led the first session of the American 
Institute of International Law, a federation of the Western hemisphere’s national 
societies which promoted a regional, specifically Pan-American conception of 
international law.108 Álvarez popularised this attempt to fuse the Anglo-Saxon and the 
Continental legal traditions prevalent in the Americas and to construct an “American 
public law” in a series of Endowment-sponsored lectures at American universities.109 
But with the United States’ entry into the war, the Endowment turned its attention back 
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to Europe. In 1918 it donated $550,000 to relief efforts, a sum that made up almost half 
of its annual budget.110  
While the Carnegie Endowment was not able to contribute as much financially 
as the Rockefeller philanthropies, once the United States entered the conflict, its leaders 
saw it as their civic responsibility to rouse fellow Americans to their wartime duties. 
Nicholas Murray Butler strongly criticised people in public life who had uttered anti-
war statements. In July 1917 he also made a distinction between “true internationalism” 
and “false internationalism”. False internationalism was supranational in nature and “lay 
stress upon a world-wide community without national ties or national ambitions”. True 
internationalism, on the other hand, strengthened “nationalistic and patriotic sentiments 
and aims … in a larger human undertaking of which each nation should be an 
independent and integral part”.111  
John D. Rockefeller, Jr. equally nimbly bridged the gap between international 
understanding and patriotism. In a 1918 speech entitled “Brotherhood of Men and 
Nations”, Rockefeller praised the Allied cause and denounced the “barbarous 
principles” of the Germans. Only after a German defeat would brotherhood be extended 
to all nations: “We shall have reason to feel that the hundreds of thousands of brave 
men who have laid down their lives could not have made the supreme sacrifice for any 
cause which will contribute more largely to the maintenance of universal peace, the 
contentment of humanity and the well-being of mankind throughout the world.”112 
Ending the speech with the Rockefeller Foundation’s slogan, Rockefeller also 
confirmed that his philanthropic work was part and parcel of an emerging 
internationalist conscience that was reinforced by religious conviction. 
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The Endowment did not limit its assistance to speeches and humanitarian aid. 
During the war, the Division of International Law offered its services to the State 
Department and compiled studies in preparation for the Paris Peace Conference. James 
Brown Scott was given leave so that he could join the American delegation at the 
conference. Other Endowment staff members, George A. Finch and James T. Shotwell, 
who was also a member of the Inquiry, followed Scott to Paris.113 Employees of the 
Rockefeller foundations assumed important roles in the war administration at home and 
abroad. Examples include Fosdick and Arthur Woods, both members of the Laura 
Spelman Rockefeller Memorial’s Executive Board. Woods, well-connected and related 
to the Morgan banking dynasty, started out as Colonel in the War Department’s 
Division of Military Aeronautics and from 1919 served as assistant to Secretary of War 
Newton Baker.114 But foundation staff also collected experiences with the semi-official 
agencies that became so prominent during the war. Tracy B. Kittredge, the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s Assistant Director of the Social Sciences Division in the 1930s, worked 
for Hoover’s Relief Commission in Belgium. In 1920 he continued his career at the 
League of Red Cross Societies where he eventually assumed the post of Secretary-
General.115 Thus many foundation employees served their country either as expert 
advisors, regular military personnel or in a semi-official capacity.  
Those who went to the Paris Peace Conference were also present at the creation 
of new institutions that would shape interwar theorising on international relations, 
namely the international affairs institutes, prototypes of the foreign policy think tank. 
The Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
emerged from the meetings of the Anglo-American experts in Paris and rose to 
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prominence during the 1920s. Both attracted foundation funding in the interwar 
years.116  
The Institute of Politics in Williamstown, a similar but less well-known venue, 
started to offer a summer academy in 1921 and became an influential model within the 
United States and abroad. Like the Council on Foreign Relations, it served as something 
of a follow-up organisation for the experts who had been recruited in the course of 
government preparation for the Paris Peace Conference.117 Williamstown, as it was 
known, enjoyed the financial support of John D. Rockefeller, Jr. and the Carnegie 
Corporation. Archibald Cary Coolidge of the Council on Foreign Relations, James 
Brown Scott, and a few more Ivy League professors in history, political science and law 
sat on the original board of advisors and were later joined by the director-general of the 
Pan-American Union Leo S. Rowe, the reparations expert and later trustee of the 
Rockefeller Foundation Owen D. Young, and public intellectual Walter Lippmann. The 
summer conferences were open to academics and businessmen—the two largest 
contingents at the sessions—but also to journalists, diplomats and military personnel. 
Williamstown acted as an important transatlantic meeting-place and its list of speakers 
and guests reads like a roll-call of European internationalism. Paul Mantoux, William 
Rappard, Count Carlo Sforza, Nicolas Politis, Walter Simons, Moritz Julius Bonn, 
André Siegfried, Count Pál Teleki, Graham Wallas, and Arnold Toynbee all gave 
lectures or led round table discussions at the institute between 1921 and 1929.118 
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Considering the wartime roles of philanthropic leaders, it is clear that their 
experiences brought them into closer contact with foreign policy makers than was 
hitherto the case. Especially those involved in the peacemaking process realised to what 
extent government was willing to rely on outside expertise.119 Finally, philanthropic 
leaders now increasingly emphasised that the fulfilment of American foreign policy 
objectives was a prerequisite to universalist aims such as world peace. Patriotic duty 
had to come before internationalist duty—or, as John D. Rockefeller, Jr. insisted, there 
were cases “where Brotherhood must halt until Right Prevails”.120 But then, the idea 
that the United States was a champion of right, a promoter of international law and a 
model for other nations was nothing new in 1918. 
Nicholas Murray Butler said as much in 1914 when he concluded that the war 
had only confirmed the United States’ “right to be appealed to on questions of national 
and international morality”.121 In the same interview, Butler suggested that Europe 
adopt the American principle of federation.122 After the war, Butler’s suggestions, 
which also linked up with Álvarez’s ideas for an international order organised through 
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regional or hemispheric legal regimes, were taken up by some Europeans active in the 
Pan-European movement.123 In 1913, Paul S. Reinsch voiced similar sentiments when 
he advised Europeans to study the American political system “for the lessons it contains 
in regard to the possibility of organizing world-wide interests upon a basis of co-
operation and a recourse to law”. To convince Europeans of the rightfulness of 
American plans for international life was, Reinsch claimed, the United States’ “national 
destiny”.124 American efforts to transplant their national experiences to nascent 
international institutions date back to the 1899 Hague Conference when the U.S. 
delegation proposed the establishment of a permanent court of arbitration along the 
lines of the Supreme Court.125 Efforts to promote international law did not cease after 
1919. While many legal internationalists, those within the Endowment among them, did 
not back the League of Nations, support for an American affiliation to the Permanent 
Court of International Justice remained strong. Elihu Root even led the American 
delegation to the Advisory Committee of Jurists which planned the Court at The Hague 
in 1920.126  
Americans did not need the wartime experience to justify their desire to 
transform Europe in the United States’ image. The Carnegie Endowment’s European 
office had been established in 1912 with the explicit aim of reorganising European 
internationalism in order to make it more efficient. Major Carnegie endeavours in the 
interwar years, the Endowment-sponsored Social and Economic History of the World 
War and the Academy of International Law at The Hague, were outcomes of initiatives 
                                                 
123 Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, with an introduction by Nicholas Murray Butler (New 
York: Knopf, 1926), 10; see also Nicholas Murray Butler (Cosmos), The Basis of a Durable Peace (New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1917), 109. 
124 Paul S. Reinsch, “American Love of Peace and European Skepticism”, International Conciliation, no. 
68 (1913): 8, 14. 
125 Boyle, Foundations of World Order, 27. 
126 Kuehl and Dunn, Keeping the Covenant, 57-59. 
  79
that the war had prevented from blossoming.127 Thus the war certainly did not mark the 
beginning of an American philanthropic presence across the Atlantic. Attitudes towards 
Europe did not undergo such a dramatic change either. Raymond Fosdick, who had 
lauded European police systems and denigrated the American counterpart before the 
war, still suffered from a cultural inferiority complex well into the 1920s. Quoting 
André Siegfried, a French observer of American civilisation, Fosdick diagnosed a 
worrying level of intellectual, cultural and artistic impoverishment in his homeland 
which constituted a “cultural lag”. In spite of his critical comments about the United 
States, Siegfried repeatedly benefited from the largesse of American foundations in the 
interwar years.128  
 
Philanthropic Internationalism after the Great War 
But despite the continuities, which are more apparent when taking into account not just 
the Rockefeller Foundation but other philanthropies as well, World War I was a 
defining moment in the development of philanthropic internationalism, if only because 
it exposed the different stances of philanthropic leaders towards international 
organisation. Root and Butler of the Carnegie Endowment did not endorse Wilson’s 
League on the grounds of Article X, which, they thought, infringed too much on a 
state’s sovereignty. They still preferred a world court with public opinion as a sanction. 
In the mid-1920s, however, the Endowment changed its stance and became more 
supportive of the Geneva system.129 Fosdick, by comparison, was a clear supporter of 
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the League from its inception and never ceased to be one throughout his life. He 
convinced John D. Rockefeller, Jr. to lend financial support to internationalist groups, 
among them the League to Enforce Peace, an organisation about which Root, Scott and 
Butler were sceptical.130 From 1922, the Rockefeller Foundation also collaborated with 
the League of Nations in several areas, notably in international health. It is estimated 
that Rockefeller funding for the League’s health organisation alone amounted to circa 
$100.000 per year. Personal gifts from the Rockefeller family to the League and the 
International Labour Organisation complemented this work.131 
 Here it is necessary to comment briefly on the relationship between private and 
foundation philanthropy. As has been emphasised in the literature on ‘scientific 
philanthropy’, philanthropic foundations professionalised and thus transformed 
charitable giving. Nevertheless, the creators of foundations often maintained a 
significant level of private philanthropic activity. In the case of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., 
one can observe that he also professionalised his personal giving which was managed 
by a permanent “Advisory Committee”. Raymond Fosdick chaired this committee and 
some Advisory Committee staff members, for example Thomas B. Appleget, later 
worked for the Rockefeller Foundation. Fosdick had a remarkably free hand when it 
came to determining where exactly private Rockefeller gifts went. He frequently 
suggested donations to the younger Rockefeller who left his trusted adviser in charge of 
fleshing out the details.132 There were also cases in which private Rockefeller gifts were 
used to support projects that did not really fit the official programme of any of the 
Rockefeller philanthropies. If such a privately supported venture turned out to be a 
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success, a grant from one of the foundations often followed.133 Thus, private 
Rockefeller philanthropy fulfilled the function of a testing device in the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s set of tools for determining which organisations to support. Alternatively, 
it was used as a way of channelling funds to causes which foundation officers felt were 
worthwhile but outside the remit of their programmes. 
 Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that the Rockefellers had no input 
into their own personal philanthropic giving. Rather, personal and public philanthropy 
were intertwined. The younger Rockefeller and especially one of his sons, John D. 
Rockefeller III, cared deeply about European affairs and the League of Nations.134 
Occasionally, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. intervened in the running of his foundations, for 
example when he redirected some of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial’s funds 
towards evangelical Protestant churches in Belgium and France after the Great War.135 
These instances seem to have been rare, though. In the case of the Carnegie 
philanthropies, donor intervention was even less prevalent during the time period 
considered in this study, simply because Andrew Carnegie passed away in 1919. There 
is, however, evidence that his widow, Louise Carnegie, took an interest in the 
programmes of her husband’s foundations and had some influence.136 
One historian of Wilsonian internationalism has argued that the difference in 
allegiance between leading figures in the Carnegie Endowment and the Rockefeller 
Foundation was due to partisan political affiliations, and that later on in the 1920s, an 
“idealist synthesis” united internationalists across party lines.137 To some extent this is 
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true, especially when one considers the intense cooperation between the Rockefeller and 
Carnegie philanthropies that began in the 1930s. However, it should not be forgotten 
that the Endowment also contained the odd Democrat, for example James Brown Scott. 
What seemed to matter more was the predominance of international lawyers in the 
Carnegie organisation, who were simply more comfortable with a judicial rather than a 
political solution to war. Therefore, the Carnegie Endowment continued its support for 
international law after 1919. It was the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial which 
came up with a different approach to the problem of reforming international relations. 
Again, Raymond Fosdick played a decisive role. Although a lawyer himself, his 
approach to internationalism sidelined the legal internationalists and focused on the 
social sciences. This new orientation resulted directly from Fosdick’s wartime 
experience which had convinced him that, while humanity had the technological 
capacity for immense destruction, it lacked the social tools to deal with these scientific 
advances: “This divergence between the natural sciences and the social sciences, 
between machinery and control, between the kingdom of this world and the kingdom of 
the spirit—this is where the hazard lies.” In Fosdick’s opinion, modern life was 
adversely affected by an antiquated form of social organisation. This was where 
philanthropic internationalism could make a real contribution.138 Optimism about the 
applicability of social scientific knowledge and the potential for the scientific planning 
of societal developments was common in American academia at the time. The 1920s 
were boom years for the social sciences: for the first time, the general public became 
aware of some social science disciplines. Progressive prescriptions for efficiency were 
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still followed but they were now sought through the measure of social control by a 
small, well-informed elite.139 
To some extent these ideas linked up with suggestions contributed by European 
internationalists before the war. After all, it had been Léon Bourgeois who introduced 
the “technique of dealing with a political difficulty by a recital of an apparently 
incontrovertible socio-economic fact” into diplomatic practice at the 1899 Hague Peace 
Conference.140 Fin-de-siècle internationalists had also counted sociologists such as 
Émile Dürkheim among their ranks, and even the international lawyers who founded the 
IDI were amateur sociologists of sorts—many of them had participated in the reform-
oriented Association internationale pour le progrès de sciences sociales.141 In 1912, 
Walther Schücking and Theodore Ruyssen, both prominent international lawyers, had 
suggested that the Carnegie Endowment establish university chairs in international 
sociology and morality. These were to conduct sociological studies of international 
conflicts and international institutions and deliver a curriculum distinct from 
contemporary university teaching of international law.142 In the 1920s, the Dotation 
Carnegie also collaborated with the Institut des hautes études internationales of the 
University of Paris’s law faculty, an institution which sought to reform the discipline of 
international law, rid it of its “caractère sèchement juridique” and take into account the 
sociological realities of international life.143 While the Carnegie Endowment still 
advocated principally the development of international law as the most important 
contribution to world peace after the war, it also started to rely on the social sciences by 
commissioning a 120-volume Economic and Social History of the World War. This 
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represented an acknowledgment that social scientific knowledge would play a role in 
the development of peaceful international relations.144  
Nevertheless, it was the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial which formulated 
most clearly the relevance of the social sciences to international affairs. But the conflict 
between impartial expertise in international affairs and national loyalties that had 
already vexed pre-war internationalists lingered on in spite of the disciplinary and 
methodological break with the past. Beardsley Ruml, director of the Memorial from 
1922, developed a philanthropic programme which emphasised the training of social 
science experts. He hoped to foster “an internationally minded group of students of 
social problems” able to “view international society with a new objectivity”: “And as 
the results of their researches, and as their point of view becomes the intellectual 
property of greater numbers of men, there will have been created an important antidote 
for prejudice and irrationality in the relations among the people occupying the various 
political subdivisions of the world.”145 In Ruml’s imagination, the training of social 
science experts could provide what other efforts to bring about the ‘international mind’ 
had failed to do. Ruml also assumed that social science expertise would immediately 
lead to an absence of national prejudice. Fosdick seconded this claim in a pamphlet 
which he wrote for the League of Nations Association. International society and 
international conflicts were technically so sophisticated that they could only be handled 
by experts. In his view, nationality did not play a role in the way the experts working at 
the League approached problems.146 
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Such optimism was tempered by Abraham Flexner, a staff member of the 
Rockefeller-funded General Education Board, who wrote an influential memorandum 
for the Memorial. Flexner cautioned that knowledge was not enough, and had to be 
accompanied by political will. Experts without nationality did not seem appealing to 
him. “Every country must develop within itself broadminded and ultimately effective 
groups, not of pacifists or outsiders, but of its own loyal nationals, who will in 
appropriate ways educate public opinion, the press, industry, officialdom to see all sides 
of their own—and others’—current problems.” He went further: “Internationalism, in 
the sense in which it is embodied in the League, requires no one to purge himself of his 
own nationality.”147  
 
Throughout the interwar years, the foundations had to wrestle with the conflicting 
outlooks of those who followed Ruml and Fosdick and those who were more 
sympathetic to Flexner’s reasoning. Significantly, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller 
Memorial implemented a dual policy in the 1920s. It established national centres of 
research in the social sciences but also an institute for the study of international 
relations close to the League, the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes 
Internationales in Geneva. There were two objectives: first, new experts in the social 
sciences were to be trained, and second, the border-transcending collaboration of these 
experts should facilitate international understanding. The Rockefeller Foundation itself 
did not deal with the social sciences before 1929, as this was the domain of the 
Memorial. 
 The Carnegie Endowment represented essentially the product of a conservative 
response to Progressive demands and stayed true to its legalist heritage for much of the 
                                                                                                                                               
Organisation”, Contemporary European History 14, no. 4 (2005); see also William Glenn Gray, “What 
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147 Abraham Flexner, “Memorandum Regarding a Proposal to Establish at Geneva an Institute of 
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interwar period. Significantly, its International Law Division also co-founded and 
promoted an international institution for international studies: The Hague Academy of 
International Law. The Endowment’s Paris office was restructured in the mid-1920s and 
became an international educational centre. The Endowment’s Division for Intercourse 
and Education also increasingly emulated the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial in 
its support of national institutes, for example the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik. In 
the next chapter, the foundations’ efforts to create international centres for the study of 
international relations will be discussed, focussing on the three cities of The Hague, 
Paris and Geneva. 
 
A Note on Finances 
Bearing in mind that the chief impact of philanthropic foundations does not result from 
their grants, but from “connecting with and helping to organize key groups of leaders”, 
detailed financial accounting might not be the best approach to study philanthropic 
funding patterns.148 Nevertheless, a few general remarks are in order. First, the Carnegie 
Endowment was a much poorer foundation than the Rockefeller philanthropies, simply 
because it had a smaller endowment which had to last over a longer time period. (The 
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial spent almost all its capital in the course of its 
short existence.) Moreover, the Endowment spent much of its money on a few costly 
ventures, such as the Hague Academy and the Carnegie History.149 Its other grants in 
the field of international relations did not amount to more than a few thousand dollars at 
a time.  
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Rockefeller grants in that field, especially to institutions, were more substantial 
and those directed to International Studies Conference member institutions have been 
listed in the Appendix, with the proviso that the sums which were actually paid out were 
often less than the sums originally appropriated. This is due to the fact that grants were 
not always used in total and sometimes partly expired. Moreover, it should be noted that 
grants provided by the Foundation’s Paris office, which were generally in the region of 
a few thousand dollars, are not listed. It has been estimated that the Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial and the Foundation spent about $ 10 million in the field of the 
social sciences in Europe between 1924 and 1941, which is significantly less than the 
amounts given to the natural or medical sciences.150 As part of the social sciences 
programme, international relations received a fair share of the funds, especially if 
fellowships to individuals are also taken into account, even though it would be 
justifiable to say that much philanthropic expenditure in the social sciences in Europe 
was driven by international concerns. 
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2 
Foundations and the Internationalisation of International Studies 
 
“What Bayreuth is to music, The Hague to applied international law, Wall Street to 
international finance, Williamstown … is to discussions on international politics”, wrote 
Carlo Sforza from his French exile in 1927. However, according to the former Italian 
senator, the reason behind the summer school’s success was not the outcomes of the 
round table discussions (of which he was rather critical), nor the voluminous conference 
publications (which he found turgid), but the conciliatory atmosphere. To Sforza, the 
easy conviviality at Williamstown seemed most conducive to international 
understanding and put this refugee from fascism into an “euphorie morale”.1 Moral 
uplift had been the intention of Williamstown’s founder, Harry Augustus Garfield, for 
whom the annual sessions represented an opportunity to endow his small college town 
with cosmopolitan glamour and to show off his own comfortable lodgings. He also 
invited nationalities from both sides of the Great War on purpose. While the official aim 
of the Williamstown Institute of Politics was to promote the non-partisan discussion of 
international problems, the basic concept behind it resembled the founding idea of many 
similar ventures in the interwar years and aimed at fostering an international sociability 
and a community of values.2 
 Williamstown in particular had many admirers, among them Otto Hoetzsch, a 
specialist on Eastern Europe who taught at the University of Berlin and at the Deutsche 
Hochschule für Politik.3 The Williamstown model was also imitated in the United 
                                                 
1 “Ce que Bayreuth est à la musique, la Haye au droit international appliqué, Wall Street à la finance du 
monde, Williamstown … l’est aux discussions de politique internationale.” Carlo Sforza, “Williamstown: 
impressions américaines”, L’Esprit International, no. 4 (1927): 519, 524. 
2 Harry A. Garfield, Lost Visions (Boston: Thomas Todd, 1944), 5-7, 38-39. 
3 Otto Hoetzsch, “Außenpolitische Bildungsarbeit an den Universitäten Nordamerikas und Deutschlands”, 
in Außenpolitische Studien: Festgabe für Otto Köbner, ed. Wilhelm Arntz (Stuttgart: Ausland und 
Heimat, 1930), 7-10. 
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States.4 However, the Institute of Politics at Williamstown was by no means the only 
institution dedicated specifically to fostering cross-national encounters. Some of these 
harked back to older approaches such as Conciliation Internationale or the Institut de 
droit international which sought to unite notables and legal experts respectively. The 
proliferation of international scientific congresses from the second half of the 19th 
century established a new mode of intellectual exchange but scientists also habitually 
praised the intrinsic benefits of international meetings. Appeals to forge personal 
relations across national borders were, according to Jean Dhombres, a way of bringing 
the individual into the international sphere, bypassing the confines of nationality.5 
However, it should not be overlooked that such international exchange also fetishised 
the concept of nationhood: without national belonging there could be no inter-national 
exchange. The seemingly banal assertion that the very act of people of different 
nationalities meeting and exchanging views was a significant contribution to inter-state 
harmony was faithfully repeated in congress after congress.  
International meetings became more institutionalised in the interwar years, 
boosted to some extent by structures established by the League of Nations. This period 
saw a proliferation of ventures that focused on the young, in particular university 
students, and included exchange programmes and the International House movement, a 
campaign to provide students of different nationalities with the opportunity to live 
together in designated houses of residence.6 Summer schools for students were also 
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popular. For instance, in 1920 the Union of International Associations launched the 
project of an international university at the Palais Mondial in Brussels, a meeting place 
which combined instruction in different disciplines with the explicit aim of promoting 
peace.7 These were examples of the personalist approach to international relations, 
aimed at changing mentalities and fostering a habit of collaboration.8 American 
foundations were important financiers of such ventures which, even if the naïve 
assumptions on which they were founded invite derision, were able to shape individual 
biographies.  
In 1935, the Carnegie Endowment received a letter from Laszlo Hoffman, a 
young Hungarian law student who was, in many ways, a child of the personalist 
internationalism fostered especially by American voluntary associations in the interwar 
years. As a secondary school pupil, Hoffman joined the World Brotherhood of Boys, a 
correspondence club which put him in touch with an American from Oregon. When 
Hoffman’s pen pal visited Europe with the National Students Forum, the two teenagers 
met and, the young Hungarian claimed, “through him, I came to know much more about 
world peace”. Hoffman then acted as an interpreter for the American contingent at the 
Boy Scouts’ 1933 World Jamboree in Gödöllö, Hungary. These experiences motivated 
him to study international law at Budapest University, a career move which, he hoped, 
would enable him to translate his personal interests into professional achievement. 
Again, he relied on structures established by an American organisation when he asked 
the Carnegie Endowment to include his university in its International Relations Clubs 
scheme. The enthusiasm of the Budapest students was assured, a professor supported 
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the idea, so the foundation merely needed to provide “information, instructions and 
directions necessary for putting this plan into action”.9 
Hoffman’s quest for an International Relations Club in Budapest remained 
unfulfilled as the Endowment had suspended the programme in most European 
countries in the early 1930s before resurrecting it in 1936. However, the example of the 
International Relations Clubs provides an illustration of how American foundations 
harnessed variants of personalist internationalism and transported them into an 
academic or scientific setting, proving that projects for the “scientification of the social” 
also thrive beyond the nation state.10 But the divides between Boy Scout meetings, 
Williamstown and the academic study of international relations were bridged by 
assumptions commonly held by intellectuals during the fin-de-siècle and the interwar 
years. One of these was, as Glenda Sluga has argued, a belief in the deep psychological 
roots of national difference.11 This belief was frequently voiced at international 
gatherings, for example by Elihu Root during one of his speeches at Williamstown. 
Based on “hundreds of years of racial history and experience”, psychological 
differences created fundamental chasms between nations, which was, according to Root, 
another reason why democratically controlled foreign policy held so many dangers and 
had to be formulated under the benign influence of expert knowledge.12 
Providing transnational spaces where these international experts could meet was 
one of the ways in which foundations supported the study and discussion of 
international relations in the interwar years. While the Great War had brought about a 
significant innovation in the form of the international affairs institute which served a 
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national community of foreign policy professionals, international institutes with an 
international constituency harked back to an earlier model. This was pioneered by the 
international lawyers who launched the Institut de droit international which met once a 
year at changing venues. Like other organisations rooted in the pre-1914 
internationalism, the institute mixed the constituencies of academia and government.13 
However, it stuck to one discipline, whereas venues such as Williamstown had a more 
‘holistic’ approach to discussing international affairs and dealt with topics such as  
technological advances, in particular aviation, agriculture, commerce and finance, and 
even chemistry.14 Nevertheless, the study of international law as the main route into the 
study of international relations remained popular and vibrant during the interwar years. 
Even the League, although it did not have a provision for codification in the Covenant, 
got involved in the development of international law. To Laszlo Hoffman, the hopeful 
young internationalist from Hungary, the discipline also seemed the most promising for 
the fulfilment of his ambitions. 
This chapter analyses three international institutions that the foundations 
supported in the course of the interwar years. All of them subscribed to the basic idea 
that international tensions could be resolved by bringing together experts of different 
nationalities, and that this was indeed a prerequisite for the ‘scientific’ study of 
international relations. The ways in which they went about this, however, differed 
considerably. The Academy of International Law at The Hague focused on debating and 
disseminating the rules for the conduct of states. Its main source of funding was, 
unsurprisingly, the Carnegie Endowment’s Division of International Law, and this 
chapter will provide an insight into the workings of this rather neglected branch of the 
Endowment. The Rockefeller philanthropies were less interested in international law, 
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although this rule had important exceptions, as will be explored through an analysis of 
foundation involvement in League initiatives for the codification of international law. 
The Carnegie Endowment’s European branch office, the Dotation Carnegie, intended to 
transform itself into a hub for communicating international ideas and attempted to 
develop a mechanism for the dissemination of international knowledge. Finally, the 
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial established in Geneva an interdisciplinary 
institute for the study of international relations that was not focused on international 
law, the Graduate Institute of International Studies. Importantly, the Geneva institute 
had an international faculty, and there were from the beginning attempts to 
internationalise the student body. 
Thanks to the creation of the League, Geneva became something like an 
international capital in the 1920s and managed to eclipse other small-state cities which 
had styled themselves as internationalist hubs in the pre-war period, for example 
Brussels (seat of the Office central des associations internationales) or Berne (seat of 
the Bureau international de la paix). Another such hub was The Hague, the city of the 
peace conferences of 1899 and 1907 and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. In 1911, 
James Brown Scott of the Carnegie Endowment had been able to assert that The Hague 
was “rapidly becoming the center of internationalism”.15 The Hague, and not Geneva, 
was the first site of a foundation-created institution for the study of international 
relations on European soil, starting the quest for the best way to organise scholarly 
activity in the field of international relations in the interwar years. The Hague Academy 
of International Law can be regarded as an institutional bridge between the legalist 
internationalism of the pre-war years and approaches to the study of international 
relations that were more committed to the social sciences. Nevertheless, with its origin 
in the Hague Peace Conferences, the Academy had broader aims than merely the 
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academic teaching of international law. Its main backer, the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, fully recognised this. Again, as with regard to the first 
establishment of an American philanthropic presence in Europe, the pioneering effort of 
the Endowment in the internationalisation of the study of international relations must be 
acknowledged. 
 
The Hague Academy of International Law 
The original idea for an academy for international law emerged in the early 20th century 
out of lawyers’ debates on alternatives to the compulsory arbitration of disputes 
between states. Such conflicts, some argued, might also be resolved by a body of 
experts with enough moral and scholarly authority to state definite opinions on the 
obligations of states under international law. Otfried Nippold, a Swiss jurist and future 
member of the Carnegie Endowment’s European Advisory Council, was the first to 
develop the idea for a specialised university for the teaching of international law at The 
Hague, linked to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Nippold’s suggestions were 
discussed at the Hague Peace Conference of 1907 but deemed too ambitious, before 
they were taken up again by the Dutch jurist T.M.C. Asser, bearer of the Nobel Peace 
Prize of 1911 and co-founder of the IDI. Asser came up with the idea of an academy for 
international law, running only in the summer months, with a changing but 
internationally renowned body of instructors. It was also Asser who, in January 1911, 
approached the newly-created Carnegie Endowment. James Brown Scott took a special 
interest in the prospective academy and fleshed out the details of the project together 
with his IDI colleague. At Scott’s request, Asser canvassed the opinions of the most 
influential authorities on international law in Europe and even those of foreign 
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governments to determine whether they would consider sending their diplomatic staff to 
the new academy for training.16 
Scott’s plan for the Academy was not wedded to a narrow conception of 
international law, at least not in his communications to the Executive Committee of the 
Carnegie Endowment. He included in his plans the other two divisions of the 
Endowment which, under the auspices of the new institution, could study the “economic 
effects of certain wars” as well as “the role of peace societies, scientific conferences and 
congresses; the methods of reaching the public; the reform of education in public 
schools, colleges, and universities so far as history, economics and political science are 
concerned”.17 Privately, however, Scott held that international law was the key to world 
peace: “it is through International Law and through it alone that the status of peace is to 
be preserved or brought about, if it be broken”, he wrote to the president of the IDI in 
1912.18 The published lectures held at the Academy would result in a comprehensive 
and authoritative body of knowledge on international life: “the monographs would be 
consulted by specialists and general readers and would make their way into the 
literature of the subjects, thus profoundly modifying prevailing conceptions. … for in 
addition to his small audience at The Hague, the lecturer would have the world for his 
audience”.19 
Given that the Carnegie Endowment was only a fledgling institution itself at the 
time, it is not surprising that Scott was eager to seek the approval of a more venerable 
organisation before forging ahead with his ambitious plans at The Hague. Having been 
assured by Asser that governments and individual scholars favoured the creation of the 
Academy, Scott also sought the collaboration of the IDI, the world’s oldest and most 
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respectable international law society.20 In December 1911, the Trustees of the Carnegie 
Endowment had appropriated $20,000 for a general grant to the IDI. In a letter to its 
president, Scott insinuated that this might become an annual subvention, if relations 
between the IDI and the Endowment’s International Law Division could be formalised: 
“I cannot conceive of any better way of formulating the plans of the Division than in co-
operation with the Institute, which, as you know, has and justly merits the confidence of 
the whole world.” Together, Scott went on, the Endowment’s International Law 
Division and the IDI could succeed in “formulating and, if possible, developing a 
system of law between the nations”.21 At its 1912 session, the IDI accepted this 
proposal and created a special committee which would act as consultant (“conseiller 
juridique”) to the Endowment, and thus lend it its own scientific credibility. Some IDI 
members were against this, fearing that the association would damage said credibility 
by embroiling the Institute in propaganda activities.22 Scott, who, as an IDI member, 
was present at the meeting, diffused these fears, emphasising the scientific character of 
his Division.23 He also proposed that the various nationalities be represented on the 
consultative committee, “given the difficulty of considering problems of international 
law in an absolutely neutral fashion”.24 This suggestion was heeded when the committee 
was put together in 1913.25 
Shortly after, the Endowment asked the IDI consultative committee to 
pronounce on the usefulness of creating the Hague Academy. In its recommendation for 
such an academy, the committee chose explicitly to speak of a “study centre”, a “centre 
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de hautes études de Droit International et de sciences connexes”. Other formulations 
such as “école” or “faculté” seemed too evocative of national institutions of instruction, 
with whom neither the Endowment nor the IDI wanted to engage in competition.26 The 
links between the new institution and the IDI were cemented when the consultative 
committee drew up the Academy’s statutes in early 1914. No nationality was allowed to 
be represented by more than one member on the Academy’s Curatorium and present 
and former IDI presidents received ex officio seats. Another space was allocated to a 
Dutch member of the Carnegie Foundation of the Peace Palace at The Hague. The 
Palace had been financed by Andrew Carnegie and provided a home to the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration.27  
The Academy, under its official name Académie de droit international de la 
Haye, établie avec le concours de la Dotation Carnegie pour la paix internationale, was 
to be inaugurated in the autumn of 1914 but the First World War intervened and 
postponed its launch until 1923. Scott in the meantime had been in high demand as an 
expert on international law. He advised the American delegation to the Washington 
Conference of 1921 and accompanied Elihu Root to The Hague in order to assist in the 
establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice which formally opened in 
the Peace Palace in 1922.28 With regard to the sources for its adjudications—a 
perennially difficult question in international law due to the lack of a formal 
legislature—the new court also named “the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations” as a subsidiary source.29 This established an 
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intellectual link with the new Academy of International Law which began its operation 
one year later also in the Peace Palace.  
The themes and contradictions that had marked the Academy’s protracted birth 
were again present. In his inaugural speech, Scott stated that the Hague Academy would 
be a place where “professors of different nationalities, in absolute freedom of thought” 
would teach “the principles of international law to students of different nations”, with 
the ultimate aim of “internationalising” international law.30 Scott and his colleagues 
were aware that international law scholars, even if they professed to be only bound by 
their scientific principles, were not free of national bias—otherwise it would not have 
been necessary to enforce such strict rules of national representation on the Academy’s 
Curatorium. For similar reasons, the Academy would also, for the time being, not 
feature any lectures on the laws of war.31 In 1923, that topic was still too controversial, 
especially considering to what extent the ruthless practices of states on both sides of the 
Great War had damaged the standing of international law.32  
Notwithstanding these delicate manoeuvres, the opening of the Academy in July 
1923 was an unmitigated success, attracting over 300 students from 26 countries, eager 
to listen to a multinational and world-renowned body of lecturers.33 While almost two 
thirds of the auditors at the first session came from the Netherlands, their number 
declined to 36 % by 1929, making the Academy’s audience even more international.34 
This diversity was aided by a number of governments who provided scholarships in 
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order to encourage the attendance of their nationals at The Hague.35 The United States 
remained conspicuously absent from this list, with the State Department claiming it had 
no money for such purposes.36 Scott’s idea of placing Carnegie Endowment 
Scholarships at the disposal of the State Department did not bear fruit, either.37 Unlike 
the officials of other governments, American members of the diplomatic, military or 
judicial service could not attend the Academy’s courses as part of their duties but had to 
undertake the journey to The Hague in their spare time.38 This disappointed the 
Academy’s backers, as one continuing objective was to raise attendance from the 
United States. Eelco van Kleffens, the Academy’s secretary, wrote to James Brown 
Scott: “I need not tell you that we shall welcome all the Americans that you may be able 
to send us.”39 The Carnegie Endowment did provide some scholarships for students 
from the United States, but increasing the American attendance at The Hague remained 
difficult throughout the interwar years.40 Apart from a lack of funds, one frequently-
cited reason for the low American turnout was the fact that the Academy’s official 
language was French. Some of the published lectures in its journal Recueil des Cours 
were translated by the New Commonwealth Institute in the 1930s, but criticism of 
France’s linguistic dominance remained strong among the members of the Academy’s 
American constituency.41  
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The Francophone influence was also felt on the Academy’s Curatorium, whose 
sessions took place in Paris. In practice, and in contravention of the Academy’s statutes, 
matters relating to the programme of the Academy were decided by a small group 
consisting of Charles Lyon-Caen, Gilbert Gidel (both law professors at the University of 
Paris) and Nicolas Politis (a former foreign minister of Greece and also a professor of 
international law in Paris). Administrative matters were dealt with by a Dutch 
committee at The Hague.42 The “Father of the Academy”43, James Brown Scott, was 
heavily involved in the selection of speakers, as his regular correspondence with the 
Paris-based Curatorium members, especially Politis, testifies.44 In 1924, the latter was 
also nominated to the Carnegie Endowment’s European Advisory Council. During the 
interwar years the Carnegie Endowment contributed $40,000 per year to the running of 
the Academy but also managed its publicity in the United States.45 This was necessary 
because, in the course of the 1920s, the Academy’s concept was widely imitated and a 
number of international summer schools on world politics started to compete for the 
attention of an interested audience.46 
In 1923, however, the mix of international scholarship and politics at the 
Academy was truly unique in the way it attempted to transcend national systems of 
academic instruction. Yet, the function of the Academy was not to supplant national 
ideologies with an international ideology but to establish the discipline of international 
law as the single most important political technology of international life. The unifying 
theme of the lectures and courses held at the Academy became, according to one 
alumnus, “the function of law in the international community, in particular in the 
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maintenance and strengthening of peace through the rule of law”.47 The point of the 
Academy was not to establish a coherent doctrine of international law—after all, 
lecturers were not chosen for their particular doctrinal positions but for scholarly 
excellence—but to increase the influence of the profession as such. Hence it was very 
important for its founders to be able to boast both scholarly impartiality and good 
relations with national governments, even if this meant professing to be simultaneously 
relevant to political decision makers and yet remote from politics.48 
International lawyers involved in the Academy maintained that its lectures, 
courses and publications both explained the state of positive law (lex lata) and had an 
impact on the making of new international law (lex ferenda, ‘evolving law’). Thus, the 
Academy was able to indirectly offer solutions to judges at international courts and 
policy makers, and, very gradually, change the international legal order.49 However, it is 
not clear even to advocates of the Academy today to what extent the courses and 
lectures at The Hague initiated or merely reflected political change—their influence 
rose and fell with the importance of international law to states’ behaviour in general.50 
Nevertheless, what was said and done at the Peace Palace mattered to European 
governments. Otherwise, they would not have sent their officials there for training, nor 
would they have been quite so interested in the Academy’s publications and annual 
reports, and also in the changes applying to the composition of its Administrative 
Council.51 The Hague Academy’s importance lies also in the fact that it created a 
distinct milieu of scholars, civil servants and policy intellectuals who believed in the 
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potential power of international law to transform international relations.52 And the 
Academy was very successful at establishing itself as a de rigeur destination in the 
market for the training of international lawyers, managing, for example, to organise 
former students of the Academy in an alumnus association, the auditeurs et anciencs 
auditeurs. A stint at The Hague, as student or as lecturer, became a boost to the career 
of academics as well as national and international civil servants.  
Thus, the Academy fulfilled one ambition of its philanthropic backer, namely to 
shape the next generation of academic law teaching. In 1928, George G. Wilson, an 
international law professor at Harvard, estimated that recipients of fellowships from the 
Carnegie Endowment’s International Law Division were “occupying … all of the 
principal junior positions in the colleges and universities” in the United States. Philip C. 
Jessup, one of the Endowment’s most promising protégés and a future World Court 
Judge, was regarded as “a product of the fellowships and also of the Academy of 
International Law at The Hague”.53 Throughout the interwar years, the Academy was 
one of the Endowment’s flagship projects, until the grants were terminated in 1949.54 
In its new approach to educational internationalism, the Hague Academy took a 
stance different from many international scientific associations at the time of its 
foundation in that it was unusually and consciously inclusive. In the early 1920s, this 
was not a given. World War I had caused a great rift between scholars of enemy nations. 
International scientific bodies excluded scholars from the Central Powers, to the extent 
that between 1919 and 1925 sixty percent of international gatherings in the humanities 
and natural sciences met without a German delegation. This academic quarantine 
became less and less strict from 1920, due to the non-cooperation of scholars from 
Britain, the United States and the neutral countries, but French and Belgian academics 
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were often adamant that Germany should remain excluded from the international 
scientific community.55  From the very beginning, though, the Academy’s Curatorium 
included a German jurist, and its first programme featured a lecture by another German 
scholar.56 Despite some doubts, the Academy also admitted a student from another 
suspect state, Soviet Russia, in 1923. Apparently, this had not been an easy step for the 
Curatorium but in the end it was decided that “political discriminations must not be 
made a precedent”.57  
In disciplinary terms, however, the Academy was less open. While it may have 
striven to become, in the words of one alumnus, “a truthful painter of the international 
reality, its normative lacunae, and institutional weaknesses”, the perspectives taken and 
the frameworks applied were mostly those of lawyers.58 This necessarily limited 
approach was not approved of everywhere. While the Academy’s model of creating an 
international institution that did not deny the legitimacy of national systems of 
instruction was copied in other places, its legalistic focus was censured, for example in 
the European branch office of the Carnegie Endowment, the Dotation Carnegie, which 
serves as a reminder that decision making within philanthropic foundations tends to be 
the outcome of a complex process of negotiation between differing points of view. 
From the early 1920s, some internationalists associated with the Carnegie 
Endowment and other philanthropic foundations increasingly criticised the efforts of 
legal scholars in the cause of world peace. They were uncomfortable with the way 
international lawyers attempted to monopolise what was often referred to as 
‘techniques’ or ‘technologies’ for peace. To some extent, this discomfort can be 
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explained by disciplinary rivalries between lawyers and non-lawyers. But within the 
Dotation, for example, the criticism levelled at international lawyers was that their ideas 
and publications were aimed at a very narrow audience conversant in the technical 
jargon of the discipline.59 Josef Redlich, an Austrian economist associated with the 
Endowment, pointed out that “the main problems of international life” were not just 
legal in nature.60 And even though international lawyers deserved recognition for their 
efforts, the golden age of international law as a peace technology was in the past, having 
reached its high point at the two Hague Peace Conferences. Such was the implication of 
a circular letter to the Advisory Council of the Dotation by its president, Paul Henri 
d’Estournelles de Constant, who briefly alluded to the great progress of the 
Endowment’s Division of International Law before moving on to a long list of 
meritorious international lawyers who had all recently deceased.61  
In the interwar years, the relationship between the discipline of international law 
and the field of international relations was complex. There were overlaps but also 
rivalry and competition. After all, international relations was an interdisciplinary 
enterprise, defined more by subject matter than by approach. International lawyers tried 
to take this into account and, in some cases, to connect their discipline with other forms 
of knowledge. Nevertheless, they also continued the pre-war project of expanding the 
international legal order and of establishing juridical solutions for political problems, 
especially in the first decade after the Great War.62 Before moving on to other 
philanthropic efforts to organise the study of international relations within an 
international framework, the foundations’ approach to creating an international legal 
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order will be examined, by analysing their contributions to the codification of 
international law. 
 
Foundations and International Law Research 
In the course of the Great War, belligerents violated international law with impunity, by 
invading neutral countries and by resorting to questionable forms of economic warfare. 
States seemed to do what they wanted, and their behaviour was not tamed by 
international law, be it in the form of customary standards of conduct or codified 
conventions. Quincy Wright, an American international law professor at the University 
of Chicago, noted that “The idea has been pervaded, partly by semi-popular 
organizations designed to influence public opinion, that after all international law is not 
to be taken too seriously and that the pre-war international law is a thing of the past.”63 
Instead of continuing the lawyers’ project of the Hague Peace Conferences—after all, 
the third conference had been postponed indefinitely due to the outbreak of hostilities in 
1914—governments embraced a new approach for ordering relations between states, 
that of international organisation.64 Advocates for the League of Nations were able to 
build on a wave of popular enthusiasm, channelled into new forms of political activism 
by the various League of Nations societies.65 International law, it seemed, had been 
abandoned by a public invigorated by the possibilities of social and political reform 
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under the auspices of League-focused internationalism. The League Covenant itself 
made scant references to international law.66 
 International lawyers reacted in different ways to losing their exclusive hold on 
the internationalist imagination. Some, including quite a few within the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, initially opposed the League of Nations and 
hankered after times past. They did not feel that international law was obsolete and 
continued their advocacy for an international court to which states would subscribe 
voluntarily.67 Others saw the emergence of a multilateral order with its new institutions 
as an opportunity, for their own professional advancement within those institutions, but 
also for the discipline as such. Alejandro Álvarez, James Brown Scott’s Chilean 
collaborator and co-founder of the Institut des hautes études internationales in Paris, 
noted that the war had created new social and political realities to which international 
lawyers had to respond. If they wanted to make a meaningful contribution to 
understanding and shaping international relations, they would have to branch out. In a 
Carnegie Endowment pamphlet he conceded that “the more vital international questions 
rest in the field of politics and not in that of law, for example, territorial expansion, and 
all matters known as imperialistic. … In the future it will be necessary to find a new 
conception or system of international law which can regulate all international relations, 
and not as to-day, regulating only a few.68  
Similarly, Roscoe Pound, a law professor at Harvard, and representative of 
“sociological jurisprudence”69, argued that international lawyers should embrace  
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A legal philosophy that shall take account of the social psychology, the 
economics, the sociology as well as the law and politics of today, that shall 
enable international law to take in what it requires from without, that shall give 
us a functional critique of international law in terms of social ends, not an 
analytical critique in terms of itself, and above all that shall conceive of the legal 
order as a process and not as a condition.70  
 
This was a dynamic view on international law that made more conservatively inclined 
jurists uncomfortable in two ways. First, it advocated the use of other disciplines to 
steer the analysis and evolution of international law. Second, Pound argued that 
international lawyers should not merely strive to restate the law as it was but to develop 
it so that “jurists of the next generation [might] do as much for the ordering of 
international relations as Grotius and his successors did in their day by a creative theory 
founded on the philosophy of that time”.71  
This line of reasoning was diametrically opposed to the kind of international law 
that more cautious jurists embraced. James Brown Scott did not desire to “develop” 
international law but merely to reveal the law as it already existed. Adopting a 
formulation which seemed to do away with society’s contribution to law entirely, Scott 
wrote in the Endowment’s annual report: “A law has unconsciously grown up, but the 
society must become conscious of its existence, and it must consciously have a law.”72 
However, it does appear that Scott became more sympathetic to the progressive 
development of international law in the course of the 1920s. As the president of the IDI, 
he chaired an international conference on human rights in 1929, which was also 
financially supported by the Carnegie Endowment.73 In practice, the differences 
between progressive and conservative lawyers did not always reveal themselves so 
starkly, and both groups collaborated on a number of foundation-funded projects in the 
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interwar years.74 Alvarez and Wright both published under Endowment auspices. 
Indeed, the mission statement of Scott’s Division of International Law at the Carnegie 
Endowment did include “the development of international law”.75 However, in practice 
this was pursued on very cautious terms. Apart from providing grants to international 
law journals and societies, the Division published some two hundred volumes of 
international law monographs, most of which provided documentary evidence for 
international law. They took the form of, inter alia, documentary collections of treaties, 
outcomes of tribunals and classical texts of international jurisprudence.76 Some of these 
publications became standard works.77  
It is important to appreciate the significance of the Division of International 
Law’s publication activity. One of the principal problems of international law is being 
able to define what actually constitutes it. In the absence of a formal legislature, 
international law has to be derived from state practise, custom or the opinion of judges, 
documentary evidence of which may be scattered and hard to retrieve. Codification of 
international law is therefore of prime importance to clarify, and sometimes to create, 
the rules of the international legal order.78 The main outcome of both Hague Peace 
Conferences had, in essence, been codified conventions. The published records of the  
discussions among the members of international law societies such as the Institut de 
droit international or the American Institute of International Law delivered important 
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impulses for the codification of international law which were taken up by governments, 
and, especially after 1945, also by international and nongovernmental organisations.79 
Codification was also a major preoccupation of the Carnegie Endowment’s Division of 
International Law.80 To a lesser extent than the Rockefeller Foundation and the 
Commonwealth Fund, the Endowment became involved in the most important private 
codification effort of the interwar years, the Harvard Research in International Law. 
The Harvard Research in International Law consisted of thirteen draft 
conventions prepared in connection with the League of Nations’ 1930 Conference for 
the Codification of International Law.81 The research was undertaken by a distinguished 
committee of American experts, based at Harvard Law School. Manley O. Hudson, 
member of the Inquiry and legal adviser to the American delegation to the Paris Peace 
Conference, directed the project.82 In 1920, the Advisory Committee of Jurists 
assembled at The Hague urged the League Assembly to convene a successor to the 
Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, explicitly citing the necessity to re-establish and 
modify those rules which had been affected by the First World War.83 The proposal 
was, however, not adopted at first, partly because it was felt that the League itself was 
now in charge of continuing the work of the Hague Conferences, and partly because 
attempts to harmonize international law so soon after the war were seen to be futile. In 
1924, however, the Assembly acted on the jurists’ recommendation and the Committee 
of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law was convened. In the 
course of the next three years, the Committee identified areas of international law that 
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were ready for codification. In September 1927, the League Assembly finally adopted a 
resolution to convoke a conference and submitted three topics for consideration: 
nationality, territorial waters, and the responsibility of states.84  
Manley O. Hudson had been an unofficial promoter of a new codification 
conference since 1924, by way of his friendships with Eric Drummond, the League’s 
first Secretary General, and George E. Wickersham, the American member on the 
Committee of Experts and, like Hudson and Raymond Fosdick, a leading light in the 
American League of Nations Non-Partisan Association.85 Shortly after the Assembly 
resolution of 1927, Hudson approached the Commonwealth Fund with a proposal to 
organise “systematic research … in order that the work of the forthcoming Conference 
may be as effective as possible”. In his grant application, Hudson not only underlined 
the importance of the conference, “one of the notable events in the history of 
International Law”, but also stressed the remarkable backing of the U.S. government for 
the conference: “Our Government’s replies to the questionnaire sent out by the 
Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law indicate a 
lively interest in this work, and would seem to afford a basis for anticipating that the 
Government of the United States will cooperate fully in the work of the future 
Conference.” This collaborative stance of the non-League member the United States 
presented American legal scholars with “a great opportunity”.  
Hudson proposed to organise the preparatory research for the codification 
conference according to a template established by the American Law Institute which 
had been founded in 1923 as an organisation of legal scholars, corporate lawyers and 
judges with the aim of restating American law. An Advisory Council guiding the work 
would include almost every member of the American international law elite at the 
                                                 
84 Ibid.: 66-77. 
85 Kenny, “Harvard Research in International Law”: 320. 
  111
time.86 It comprised scholars as well as practitioners, for example Edwin Borchard, 
James Garner, Charles E. Hughes, John Bassett Moore, James Brown Scott, George G. 
Wilson and Quincy Wright.87 Though not a prominent international lawyer, Raymond 
Fosdick was also on the Council. Thus the Harvard Research truly aimed to “represent 
the best in American experience and American scholarship”.88 Hudson’s proposal was 
accepted and from 30 December 1927, the Commonwealth Fund appropriated $30,000 
over two years under the auspices of its Legal Research Program.89 
In early 1928, the Harvard Research went underway.90 It attracted considerable 
attention, including that of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. Up to this point, 
the Memorial had not been particularly interested in international law. Although it had 
given two $7,500 grants to ASIL in 1923 and 1924, the archival record reveals that 
those were solely intended for ASIL’s purchase of the League of Nations Official 
Journal’s Treaty Series. By the means of this subscription, Fosdick assured the bilingual 
publication of the series. The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial almost had to cajole 
ASIL into accepting the money.91 Thus, the relationship between the Memorial and the 
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United States’ foremost international law society was not very close.92 The latter’s 
stance towards Geneva might have been a reason why. According to Hudson, ASIL was 
“filled with people with prejudices about the League of Nations” and had not supported 
his work for codification under League auspices.93 But although law was not one of the 
core interests of the Memorial—it really branded itself as an organisation dedicated to 
the support of the social sciences—its officers were very interested in the Harvard 
Research.94 Edmund E. Day, a staff member and from 1929 the head of the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s Social Science Division, gave the following assessment: “The project 
which Professor Hudson has presented involves work along lines that are significantly 
related to the Memorial’s program in social science and social technology.”95 
 For administrative reasons rather than disciplinary incompatibility, the Memorial 
never supported the Harvard Research financially.96 Nevertheless, it recommended 
Hudson’s project to John D. Rockefeller, Jr.’s Advisory Committee which, under 
Fosdick’s chairmanship, administered the younger Rockefeller’s personal philanthropy. 
Thus Fosdick secured a personal gift of $10,000 for the Harvard Research.97 In April 
1929, John D. Rockefeller, Jr.’s Advisory Committee referred the project back to the 
Rockefeller Foundation as “sociological research”. The Foundation had by then 
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incorporated the Memorial as its own Social Science Division and was able to make an 
appropriation. Again, the endorsement was strong: “No question of quality of work or 
strength of backing in influential quarters.”98 Over the next three years, the grants 
amounted to $60,000.99  
 The Carnegie Endowment was also involved in the Harvard Research, though in 
a different way. It was through the Endowment’s mediation that the draft conventions 
emanating from the Research were published in the American Journal of International 
Law.100 As a member of the Advisory Committee, James Brown Scott had an early 
influence on the direction of the work, successfully proposing that the Committee 
accept the IDI’s previous contributions to codification as a model. His view on what the 
Harvard Research should aim to achieve was predictably cautious: it should state 
generally accepted views, precedents and principles of international justice.101 This 
contrasted with Roscoe Pound’s ambition to turn the research into a “first step in a 
progressive codification”.102 Even when asked to endorse the Harvard Research in a 
letter submitted for another grant application, Scott flatly stated that the work aimed to 
“authoritatively state” what international law was, not to develop it.103 The Advisory 
Committee also discussed to what extent the research should be tailored so that the 
American government would be likely to accept it. Pound did not see this as a 
priority—but here he was in a minority. George Wickersham, the Committee’s 
chairman, even proposed that the work should be undertaken in direct contact with the 
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State Department.104 The Harvard Research did indeed rely on the work of scholars, 
practitioners and government officials alike, and in the course of its existence, the State 
Department was represented on ten codification projects.105 
 This, however, did not ensure the success of the League’s Codification 
Conference itself which took place in March and April of 1930. Hudson, Jesse Reeves 
and Edwin Borchard attended as technical advisers. On his return, Hudson received a 
letter from E.E. Day, asking about the results in a way which revealed the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s priorities: “To what extent were those of you who represented the research 
program accepted by the officially designated American delegates? More specifically, 
were the results of your researches utilized as fully as you think they should have been? 
Your frank comments along this line will be much appreciated.” Hudson’s reply was 
mixed. While the results of the Harvard Research were praised and utilised at the 
Conference, it was clear that as a whole, the meeting had been ill prepared on the part of 
the League, governments and private organisations. “As to the American delegates, they 
had little preparation for the Conference except that which was contained in our drafts. 
The difficulty was, however, that there had been no agreement on policy in Washington, 
and the delegates were left without sufficient guidance on policy.”106 In effect, only one 
draft convention, that on nationality, was discussed in any way at the Conference. Apart 
from the lack of preparation, there was also a lack of agreement as to the purpose of 
codification, whether it referred to the clarification of existing rules or the progressive 
development of the law. This lack of consensus regarding purpose had, of course, also 
been a feature of the Harvard Research. There was no follow-up conference to the 1930 
meeting and in the end, the League referred the codification issue back to national 
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governments, thus ensuring its demise for the rest of the interwar period. As an 
intergovernmental conference, the meeting at The Hague was an abject failure.107  
Hudson himself recognised the unlikelihood of another League effort at 
codification. However, he persevered with the Harvard Research, which went through 
another three cycles after the Conference. In his view, the débâcle at The Hague had 
shown that governments were unlikely to come up with any useful draft conventions in 
future and that the onus was more than ever on “non-official bodies”, a fact reflected in 
the League Assembly’s resolutions which called for the collaboration of “international 
and national scientific institutes”.108 Hudson was undeterred but the Rockefeller 
Foundation refused to renew its grant to the Harvard Research in 1932, claiming it was 
impossible “under present circumstances”. However, the Social Science Division 
encouraged Hudson to seek funds from the Harvard Bureau for International Research 
which was entirely Rockefeller-funded.109 With this indirect form of support, the 
Harvard Research continued and its results, despite the minuscule immediate impact, 
went on to shape future codification projects. Recognising the importance of a 
permanent body dedicated to codification, in 1947 the U.N. established the International 
Law Commission which built on the Harvard Research’s experience.110 Recent 
assessments of the value of the work and its influence on the long-term development of 
international law also praise the quality and originality of the Harvard Research draft 
conventions.111 
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 When the American international law elite assembled under the umbrella of the 
Harvard Research it sought to take advantage of a unique opportunity to shape the 
international legal order under League auspices by submitting “drafts or projects, 
embodying American views, even if American views from a universal rather than a 
national standpoint, and the results of American scholarship and American 
experience”.112 Once that opportunity had passed in 1932, the Harvard Research lost its 
Rockefeller funding, even though the Rockefeller Foundation admitted that the quality 
of the work was excellent. Neither the Foundation nor the Memorial saw international 
law as a key field of interest but they did acknowledge its potential to shape the 
international order. From 1936, the Rockefeller Foundation told potential grant 
recipients that it had stopped giving any support to international law projects as a matter 
of policy.113 James Brown Scott joined the Harvard Research Advisory Committee by 
virtue of his professional standing within the American legal community but never 
actually became involved in any of the drafting work. His main concern seemed to be to 
ensure that his American colleagues paid homage to their European predecessors of the 
IDI and did not become too creative when drafting conventions.  
It is likely, though, that Scott welcomed the League’s efforts in the area of 
codification. By participating in the Harvard Research he was able to ensure that these 
efforts would be underpinned by the models and ideas emanating from the legalist 
internationalism of venerable organisations such as the IDI. Indeed, by the mid-1920s, 
the Carnegie Endowment had substantially revised its stance towards the League in 
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general.114 This was due, on the one hand, to a change of guard. Elihu Root, the 
Endowment’s cautious president, vacated his chair to to the more enterprising Nicholas 
Murray Butler in 1925.115 On the other hand, the Endowment's more favourable attitude 
to the League later in the 1920s may have been linked to the well-founded perception 
that the institution, as it developed, represented less of a break with traditional 
international politics than many Wilsonians had hoped.116 Moreover, the Endowment 
faced substantial pressure from its European collaborators with regard to its attitude 
towards the League. The next section of this chapter deals with the Endowment’s 
attempt to establish its European organisation, the Dotation Carnegie, as a centre for 
international publicity. 
  
The Dotation Carnegie and the International Mind 
During the very first meeting of what was left of the Advisory Council of the Dotation 
Carnegie after the armistice, president d’Estournelles de Constant informed his 
colleagues that he had asked Nicholas Murray Butler to provide money for a League of 
Nations newspaper. In stark contrast to the usually cautious stance of the Carnegie 
Endowment’s American trustees, d’Estournelles de Constant had provided office space 
and clerical support to Léon Bourgeois’ Association française pour la Société des 
nations from late 1918, when the shape of the League Covenant had not even been 
discussed yet by the Allied powers. He had also been in contact with the League to 
Enforce Peace, an organisation that Butler, Scott and Root famously had refused to 
join.117 Thanks to his considerable interpersonal skills, d’Estournelles de Constant 
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usually managed to extract a maximum of independence from his American backers and 
in 1913, the American trustees had accorded the Dotation Carnegie the right to allocate 
grants independently from its budget.118 But after the United States had formally 
rejected the Versailles Treaty, d’Estournelles de Constant felt it wise to quietly remove 
the Association française pour la Société des nations from the Dotation’s premises, 
diplomatically citing a lack of space as the reason.119 The real rationale was the anti-
League stance of the American leaders of the Carnegie Endowment in the early 1920s. 
The question as to what extent the Dotation would be able to support League-associated 
organisations remained an issue that divided Europeans and Americans within the 
Carnegie Endowment. On one occasion, when both Butler and Root were present at a 
full meeting of the Dotation in Paris, their European collaborators criticised them 
heavily but were told that public opinion in the United States was already hostile 
enough towards the Endowment.120 However, Butler did not object to discreet support 
for certain small projects, for example for a book on the work of the League by Léon 
Bourgeois.121 
 It is not clear whether Butler was aware of another League-related initiative of 
his European organisation. Since before the war, one prime concern of the Dotation was 
publicity in the cause of peace, with the aim of breaking the monopoly of nationalist 
news agencies and publicists who instilled irrational hatreds in the masses. In 1919, the 
leaders of the Dotation concluded that a daily newspaper should be launched, first in the 
Entente and later in the neutral countries. Its line should be independent but popular, 
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with the American Christian Science Monitor as a possible model.122 This would be the 
only means of having an impact “on a public opinion which is led to aberration and 
crime by unwholesome incitement”.123 D’Estournelles de Constant was fully aware that 
such a project necessitated a considerable outlay in the region of several million francs 
and, predictably, the American trustees were not interested. Thus, at a Dotation meeting 
in 1920, it was decided to approach the League of Nations.124 
 D’Estournelles de Constant wrote directly to Eric Drummond himself to 
communicate two suggestions. First, the League should endow university chairs and 
second, publish a daily newspaper, “aussi populaire que possible”.125 Appealing to the 
democratic and the scientific ambitions of many post-1919 peacemakers, d’Estournelles 
de Constant underlined that such a project would fulfil both the League’s high mission 
and respond to popular demand.126 By putting the League in charge of the realisation of 
ideas which had been discussed within the Dotation since 1912, d’Estournelles de 
Constant ensured their transition from pre-war internationalism to League 
internationalism. The suggestions were seriously discussed in Geneva, as their printing 
as a Council document indicates.127 Moreover, they sparked fresh ideas on international 
propaganda within the League, whose financial director developed the concept of a 
League summer school in Geneva “to which the professors of Universities throughout 
the world would be invited”. Such a format, the clairvoyant League officer reasoned, 
would be very popular with Americans, and might thus serve to draw the non-member 
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United States closer to the League.128 Ultimately, though, the League’s Information 
Section passed the buck back to the Dotation, concluding that “The best propaganda … 
should emanate from such organs as the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace”.129 
In the course of the 1920s, the Endowment experimented with several 
approaches to effective internationalist propaganda. The idea of a Dotation-sponsored 
publication was further developed, as was the project for university chairs devoted to 
international studies. Other publicity methods were also explored, albeit less 
successfully. In the field of education, the Endowment launched the project of 
university-based International Relations Clubs for students in Europe, and it briefly 
considered transforming an American library in Paris into a large cultural centre. Thus, 
the Carnegie Endowment, specifically the Division for Intercourse and Education under 
Butler, strove to internationalise its Paris office and turn it into a hub for internationalist 
publicity.  
This aim intersected with other, underlying aspirations of the Endowment. One 
of these was a desire to shape the new nation-states of Eastern and Central Europe and 
to support movements for the economic integration of the Danubian countries. The 
Carnegie Endowment had displayed an interest in Danubian federation from1921 when 
it allocated $10,000 for a conference in cooperation with the International Chamber of 
Commerce, which, however, never took place. The issue as such remained on the 
agenda of Endowment officers, though, in particular that of James T. Shotwell. As a 
member of the Inquiry, he had helped to shape the new political geography of Eastern 
Europe and he embarked on several missions in that region in the course of the interwar 
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years.130 In addition, the Endowment encouraged European-American cultural exchange 
and attempted to project a positive image of the United States through the Dotation 
Carnegie. Libraries and specific ways of organising information played a particular role 
in this endeavour, as to many Americans abroad they seemed to offer an opportunity to 
overcome cultural inferiority complexes while at the same time promoting international 
goodwill. A pamphlet issued by the American Library in Paris made precisely this 
point: “In art, in literature, in drama, America has followed foreign models; in formal 
education she has built on Continental systems; but in library service the nations of the 
world are looking to America for leadership. Because of this, public library service has 
come to be regarded as a prime factor in the establishment of international harmony.”131 
After d’Estournelles de Constant’s death in May 1924 the Dotation underwent a 
reorientation. Butler’s complete overhaul of the Dotation’s Executive Committee in 
1925—it even changed its name to ‘Administrative Committee’—signified that he 
wanted a fresh start. The former committee members who mostly belonged to the 
French legalist peace group Association pour la paix par le droit were replaced by an 
international board including Nicolas Politis, Henri Lichtenberger, a French professor of 
German literature, and Gilbert Murray, classical scholar, chairman of the British League 
of Nations Union and member of the League’s Committee on Intellectual Cooperation. 
Earle B. Babcock, Dean of New York University’s Graduate School, professor of 
Romance languages and first president of the International Auxiliary Language 
Association, an organisation which promoted the artificial language Interlingua, became 
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the new director of the Dotation.132 Married to a French woman, Babcock soon acquired 
considerable standing within the vibrant American community in Paris which included 
representatives of all walks of life, as noted by a contemporary commentator: “We have 
American bars in Paris, an American Hospital in Paris, American Jazz-Bands, American 
Newspapers, American Crooks, Philanthropists, Barbers, Dentists, Doctors, and 
American Undertakers in Paris.”133 
Paris also boasted an American library whose board was led by Babcock. This 
institution—simply called the American Library in Paris—became a hub for a thriving 
community of American information professionals.134 They included Waldo Leland, a 
contributor to the Carnegie History, who compiled a multi-volume guide to sources on 
American history in French archives on behalf of the Carnegie Institution of 
Washington. He had been involved in this work on and off since 1907 and, while in 
Paris, used office space in both the Dotation Carnegie and the International Institute of 
Intellectual Cooperation.135 W. Dawson Johnston, the librarian of the American Library, 
advised the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial on “the next steps in the relief of 
European students and in the establishment of closer intellectual relations between 
America and Europe” when the Memorial conducted a survey of the European field in 
1924. As a librarian, Johnston was very aware of the “numerous agencies” which sought 
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to augment the stream of English-language publications into continental Europe.136 
According to one estimate, there were more than twenty British and American civil 
society organisations involved in the distribution of books, ranging from the Royal 
Society of Literature to the American Red Cross.137  
The foundations occupied a prominent role in the spreading of Anglo-American 
print culture in European countries, a less well-known chapter in the history of 20th 
century Americanisation.138 In the mid-1920s, the Dotation toyed with the idea of 
integrating its own operations with that of the library, and to transform it into a 
$1,000,000 center for American culture on the Left Bank, which would be, according to 
Babcock, “a focal point for the spread of American cultural influence not only in France 
but throughout Europe”.139 The American Library in Paris was another relic of the Great 
War, having served as the headquarter for the Library War Service with the American 
Expeditionary Forces.140 Due to a lack of funds, the Carnegie Endowment shelved its 
plans for the library but the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial supported it on a 
smaller scale from 1923. The feature that the Memorial was mostly interested in was the 
library’s Research Service on International Affairs. This reference service published a 
journal, the European Economic and Political Survey, to which various American 
banks, universities and embassies, but also institutions like the LSE and the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, subscribed.141 Due to internal squabbles the library 
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declined throughout the 1920s and in 1933 lost its Rockefeller funding, also because, by 
the mid-1930s, a lot of the American community had left Paris.142  
Nevertheless, the interest of American foundations in libraries highlights how 
much importance they attached to the way knowledge was stored, organised and 
displayed.143 Morevoer, libraries served the broader aim of a “cross-fertilization of 
ideas” between the United States and Europe, which was also on the agenda of 
Beardsley Ruml who felt that “effective steps should be taken to secure that in London 
at least and also if possible in two or more cities on the European continent there shall 
be a thoroughly representative collection of American books, periodicals and other 
publications in the field of social science”.144 This also meant that librarians, in their 
role as information professionals, found a route into the foundations’ work in 
international relations. One example is Florence Wilson, the League’s librarian until 
1926, another veteran of the Inquiry and the Paris Peace Conference, where she had 
organised the archive of the American delegation.145 
Wilson was hired by the Endowment to develop the European branches of its 
International Relations Clubs (IRCs), an initiative which Butler had rolled out at mostly 
provincial American universities from 1921 and was eager to expand. A number of 
IRCs were established in Latin America, Asia and the British Dominions. The 
Endowment supplied these student discussion clubs with reading lists and books, with 
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the purpose of cultivating the ‘international mind’.146 From 1927 Wilson threw herself 
into the work of organising the clubs in Europe and the Near East. She achieved 
remarkable results, especially in South-Eastern Europe.147 However, Babcock and 
Butler killed the initiative in 1931, after a critical review of Wilson’s work appeared in 
an Orientalist journal which alleged that her proposals regarding Turkey were indicative 
of “an ambitious and broad propaganda programme for the reputation of the United 
States”.148 
Only the British IRCs were continued under the auspices of the Carnegie 
Endowment’s New York office, as Babcock felt that the “psychology of public opinion 
in Great Britain is so similar to that in the United States” that any “misunderstanding” 
could be avoided.149  However, the Endowment kept on receiving numerous requests for 
the endorsement of new clubs and the maintenance of those established by Florence 
Wilson.150 Inadvertently, it had scrapped an initiative that had elicited considerable 
grass-roots enthusiasm all over Europe, from Romania to Spain—probably more than 
any other Endowment-backed scheme. After Babcock’s sudden death in 1935, the 
Dotation’s new American director, Malcolm Davis, decided to revive the IRCs in 
continental Europe, but the Endowment’s overly cautious stance in 1931 had cost it a 
valuable opportunity.151 
The most successful Dotation initiatives in the field of publicity were the 
Carnegie Chairs and the in-house journal, L’Esprit International. Both projects were 
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started as soon as Babcock took over the direction of the Dotation.152 The Chaire 
Carnegie in Paris was effectively a series of public lectures held at the Dotation itself. 
Most of them were given by André Tibal, the former director of the Institut Français in 
Prague, but he alternated with international guest lecturers. Tibal, originally a scholar of 
German literature, had a background similar to those of many Endowment leaders. 
Serving his country during the war, he produced the Bulletins politiques de presse 
allemande for the French Maison de la Presse, the precursor to the Quai d’Orsay’s 
information and press division. In 1919, Tibal moved to the University of Prague as 
“Professeur d’histoire de la civilisation française”, a post sponsored by the French 
government. In 1920, he became director of Prague’s newly created Institut Français. 
His involvement in official cultural policy, and possibly his marriage to a Romanian, 
shaped his research interests which by then had veered towards the relations between 
the Slavic nations, Germany and France.153  
Tibal’s tenure was regarded as a success and the Dotation renewed his contract 
year after year.154 In an undated letter which was probably intended for his former 
colleagues at the Quai d’Orsay, Tibal outlined the purpose of the Carnegie Chair. First, 
it should function as a stabilising factor in the political, economic and cultural 
reconstruction of Central Europe, a region that was slowly discovering a new identity 
after the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Seemingly above politics, the 
organisers of the Carnegie lectures would find it easier, according to Tibal, “to extricate 
from a chaos of contradictory information the true factors, the legitimate interests and 
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the most appropriate measures to ensure harmony and prosperity among the peoples”.155 
Second, by educating the public about contemporary Central Europe, the Carnegie 
Chair would contribute to a better understanding between nations. Finally, the Carnegie 
Chair sought to import an “Anglo-Saxon” debating culture, aiming at the ideal of open 
and respectful discussion among an educated but not necessarily specialist audience.156 
This last aspiration, though, was abandoned after several years, “because of the meagre 
results obtained”.157 
Tibal’s programme certainly dovetailed with French political ambitions in 
Central Europe as it was formulated during a period when relations between France and 
the countries of the Little Entente were strengthened by friendship treaties (1924-1927). 
Nevertheless, the Chaire Carnegie should be interpreted in the context of both French 
cultural diplomacy and European movements for reconciliation. The German novelist 
Thomas Mann, for example, was invited to give one of the numerous guest lectures at 
the Chaire Carnegie.158 This invitation was extended also on behalf of Prince Karl 
Anton Rohan’s Pan-European Kulturbund.159 It is also important to note that under 
d’Estournelles de Constant, the Dotation had been one of the first French organisations 
to extend an olive branch to German pacifists after the war.160 Moreover, Tibal was 
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keen on securing the collaboration of a diverse array of speakers representing as many 
different (European) nationalities as possible.161  
Ultimately, the Carnegie Chair project represented an attempt to come to terms 
with a conception of politics that was, in the 1920s, still relatively novel, namely the 
view that the world was not structured by a network of empires but by a series of 
nation-states that were, in theory at least, equal. Tibal indicated as much in his letter to 
the Quai d’Orsay: “More and more we will have to admit that Europe, or, more 
generally, the world, is a republic of equals and that … each people has a right to its 
place in the sun with its national individuality.”162  
The lectures held under the auspices of the Carnegie Chair soon evolved into 
collaborations with academic institutions both in France and abroad. The Institut des 
Hautes Études Internationales based at the University of Paris’s law faculty developed 
a whole course in international relations in association with the Carnegie Endowment, 
and another Carnegie Chair was established at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik in 
Berlin in 1926.163 This institution also received funding from the Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial and the Rockefeller Foundation. The lectures at both Carnegie 
Chairs were aimed at an educated lay audience but given by academics or high-ranking 
officials from international organisations, for example Albert Thomas, the head of the 
International Labour Organisation.164 The Dotation seems to have realised that the 
academic imprimatur was useful in its task of shaping public opinion in Europe. 
Fundamentally, though, they were concerned with the influence of these activities on 
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public opinion and sought to organise others that would involve “des personnalités de 
notoriété intellectuelle”.165 
 In 1927 Babcock successfully launched the Dotation’s own quarterly journal, 
L’Esprit International, for which he managed to recruit the young historian Pierre 
Renouvin and a journalist from the right-of-center Journal des Débats as editors. Lively 
discussions within the Dotation preceded the journal’s creation, as two already existing 
publications, Prince Rohan’s Europäische Revue and the Journal de Genève, had 
offered to cooperate with the Carnegie Endowment. As the Dotation was keen to 
develop its own profile, the offers were rejected.166 Simultaneously avoiding the 
templates of pacifist, literary and scholarly international law journals, L’Esprit 
International aimed to become “one of the leaders of public opinion in international 
tasks and problems in all European Countries”, something like a European version of 
Foreign Affairs. As was typical in the interwar years, the journal also contained a 
documentary section which reprinted international treaties and agreements. Finally, 
another element of its editorial policy was “to make the United States better known and 
less criticised” in Europe.167 
Some of L’Esprit International’s articles indeed served the purpose of 
‘explaining’ the United States to a European audience, often in the form of travel 
reports. One of these pieces, written by the editor, praised American “efficiency”, the 
service-ethic and American “socialité”, and discussed common French criticisms of 
U.S. foreign policy, in particular the refusal to scrap war debts, as well as fears of being 
steamrolled by the American economic powerhouse. In its ambivalence, the article, 
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which finished on a positive note, probably served as a convincing propaganda piece.168 
Apart from such musings on the European-American relationship, L’Esprit 
International offered pieces on current affairs, international law and European 
federation. Its editorial line was liberal and anti-communist, its authors were well-
known liberals, such as Butler himself, Count Carlo Sforza and William Rappard, the 
latter two of Williamstown fame. L’Esprit International also published several articles 
by Robert Seton-Watson, a prominent expert and advocate for the political 
emancipation of the Slavic nations of the former Austro-Hungarian empire, and the 
founder of Slavic Studies at King’s College, London.169 Thus, key interests of the 
Endowment can also be traced in this aspect of the Dotation’s activity. 
Finally, it is important to note that the Dotation’s influence was not only 
intended to radiate throughout Europe but also beyond. Paris represented an intellectual 
centre not just for Europeans and expatriate Americans, but also in Latin America. 
Copies of L’Esprit International were sent to Latin American intellectuals and, while 
the European International Relations Clubs remained underdeveloped, Renouvin 
assisted the Endowment in the management of its Latin American IRCs.170 Since the 
Endowment felt that Spanish books were not “truly international” and “either very 
antagonistic to the United States or else foolishly pro-American”, Renouvin was 
charged with selecting appropriate French literature which could be sent to the IRCs.171 
 The Dotation fulfilled an important role with regard to the Carnegie 
Endowment’s presence in Europe. Shortly after the Great War, its French leadership 
built links with the League of Nations and attempted to connect with popular, League-
focused internationalism. In the early 1920s, it thus provided an antidote to the legalistic 
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bent of the Endowment, which was dominated by James Brown Scott and Elihu Root at 
the time. Efforts to transform the Dotation into an international cultural centre under 
American leadership from the mid-1920s were only partly successful. In particular, the 
opportunity offered by a more forceful expansion of the International Relations Clubs 
was missed. The Carnegie Endowment’s publicity activities stand in contrast to the 
more research-oriented ambitions of the Rockefeller philanthropies, explored in the next 
section. The Dotation was not interested in developing new models for international 
organisation or instruments that would make an international legal order more precise. 
Instead, it aimed to be “a mirror of international feeling”, directing public opinion while 
at the same time presenting the raw material, ‘facts’, from which it was to be 
synthesized.172 
 
University for the League: the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies 
The lectures and publications offered by the Dotation Carnegie in Paris paled into 
insignificance when compared to the huge variety of educational offerings available in 
Geneva, the site of another institution created with foundation money, the Geneva 
Graduate Institute of International Studies (Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études 
Internationales). The Institute was mostly supported by Rockefeller funds and 
developed into an international centre for the study and teaching of international 
relations. Its influence was not just felt in Switzerland, where it became the prime 
institution for the study of international history, but also abroad, chiefly due to the 
prominence of several liberal economists who taught there. Moreover, the Institute was 
an integral part of the cosmopolitan milieu around the League of Nations, a social scene 
partly financed by American philanthropic foundations. 
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In the 1920s, Geneva was something like an international capital and thus 
attractive to anybody interested in learning more about international politics or 
observing them closely from the sidelines. From the mid-1920s there were several 
private initiatives in that field, notably a number of summer schools. The French 
Association de la paix par le droit organised the so-called cours Ruyssen, named after 
Theodore Ruyssen, the president of the International Federation of League of Nations 
Societies and former auditor of the Dotation Carnegie.173 An English speaking 
equivalent was the Geneva Institute of International Relations. Organised in 1924 in 
cooperation with the British League of Nations Union and the American League of 
Nations Non-Partisan Association, it featured a series of lectures by international 
speakers during the summer and eventually grew to accommodate an average of 250 
attendants at meetings. Its proceedings were published in the Problems of Peace 
series.174 The Carnegie Endowment supported the Geneva Institute of International 
Relations with several thousand dollars per annum from 1925.175  
Another initiative, often confused with the Geneva Institute of International 
Relations, was the Geneva School of International Studies. This summer school was run 
by the British scholar Alfred Zimmern who worked for the League of Nations’ 
International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation and had a special interest in 
internationalist education.176 He also sat on the committee of the Geneva Institute.177 
The Geneva School of International Studies’ origins date back to the 1924 founding 
congress of the International Student Union for the League of Nations (Fédération 
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universitaire internationale pour la Société des nations). John D. Rockefeller, Jr., along 
with several other wealthy Americans, supported the school between 1926 and 1934 to 
the tune of $40,000.178 
The person responsible for attracting most of the private American funds that 
flowed into Geneva was Arthur Sweetser, a member of the League of Nations 
Information Section since September 1919.179 Sweetser was a crucial unofficial 
mediator between the League and the United States in the interwar years and a fixture of 
the American community which had started to develop around the League in the early 
1920s. In the course of the decade, the number of American citizens who visited the 
League increased substantially, to the extent that the U.S. consul in Geneva reported in 
1933 that they formed the largest national contingent of visitors.180  For many upper-
class Americans, a pilgrimage to Geneva became a compulsory element of a European 
tour and most of them would enjoy the hospitality of Arthur Sweetser at some point.181 
So did three foundation representatives who came to Geneva in the spring of 1924. One 
of them described the experience in a letter: “He took us in, talked for an hour, during 
which President Hopkins of Dartmouth came in, and then took us out to his delightful 
home in a village outside Geneva, facing the Alps and looking across the lake.”182  
Sweetser, who worked in the perpetually cash-strapped Information Section, 
took great care to outline the League’s financial needs to the foundation representatives 
as he was concerned that the League might not receive all it was due from the 
                                                 
178 Memorandum “The Geneva School of International Studies”, 16 April 1926; Fosdick to Thomas 
Appleget, 30 November 1926; Robert K. Straus to Fosdick, 4 February 1930; Memorandum “Geneva 
School of International Studies”, 22 March 1934, all in RFA, RG 2, Educational Interests series, box 29, 
folder 184. 
179 Arthur Sweetser League Secretariat personnel file, LN, Personnel Files S889, Varia 2 425. I am 
grateful to Frank Beyersdorf for directing me to this source. 
180 Prentiss B. Gilbert, despatch 526 political, 27 February 1933, NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 
811.43/66. 
181 Kuehl and Dunn, Keeping the Covenant, 81-82; Susan Sweetser Clifford, One Shining Hour: A 
Memoir (privately printed, n.d.), 58. 
182 John Jacob Coss to mother, 24 March 1924, John Jacob Coss Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript 
Library, Columbia University, New York (hereafter Coss Papers), box 8, part I. 
  134
philanthropic pork barrel. He need not have worried, though. Both the Rockefeller and 
the Carnegie foundations became major donors to the League and other Geneva-based 
institutions in the course of the 1920s. Interlinked with the informal League network 
which had been established by American nongovernmental organisations, the 
foundations ensured that the United States became, at least with regards to technical 
collaboration, a de facto member of the League of Nations.183 
Among the foundations’ largest financial contributions to the Geneva milieu 
were those dedicated to an academic institution, the Graduate Institute of International 
Studies, founded in 1927. The original idea for the Graduate Institute had been 
developed by William Rappard.184 Rappard, a Swiss born in the United States, retained 
very good contacts with his country of birth which helped him when negotiating with 
American philanthropic backers.185 Noting the numerous educational opportunities that 
had opened up in Geneva due to the presence of the League and the International 
Labour Organisation, Rappard envisioned, associated with the University of Geneva, a 
specialist institute “the students of which would attend the already existing lectures of 
international law” but also receive instruction in other disciplines.186 
The idea of a scientific institute devoted to international questions in Geneva 
easily found favour with Beardsley Ruml, the director of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller 
Memorial, who desired to create an international elite of social science experts. Ruml 
felt that such an institution could use League resources in the form of archives or simply 
intellectual stimuli to conduct new research while at the same time providing a hands-on 
educational experience to advanced students of international questions. Moreover, Ruml 
saw Geneva as a provincial intellectual backwater that had to be rescued from its 
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“mediocrity and superficiality” by a new institution with “a competent Faculty and alert 
student body”. As an afterthought, Ruml added that the creation of this new institute 
might also represent an innovation in the higher education sector: “I wonder whether 
there is not a rare opportunity to build a modern university in Europe free of whatever 
traditions may be hampering and at the same time with the background of European 
university tradition and experience.”187 
Raymond Fosdick also perceived the opportunity to establish a new academic 
institution in Geneva. Putting forward his own proposal, Fosdick echoed some of the 
concerns that affected decision makers within the Carnegie Endowment but gave the 
League mechanism a larger role. “The basis of any intellectual judgment and action in 
the science of government is facts”, Fosdick began, before describing how independent 
research institutions had started to supply these to American municipal and state 
authorities in the Progressive Era. With the monumental changes since the war, “The 
time has now come, I believe, for a similar development in the international field.” In 
that arena, one had to deal with “new and untouched problems … economic, industrial 
and social in character”. These problems, Fosdick believed, were so numerous, that only 
those should be tackled which were “in public international discussion and susceptible 
to early governmental action”. Therefore, the prospective institute should “serve as an 
aid and stimulant to the League” while also “us[ing] the League of Nations as the 
medium for translating its findings into government action”. Finally, the proposed 
institute should be staffed with international personnel:  
I believe that the head of the Institute should be an American or an 
Englishman—the most competent man that could be secured, and the staff 
should be chosen with painstaking care. I would suggest an International Board 
of Trustees, perhaps at the start an Anglo-American Board. The Board could be 
built up slowly from a small nucleus. Perhaps three or four men could start it - 
men like Lord Cecil, Gilbert Murray and Professor Baker from England, and Mr. 
Root, Owen D. Young and Mr. Wickersham from the United States. …A non-
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Anglo-American name that might be immediately considered is Rappard, a 
Swiss, the new head of the University of Geneva and formerly professor at 
Harvard.188 
 
After lengthy negotiations involving Rappard, the relevant Swiss authorities and the 
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, some of Ruml’s and Fosdick’s ambitions were 
realised when the Graduate Institute of International Studies was inaugurated in 
September 1927 with a Memorial grant of $100,000.189 This support was continued by 
the Rockefeller Foundation and remained substantial throughout the interwar years.190 It 
was only terminated in the late 1940s. 
The Institute had less of an Anglo-American character than Ruml and Fosdick 
had desired but its make-up was certainly international. Rappard and the French 
historian Paul Mantoux shared the directorship. Over the years, a distinguished 
international faculty was assembled which included the German jurist Hans Kelsen, the 
Italian historian Guglielmo Ferrero and the liberal economists Ludwig von Mises and 
Wilhelm Röpke. The international relations specialists Arnold Wolfers and Pitman 
Potter were among the visiting professors, as were André Siegfried and the American 
economist Jacob Viner.191 The student body was also fairly international, with Swiss 
students in the minority. Like the administrators of the Hague Academy of International 
Law, Rappard was at pains to increase the American contingent and even considered 
establishing special bursaries for applicants from the United States.192 
 Instruction at the Graduate Institute rested on a combination of the disciplines of 
history, international law and economics, thus only including one of the social sciences 
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which the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial aimed to develop in the 1920s.193 The 
Rockefeller Foundation was aware of this when it took over from the Memorial in 1929, 
as a report written for the Foundation admonished that “International research has thus 
far been largely in the hands of the historians, the diplomat and the jurists” while “the 
more modern approaches through economics, through anthropology, psychology, 
education” were still neglected, also in Geneva.194 However, the Graduate Institute did 
make a significant contribution to economics, at least in the long run. The Institute 
provided a haven for liberal economists outside the Keynesian orthodoxy which became 
so entrenched from the 1930s. Thus Geneva acted as a launch pad for the free-market 
critique of state intervention in Western societies. Von Mises and Röpke were founding 
members of the Mont Pèlerin Society, a think tank created in a small Swiss village in 
1947, and one of the institutions responsible for the global rise of neo-liberalism as a 
political ideology in the second half of the 20th century.195 
 As with so many long-term political outcomes of philanthropic projects, the 
question to what extent the ascent of neo-liberalism was consciously engineered by 
Rockefeller philanthropy through the support of the Graduate Institute in Geneva is 
difficult to answer. Foundation officers almost never couched their preferences in 
explicitly political terms, pointing instead to the potential policy-relevance of the 
knowledge they intended to help produce. Rappard himself certainly subscribed to a 
form of liberalism and he also emphasised to his colleagues on the board of the 
Graduate Institute that the Rockefeller Foundation was not trying to steer the institution 
into a particular political direction: “I do not believe that one can discern in the efforts 
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which are encouraged [by the Foundation] a definite national or international political 
tendency.”196 Arguments between the directors of the Graduate Institute and the 
Rockefeller Foundation, which became more frequent from the mid-1930s, revolved 
around the Institute’s lack of ‘concrete’ accomplishments in the form of ground-
breaking and policy-shaping studies on particular problems.197 Nevertheless, the 
Foundation’s insistence that the Institute should work harder to provide blueprints for 
policy alternatives during the 1930s heyday of economic nationalism, protectionism, 
autarky and the planned economy indicates that Rockefeller officers indeed hoped to 
promote a liberal world economic order, as did their more outspoken colleagues in the 
Carnegie Endowment.198 Of course, this is not particularly surprising. What is 
remarkable, though, is the extent to which these political preferences were neutralised 
by a discourse focused on expertise and practical policy relevance, and remained 
unrecognised by grant recipients who had similar convictions. 
 
Even before the Great War, American foundations started to experiment with different 
institutional models for the study and teaching of international relations. Accordingly, in 
the course of the 1920s, several institutions, wholly or partly financed by philanthropic 
funds, were founded or restructured. Although the social sciences became more 
important in scientific approaches to international relations, international law remained 
a key discipline. The models explored in this chapter represent attempts to 
‘internationalise’ the process of finding and disseminating scientific facts about nations 
and the international order. The Hague, Paris and Geneva became international hubs for 
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international relations experts, funded with philanthropic gifts. In the next chapter, the 
foundations’ support for the study of international relations within national frameworks 
will be examined. 
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3 
International Relations As Seen From the Capital:  
Philanthropy and Cultural Diplomacy 
 
A Survey of European Prospects 
In early 1924, three American academics embarked on what one of them later termed a 
“European safari”.1 For two months, they travelled across Britain, France, Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, Austria and Switzerland, consulting with European scholars on behalf 
of the Carnegie Endowment and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. The party 
consisted of John Jacob Coss, a philosophy professor at Columbia University who had 
made a name for himself as chairman of the Contemporary Civilization course, Guy 
Stanton Ford, Dean of the University of Minnesota’s Graduate School and James T. 
Shotwell, Columbia historian and editor of the Carnegie History of the World War.2 
Their journey from country to country serves as a spotlight on the background, attitudes 
and motives of American foundation representatives and on the remarkable density of a 
philanthropic network in Europe that dated back to the war years and which they could 
take advantage of in the course of their journey. It also serves as a reminder that the 
foundations, despite their attempts to ‘internationalise’ the field of international 
relations, were equally concerned with how the institutions they supported fitted into 
national contexts. This meant that the foundations had to negotiate the particularities of 
national systems of higher education which were often geared to train a national elite. 
Small states tended to be more accommodating to internationalist ventures in science 
and education—great and formerly great powers had more to loose from opening up a 
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traditional bastion of nation-building, namely elite education. This put the foundations 
on a potential collision course with national bureaucracies and required them to get 
involved in cultural diplomacy, despite their ostensibly ‘private’ status. Their strategy 
for negotiating this problem was to encourage national viewpoints but with the aim of 
uniting them all in the same project. The journey of the three foundation representatives 
flags up these issues. This chapter will examine the foundations’ need to negotiate a 
national context mainly through a case study on Germany. At a time when international 
relations was still as much a scientific discipline as a movement for international 
conciliation, Germany and its reintegration into transnational politico-scientific 
networks was a major concern for foundation officers, especially those who were sent to 
Europe in the early and mid-1920s. 
Coss, Ford and Shotwell had been assigned slightly different tasks in Europe 
but, taking the same ship from New York harbour on 2 February 1924, they resolved to 
“be much together”.3 The trip had been arranged at very short notice. Days before the 
departure, Ford had received a phone call from George E. Vincent, his former boss at 
the University of Minnesota and now president of the Rockefeller Foundation. “They 
had had very distressing, disturbing reports about conditions in universities in Germany, 
following the World War and the inflation and collapse there.” While the Rockefeller 
Foundation had already provided assistance to the natural sciences, Ford was to 
examine conditions in history and the social sciences under the auspices of the Laura 
Spelman Rockefeller Memorial.4 He would be accompanied by John Jacob Coss whose 
task it was to prepare the ground for the Memorial’s European fellowship programme in 
the social sciences. Midwesterners both, Coss and Ford knew each other through their 
wartime service on the Committee on Public Information. Like many American 
                                                 
3 Coss to sister, 2 February 1924, Coss Papers, box 8, part I. 
4 Ford Oral History, iii, 487; at that time, Ford was not yet, as has been claimed by Fleck, a staff member 
of the Memorial. He only joined after the European trip. Fleck, Transatlantische Bereicherungen, 71. 
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academics of their generation—Ford was born in 1873, Coss in 1884—they had pursued 
graduate studies in imperial Germany. It was under different circumstances that they 
would now visit the new German republic and other European countries, even if Ford 
intended to “go as a visiting scholar”, not as the “overt representative of a Foundation 
with money to distribute”.5 However, Ford’s choice of travel companion made it quite 
clear that he came as a foundation representative. James T. Shotwell, the third member 
of the party, was not only the director of the Carnegie Endowment’s Division of 
Economics and History—he had succeeded the economic historian John Bates Clark in 
July 1923—but had also been busy establishing a philanthropic network across Europe 
for several years.6  
Shotwell was the driving force behind the Economic and Social History of the 
World War, a project he had been involved in since December 1914, when, at Clark’s 
behest, he submitted a proposal for a history of the war designed to reveal the social and 
economic dislocations caused by armed conflict, in particular by wartime government 
intervention.7  As a representative of the “New History” in the United States, Shotwell 
was committed to the use of a social scientifically-grounded history as a tool of social 
reform.8 During the war, he also advised the Creel Committee on historical matters. 
From 1920 onwards, Shotwell moved constantly all over Europe and across the Atlantic 
in his capacity as editor-general, establishing a temporary basis in London and securing 
the contribution of editors and authors in each country covered by the project. His trip 
                                                 
5 Ford Oral History, iii, 488; on Coss see James Gutmann, “John Jacob Coss, 1884-1940”, n.d., Coss 
Papers, box 5, Folder: Coss, John J. – Biographical; on Ford see the biographical sketch contained in Guy 
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(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1938), 1-34. 
6 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Year Book 1924, 18. 
7 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Economic and Social History of the World War, 152 vols. 
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8 On the New History see Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the 
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in early 1924 with Coss and Ford served the same purpose.9 Shotwell succeeded in 
assembling a huge number of government officials and scholar-politicians for his 
history. The revolutionary idea behind it was that it should be written by those who had 
participated in the war at a high political or administrative level.10 Those who were 
united through this project, for example Charles Rist, a member of the Carnegie 
History’s French editorial board, or William Beveridge, director of the London School 
of Economics and author of one volume, keep on appearing throughout the interwar 
years in philanthropic funding networks, which makes the Carnegie History one of the 
missing links between the war and the philanthropic projects of the mid-1920s.11 In fact, 
Raymond Fosdick had sought Shotwell’s advice regarding the situation of social 
scientists in Germany just weeks before Coss and Ford embarked on their journey.12 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Shotwell’s Carnegie History network came to overlap 
with another philanthropic network, namely that of the fellowship advisers appointed by 
the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. 
After a short journey across the Atlantic, Shotwell and Ford disembarked 
together in Cherbourg, leaving Coss to continue to London where he arrived on 9 
February 1924. His first evening in England was spent in the company of William 
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Beveridge and Graham Wallas, whom Coss described as a “dear old fellow who has 
written some really big socio-political books”.13 It was no accident that Beveridge and 
Wallas were the first point of contact for Coss. Both worked at the London School of 
Economics, an institution that the Memorial had supported since 1923.14 After several 
interviews in London, Coss left for Oxford, Cambridge, Liverpool and York. While the 
first two destinations are highly plausible for an American academic setting out to 
survey the British university scene, Coss’ trip to the North of England, where he visited 
the model village of Port Sunlight on Merseyside and the Rowntree chocolate factory in 
York, seems more unusual.15 However, Coss’ itinerary was far from random and should 
be interpreted against the backdrop of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial’s 
origins and its development of a policy towards the social sciences.  
Leading British industrialists had established Port Sunlight and a similar model 
village near York as their philanthropic projects. When Coss visited them, he continued 
a long-standing transatlantic exchange of social models, exemplified by the settlement 
movement, the professionalization of social work and the social survey. Philanthropic 
organisations on both sides of the Atlantic had frequently been at the forefront of such 
developments. The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial was steeped in the same 
tradition, and, for the first years after its creation, committed to funding social welfare 
organisations. When Coss made his journey to the North of England, the Memorial had 
only recently begun the transition “from charity to knowledge-based social 
engineering”, as Martin Bulmer has put it.16  
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This evolution of Memorial policy owed much to the energetic leadership of 
Beardsley Ruml. Maintaining that increasing scientific knowledge was the best route 
towards increasing human welfare, Ruml advocated channelling financial aid to the 
social sciences, at the expense of social welfare and religious organisations. Ruml’s 
strategy centred on encouraging the advancement of the social sciences at the 
universities while ensuring that social scientists produced knowledge that was based on 
empirical research and practically useful.17 In the United States, this new approach led 
to the formation of the Social Science Research Council under Memorial auspices, the 
establishment of a fellowship programme and institutional support for universities.18 In 
Europe, a similar programme was rolled out in a number of countries. Coss’ visit to the 
North of England in February 1924 mirrored the journey that the Memorial itself had 
taken in terms of its policy. Acknowledging the efforts of a previous generation of 
philanthropists, of which the model village was a typical example, Coss nevertheless 
thought that it was not a blueprint for the future: “good plant, but old methods”, he 
wrote to Ruml about Port Sunlight.19 
After two weeks in England, Coss travelled to Paris. Again, he was not left to his 
own devices but could take advantage of the amenities of the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
branch office at 20, rue de la Baume. The origins of this office date back to the 
Rockefeller tuberculosis campaign of 1917 in France, when the Foundation decided to 
join the Carnegie Endowment in maintaining a permanent European presence.20 Coss’ 
colleagues in Paris did their best to help. He found them “Very kind and willing but 
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their field is medicine, mine economics, so on men they have little advice to give.”21 
Nevertheless, Coss soon found the local collaborator for the Memorial’s fellowship 
programme that he was looking for, Charles Rist. Rist was one of the few French liberal 
economists and, like many scholars who collaborated with the foundations, he had also 
taken on the role of expert advisor during the war.22 This experience recommended him 
to Shotwell who commissioned him to write a report on Central Europe and put him on 
the French editorial board of the Carnegie History.23 After a “delightful” lunch with Rist 
and his family in Versailles, Coss asked the economist to become the Memorial’s 
French fellowship advisor.24  
Coss also, as he had in London, where he had met Civil Service Commissioner 
David Mair, visited state officials with a potential interest in the Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial’s activities. Just before his departure, he had an interview in the 
Quai d’Orsay.25 Bernard Fay, a French academic, accompanied Coss as intermediary 
and interpreter. In the meantime, Rist was to talk to Paul Appell, the Rector of the 
University of Paris. In a letter to Ruml, Coss stated that “I don’t like these official 
warnings but better us tell them than have them find it out in some underground way 
and be mad”. Foundation officers were aware of their curious position as foreign 
interference in what was traditionally a domain of the nation state: elite education.26 
They realised that in order to complete their ambitions in Europe, they had to have the 
quiet backing of governments. As Coss put it, “the Foreign Office must be informed, 
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and in secret, so they will not be offended”.27 These behind-the-scenes accords of 
course put into question the foundations’ self-image as disinterested promoters of non-
political intellectual exchange but even if Coss disliked these official visits, they were 
standard practice.28 
After only five days in France, Coss left for Berlin to meet Guy Stanton Ford. 
Travelling through the occupied Rhineland, Coss wrote to his sister that he empathised 
with the Germans, “a bitter and resentful people—don’t really see how they could be 
otherwise”.29 A former tutor whom Coss looked up also appeared “very bitter against 
England’s blockade which was as brutal he says as any U-Boat warfare”, a detail which 
Coss again found worthy of including in a letter.30 Even to those Germans who did not 
articulate any feelings of acrimony, Coss ascribed a sense of victimhood, for example 
when he portrayed his two main collaborators as “without self-interest, wise and gentle, 
and full both of humor and kindliness—real people, and able people who feel their 
distress deeply but are saying nothing about it”.31 Belying this image of smooth 
serenity, organising the German side of the Memorial’s fellowship programme was 
actually a rather complex task. Coss and Ford, who decided to join forces in Germany, 
had to set up a mechanism that would take account of existing hierarchies and the 
peculiarities of local academic culture. The two American foundation representatives 
approached this task with a mixture of deep respect for a university system they had 
come to admire in their formative years and a sense of frustration with this system’s 
negative by-products which, in their view, impeded the reconstruction of German 
academia. 
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When Coss arrived in Berlin, Ford had already spent the past weeks touring 
Germany, visiting nine universities to inspect the working conditions for historians and 
social scientists. Two issues struck him as most pertinent: the material problems of 
German scholars and their lack of familiarity with academic trends outside of 
Germany.32 “Intellectually as well as physically”, Ford wrote to Ruml, “they have lived 
for ten years on their own flesh. More than they realize they are out of touch with what 
has been done in the fields you have in mind.”33 Mixed in with Ford’s observations on 
the intellectual isolation of German scholars were  somewhat gleeful comments on the 
war-induced decline of the mandarins, German middle-class professors brought down 
by hyperinflation and a lack of public funds for the universities.34 Ford mocked the 
mandarins’ outrage at being reduced to what he later admitted were “skimpy living 
conditions” and, more importantly, to a lower rung in social hierarchies, a situation that 
only improved slowly.35 Commenting on a newspaper article reporting that young 
academics were finally able to find a suitable fiancée again, Ford added sarcastically: 
“Cheer up! The young Privat-Dozent may yet be as eligible as a Prussian officer in the 
old days. The sun is rising and the worm turns!”36 
But although hyperinflation had been curbed by the time Ford arrived, it had had 
a devastating impact on the professional middle classes. In Austria, where the situation 
was even more desperate, their plight was taken up by the American Relief 
Administration and the Commonwealth Fund which, from 1920, established special 
programmes “for university professors, students, and impoverished members of the 
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middle classes generally”.37 One of these initiatives provided food relief for university 
professors in the form of a heavily subsidised lunch club. This institution, called 
Professorentisch, spread throughout Austria and attracted numerous smaller donations, 
notably from the Carnegie Endowment, which subsidised meals consumed by Austrian 
authors of the Carnegie History.38 James T. Shotwell fondly cited the Professorentisch  
as an example of “constructive” aid because they did not just feed professors but also 
acquainted them with a different model of academic sociability. Previously isolated 
scholars could now discuss their work in an informal setting, as they would do in an 
American faculty club. Shotwell regarded the highly individualistic organisation of 
research common at German and Austrian universities as an anachronism and felt that 
American foundations should strive “to enlarge the point of view of German 
scholars”.39 Ford took a similar stance when he recommended not a relief programme 
for professors but grants to enable university libraries to buy foreign books and 
journals.40 
The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial’s sister organisation already aided 
German university libraries. In 1922, the Rockefeller Foundation started to donate 
medical journals and distributed them through the Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen 
Wissenschaft (Emergency Fund for German Science).41 The Notgemeinschaft was 
Germany’s own answer to the problem of reconstructing its research base after the war. 
Formed by scholars and bureaucrats in 1920, it coordinated and funded academic 
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research.42 Coss and Ford relied heavily on the connections previously established by 
the Rockefeller Foundation and thus the Notgemeinschaft became a key institutional 
partner of the Memorial.43 However, the basic idea for the organisation of the German 
fellowship programme came from a contact established through the Carnegie History 
network. Interrupting their stay in Berlin, Coss and Ford made a day trip to Hamburg to 
see Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, the director of the Institut für Auswärtige Politik, 
the first German institution dedicated to the study of war and peace.44  
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, a jurist, was the co-editor of the Carnegie History’s 
German series, and, as Coss recognised, “Shotwell’s chief German advisor”. During a 
long conversation with Ford and Coss, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy counselled against 
nominating just one fellowship advisor for the Memorial. Instead, he “Would take many 
on a committee because of great specialization and group and state jealousies.”45 Ford 
later passed on this recommendation as his own insight:  
Well, I knew Germany well enough to know that I couldn’t pick any one man that 
would be satisfactory, North, South, Protestant, Catholic, Jew and that could cover 
the social sciences as we understood them—history, economics and so on. I 
therefore determined on a committee of five, which I was very successful in 
forming, some very important front names, taking all of these factors into 
consideration, knowing all the time that the main business was to find an 
executive secretary for this outfit who would really do the thing.46 
 
In fact, Ford and Coss arrived at this solution with the approval of the Notgemeinschaft 
whose chairman, Friedrich Schmidt-Ott, was nominated to the fellowship committee, 
along with Mendelssohn-Bartholdy. Schmidt-Ott also influenced Ford’s 
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recommendations for the Memorial regarding grants to German libraries. The secretary 
of the fellowship committee was also a Notgemeinschaft employee .47 
Together, Ford and Coss continued their journey to Prague, where Shotwell 
joined them. Within two days, they appointed two fellowship advisers for 
Czechoslovakia, one Czech and one German speaker, reflecting the divisions of the 
country’s university system.48 Ford relates that they dealt mainly with Alice Masaryk, 
the daughter of the Czechoslovakian president.49 Miss Masaryk, herself president of the 
country’s Red Cross and something like an ambassador for nongovernmental 
organisations, had been instrumental in getting the Rockefeller Foundation into 
Czechoslovakia where it set up its first post-war public health and medical programme 
in Europe.50 Unsurprisingly, President Masaryk was also involved in the Carnegie 
History, and Shotwell arranged both a luncheon with Czechoslovakian Foreign Ministry 
staff and an audience with the president himself.51 After this flying visit, the Americans 
continued to Vienna, where the next fellowship adviser was swiftly appointed. Again, 
Shotwell introduced his colleagues to suitable candidates. He signed up the acting 
Austrian Chancellor as another author for his history, too.52 At the end of their stay, the 
American foundation representatives were driven to the train station in a car belonging 
to the Commonwealth Fund, relying once more on the close-knit nature of the American 
philanthropic network in Europe.53 The next stop was Munich where Coss and Ford 
made their final appointment for the Memorial’s German fellowship committee. As 
usual, they also treated themselves to some European high culture: in Vienna, they had 
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gone to see the opera Così fan tutte, conducted by Richard Strauss, but in Munich they 
went to the cinema to watch Siegfried, the first part of Fritz Lang’s recently released 
silent film Die Nibelungen.54 
The trio continued to Geneva, their last stop, where they, like most high-profile 
American visitors to the League of Nations, enjoyed the hospitality of Arthur Sweetser. 
In his idyllic country house Sweetser outlined the League’s work and also its financial 
requirements to the three foundation representatives.55 Sweetser was obviously keen to 
swell the stream of philanthropic funds to Geneva which he had helped to start in the 
early 1920s and so, two days after Coss, Ford and Shotwell had left, he complained to 
Raymond Fosdick that they should have come to Geneva first: “with so many interests 
at the League, and so many contacts, and so varied a personnel … the logical jumping 
off place for any enquiry”.56 However, this opinion was not necessarily shared by 
Beardsley Ruml back in the New York headquarters of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller 
Memorial. 
 
The Development of Foundation Policies towards Europe in the 1920s 
In a 1924 policy document, Ruml had outlined the need for “more information 
concerning social science in other countries, particularly in the principal countries of 
Europe”.57 Geneva may have been the seat of the League but Ruml did not lose the 
great powers out of sight—in political or scientific terms. Coss and Ford’s reports may 
have emphasised to him to what extent Europe’s academic community was still racked 
by divisions and mutual resentment, even if American foundation representatives were 
well-liked both in former Allied countries and in those formerly belonging to the 
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Central powers. The shadow of the Great War was constantly present, mostly in the 
philanthropic network itself which, after all, relied heavily on structures and contacts 
established as a result of the conflict. On the recommendation of his envoys, Ruml 
tailored his programme to national specifics, opting, for example, to have a fellowship 
committee in Germany, but leaving only one man, Rist, in charge of fellowships in 
France. Finally, foundation officers took care to inform government officials in the 
countries where they operated of their plans and cultivated political elites. So even 
while the foundations built up a transnational network, the power of the nation state was 
ever-present in their calculations, which may be a feature that most transnational 
endeavours share.58 
When Coss and Ford returned to the United States, Ruml used their 
recommendations, together with those of another Memorial envoy, Frank Aydelotte, to 
appoint a network of national fellowship advisers.59 Ruml also allotted $16,500 to the 
emergency grant programme for German libraries devised by Ford, thus cementing the 
Memorial’s link to the Notgemeinschaft which administered the programme. In 1925 
and 1926, he also started grants for social science institutions in Europe, principally in 
Britain ($377,000), Germany ($70,000) and Sweden ($75,000). On top of that, 
$100,000 went to the Graduate Institute in Geneva.60 These institutional grants 
multiplied and resulted in a programme that until 1935 supported basic social science 
research in a dozen European countries.61 It is notable that Ruml decided not to make a 
large appropriation in France, a lacuna that has been explained by the theoretical bent of 
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French social scientists who taught, moreover, mostly in law faculties.62 Ruml might 
also have been influenced by Harold Laski who had advised him in 1923 that France 
held “little possibility”.63 Only after the Memorial had been amalgamated with the 
Rockefeller Foundation in 1929 did France receive similarly generous grants as other 
large European countries, starting with an institutional grant for a research institute in 
economics headed by Charles Rist.64  
In the field of international relations, Germany represented a key country for 
American foundations. German scholars enjoyed a high reputation among foundation 
officers who had mostly received some of their graduate education in the country. 
Another factor was the desire on the part of the Americans to smooth over the rifts 
caused by the war and to re-integrate Germany into an international scientific but also 
political community. With the exception of Britain, which was more important in the 
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial’s social science programme as a whole, Germany 
was the European country on which the foundations spent most attention in the 1920s. 
Germans made up the second-largest contingent of Laura Spelman Rockefeller 
Memorial fellows, after the British.65 As will be discussed later, the Memorial had even 
more ambitious plans for a national centre for the study of international relations in 
Berlin which, however, did not come to fruition. With the rise of Nazism in the early 
1930s, local conditions became less and less accommodating to a liberal venture such as 
that of the foundations and they directed their energies elsewhere, first to Britain and 
then to other European countries.  
In the larger European countries, the foundations were more likely to encounter 
government opposition to their plans for internationalist research and education. After 
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all, the international institutions set up by the foundations for the study and teaching of 
international relations had, with the exception of the publicity-oriented Dotation 
Carnegie, their seats in small states which, in an attempt to raise their profile, often 
competed for the privilege of hosting international organisations, be they of an 
intergovernmental or nongovernmental nature.66 Thus it is no accident that the German 
grant recipients in the field of international relations were private institutes, existing 
outside the state-run university system. Both of them, the Institut für Auswärtige Politik 
in Hamburg and the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik in Berlin, have been credited with 
laying the foundations for the institutionalisation of international relations as a 
discipline in Germany.67 The Institut für Auswärtige Politik has also been interpreted as 
a representative of the post-1919 foreign affairs institutes movement, alongside 
Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations.68  
Before analysing the foundations’ support for these two German institutions and 
the triangular relationship between philanthropy, grant recipients and German foreign 
policy that ensued, it is necessary to clarify to what extent the foundations’ programmes 
were part and parcel of American foreign policy in the interwar years. Standard 
accounts of the development of American cultural diplomacy claim that the non-
political, voluntarist system which marked the American approach to cultural relations 
in the interwar years and of which the foundations were an integral part differed greatly 
from that embraced by European countries. The latter has been summed up as 
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Kulturpolitik, culture in the service of power politics.69 While there certainly were 
differences—for a start, European states institutionalised the conduct of cultural 
relations several years earlier—the question remains whether they were differences in 
form or in substance. Hence, the relationship between the foundations and American 
foreign policy makers will be examined before moving on to the German case study and 
the trajectory of foundation policy in the late 1920s and early 1930s. 
 
Foundations and the State Department 
Throughout the 1920s and the 1930s, the philanthropic elite of the Carnegie and 
Rockefeller foundations retained a certain closeness to officials in the State Department, 
and in American embassies abroad. It is well-known that leading officers of the 
Carnegie Endowment in particular were regularly drafted as expert members of 
American delegations to intergovernmental conferences.70 This was also the case for 
some Rockefeller Foundation officers.71 James T. Shotwell’s role as the intellectual 
father of the Kellog-Briand pact is also recognised.72 And, of course, the numerous 
studies on international law which were  instigated and sponsored by the Carnegie 
Endowment served policy makers in the State Department. Rockefeller officers were 
also valued for their expertise and took part in informal consultations.73 Foundation 
leaders and trustees frequently belonged to a social elite which has been identified as the 
American foreign policy establishment. The best example here is probably elder 
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statesman Elihu Root who certainly enjoyed privileged access to decision makers in 
government.74 
For their part, foundation officers were keen on supporting projects that were 
favoured by U.S. policy makers. This led to a situation in which prospective grant 
applicants sought the State Department’s opinion on certain projects, realising that 
official approval would strengthen a proposal. Edwin Borchard, the prominent law 
professor who had participated in the Harvard Research, for instance, sent an outline of 
what later became the Yale Institute of International Studies to the State Department 
and requested a statement confirming that government officials would find “value in 
such a private agency for public service”.75 What Borchard really wanted was an official 
endorsement that he could then present to philanthropic backers.76 However, the State 
Department would merely send a personal letter of encouragement. Policy makers were 
not quite ready to outsource the creation and formulation of expertise and rely on 
private research institutes, as is clear from a State Department memorandum: 
While the Department, of course, could not call upon such an organization to 
make researches with respect to questions pending before it, and would 
seldom, if ever, need to do so since it has its own corps of experts to develop 
such questions, it is conceivable that reports of researches already made … 
might be utilized to advantage. The results of such researches could not, of 
course, be accepted at face value, but they would probably often save a great 
amount of work in the Department and in that way would be helpful.77 
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At least the State Department was not unsympathetic to the proposal. When Borchard 
approached the State Department again, asking for the assistance of the American 
embassies in London and Paris with a Carnegie Corporation funded investigation of 
state insolvency, government officials were happy to comply. James G. Rogers, 
Assistant Secretary of State, concluded “that inasmuch as the project was under 
Carnegie and Yale auspices I thought the Department might be willing to write a letter 
to the Ambassadors concerned”.78 The Carnegie stamp, as much as the affiliation with 
an Ivy League university, assured government officials that the project was worthwhile, 
when other initiatives probably would have received a less sympathetic hearing. 
Evidence of the State Department’s accommodating attitudes to foundations dates back 
to the 1910s.79  
Foundation officers not only maintained close contacts with the State 
Department but also with American diplomatic staff abroad. These contacts could range 
from informal consultation to the reining in of private philanthropic diplomacy or even 
to official attempts to use a foundation as a vehicle of American foreign policy. The 
State Department archives yield evidence for all of the above. Malcolm Davis of the 
Carnegie Endowment regularly conferred with the American consul at Geneva, Prentiss 
Gilbert, supplying him with information on the League Secretariat, various 
nongovernmental organisations around the League and American voluntary groups in 
Geneva.80 Gilbert, whose posting to Geneva lasted from 1930 to 1937, was an acute 
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observer of League business and insisted on its importance to the American national 
interest.81 
Nicholas Murray Butler’s annual ventures to European capitals, often connected 
with a sumptuous banquet in his honour and a lengthy speech, were unconcealed 
exercises in private diplomacy. On a 1931 visit to Hungary to receive honorary degrees 
from the universities of Budapest and Szeged, Butler delivered two public addresses, 
greeted with apprehension by S. Pinkney Tuck of the American Legation in Budapest, 
“for both subjects he selected were capable of interpretation and development along 
lines which might render my official presence distinctly embarrassing”. To Tuck’s 
relief, the speeches did not cause too much publicity in Hungary: “The local press 
contented itself with brief but flattering comments on Dr. Butler’s position in public life 
in the United States and the real pleasure with which the Hungarian Government 
welcomed him to Budapest.”82 Butler’s standing as a quasi-official figure certainly 
contained the potential for diplomatic ruptures. Yet, neither he nor any other American 
foundation representative was ever threatened with the Logan Act which prohibits 
unauthorised citizens from conducting American foreign policy. This had happened to 
Herbert Hoover, due to his involvement in World War I relief operations.83 In Butler’s 
case, however, the State Department tolerated a significant amount of unofficial 
diplomacy.  
In other cases, American diplomats encouraged it. One example is the issue of 
Balkan federation, a major concern of the Carnegie Endowment since its investigation 
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of the Balkan wars in 1913.84 The American legation in Athens supported Greek 
initiatives for pan-Balkan federation which gained momentum in 1929. While officials 
in Washington were sceptical—any movement for integration in the Balkans risked 
colliding with both the aims of the Little Entente and growing Italian expansionism—
and opposed giving the idea any direct encouragement, they were pleased when they 
heard that the American legation had managed to interest a representative of the 
Carnegie Endowment in the matter.85 The State Department’s Chief of Near Eastern 
Affairs concluded: “Thus it seems that the seed has found fertile soil and is growing. … 
This appeals to me as being the ideal solution of the question we have had in mind, as it 
seems desirable from all points of view that any offer which may be forthcoming should 
appear as emanating directly from the Carnegie Foundation.” Any insinuation of official 
backing, however, was to be avoided.86 The Carnegie Endowment did indeed support 
the Council of the Balkan Conferences which took place between 1930 and 1934 to the 
tune of $10,000 per annum, despite the opposition of its European Advisory Council.87 
Earle Babcock attended several Balkan Conferences as an unofficial observer, thus 
confirming the predictions of the American legation in Athens which, ever fond of 
horticultural metaphors, had forecast that “the seed … will strengthen and fructify 
entirely beyond the domain of the Department of State”.88 
The relationship between foundations and the State Department involved mutual 
trust and recognition, and a commitment to keeping the link discreet and outwardly 
‘unofficial’. From the archival evidence, it cannot be surmised that the State Department 
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was directing foundation policy. However, it was certainly prone to encouraging 
foundation activity that dovetailed with American foreign policy objectives. This 
approach helped especially the Rockefeller Foundation cultivate an image of 
impartiality and independence in its dealings abroad. Some scholars have tried to 
capture the nature of this relationship in Gramscian terms, assigning a “state spirit” to 
the foundations, meaning that they acted in the interest of the state, even if they were 
not of it. According to Inderjeet Parmar, such action included preparing American 
public opinion for an active, interventionist foreign policy which would enhance U.S. 
power in the world.89  
But this state-focused interpretation neglects that pushing the American state 
towards a globalist foreign policy was not on the top of the foundations’ agenda in the 
interwar years. Rather, philanthropic programmes helped construct a narrative which 
emphasised Americans’ positive role in international nongovernmental cooperation and 
portrayed the American nation as a disinterested, modern and rational force in the 
world. In some ways, this resembled U.S. banker’s diplomacy of the 1920s.90 
Foundations helped promote a distinctively American style of conducting foreign 
relations which held that American cultural policies were qualitatively different from 
European cultural policies. This was effective because it was persuasive. André Tibal, 
who ran the Carnegie Chair in Paris, was critical of official European cultural 
diplomacy as he was “convinced that any Minister of Foreign Affairs to whom you 
speak of the teaching of international relations will immediately and necessarily begin 
thinking how he can make that teaching a vehicle for his propaganda“. In contrast, the 
Dotation Carnegie was, Tibal proclaimed, completely “free and disinterested” as it was 
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not state-sponsored.91 This emphasis on the distinction between state and private, 
however, benefitted both the foundations and the American state. 
Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, there were two axioms of foundation 
behaviour towards the Department of State. First, the foundations did not publicly 
criticise American foreign policy, even if their behaviour at times contradicted it. An 
example of the latter is the foundations’ involvement in the League of Nations which 
flourished at a time when the State Department would not even acknowledge 
communications from Geneva. Second, American philanthropic foundations desired to 
appear more independent of official foreign policy than they really were. However, not 
all of their foreign collaborators quite believed this elaborate ruse. Thus Nicholas 
Murray Butler was treated like an American cultural attaché would have been and the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s grants were regarded as a way of “bringing the Americans 
in”. As for the State Department, its attitude towards the foundations was marked by 
general, if at times detached, benevolence: foundations were useful for those things that 
official diplomacy could not do itself. These attitudes underwent a change in the second 
half of the 1930s, along with the rest of American cultural diplomacy. For now, 
however, it can be concluded that the foundations were partners of the State Department 
but the initiative for their projects remained in New York and not in Washington. 
 
Cultural Diplomacy and International Relations Research in Germany92 
Contrary to the United States, in Germany the conduct of cultural relations was 
institutionalised shortly after the First World War. This allowed the systematic 
formulation of cultural policies and their implementation. The roots of German cultural 
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diplomacy lay with the cultured bourgeoisie (Bildungsbürger) which had started to 
discuss possible cultural alternatives to military might from the 1900s. France, a country 
which successfully projected its national culture abroad, was regarded as an example to 
be emulated.93 Bureaucrats and politicians took up this debate in the newly formed 
Weimar Republic and argued that Germany should try to expand its scientific and 
cultural influence to compensate for its lost great power status.94 In 1920, the Ministry 
of External Affairs created its department of cultural relations, the Kulturabteilung. It 
was responsible for German educational institutions in foreign countries, international 
scholarly exchange and the promotion of German culture and language abroad.95 During 
the 1920s, German cultural policies broadly pursued two aims: first, influencing 
domestic and international debates on the origins of the Great War, and second, ending 
the international scientific isolation of German scholars. 
The debates on the origins of the war had, of course, direct political relevance. 
Article 231 of the Versailles treaty, the so-called ‘war-guilt’ clause, was pivotal to 
German attempts at treaty revision.96 Interpreted as assigning moral responsibility for 
the war exclusively to Germany, the clause was a favourite target for the public and the 
Ministry of External Affairs alike. Officials fuelled campaigns against Article 231 and 
hoped to take the battle against the ‘war-guilt-lie’, the Kriegsschuldlüge, abroad, 
convinced that influencing public opinion in the former Allied countries would improve 
the prospects for revision.97 The Ministry created and funded organisations dedicated to 
supplying ever more ‘scientific’ arguments against German responsibility for the war. It 
                                                 
93 Eckard Michels, Von der Deutschen Akademie zum Goethe-Institut: Sprach- und auswärtige 
Kulturpolitik, 1923-1960 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 11-18. 
94 Hammerstein, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 35. 
95 Düwell, Deutschlands Auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 70-88, 103. 
96 Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919-1933 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 59. 
97 Michael Dreyer and Oliver Lembcke, Die deutsche Diskussion um die Kriegsschuldfrage (Berlin: 
Dunker & Humblot, 1993), 226-228; Erich J. C. Jahn, “The German Foreign Ministry and the Question of 
War Guilt in 1918-1919”, in German Nationalism and the European Response, 1890-1945, ed. Carole 
Fink, Isabel V. Hull, and MacGregor Knox (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 60. 
  164
also attempted to suppress publications by German scholars and archives that ran 
contrary to the official line.98  
The Kriegsschuldlüge campaign reaped its greatest success abroad with a multi-
volume collection of German diplomatic sources relating to the period from 1871 to 
1914, entitled Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette.99 The Ministry of External 
Affairs had commissioned it as an authoritative collection of documents that presented 
German pre-war diplomacy in the best possible light, and successfully put pressure on 
the Allied governments to open their archives in turn. The editorial board consisted of 
several well-respected German historians and was headed by Albrecht Mendelssohn-
Bartholdy who soon after became a key collaborator of the foundations. However, the 
Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette underwent an extensive vetting process by 
German diplomats before publication and the Ministry of External Affairs repeatedly 
intervened in the publication process. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy complained about this 
practice but other members of the editorial board justified this deviation from scholarly 
standards with political necessity. 100 
The second salient issue that concerned practitioners of German cultural 
diplomacy in the early 1920s was the international isolation of German scholars, caused 
by the ‘boycott’ imposed by the International Research Council between 1919 and 1926 
and the resulting counter-boycotts. Public opinion in the Allied countries veered 
towards the idea that the German academic elites had only themselves to blame as they 
had fully supported the German war effort and alienated colleagues abroad at the 
outbreak of war with aggressive statements such as the “Manifesto of the Ninety-three 
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Intellectuals”.101 As Ford and Coss had observed when they visited Germany, the 
boycott was exacerbated by the general funding crisis affecting the German university 
system after the war. Academic libraries were especially hard hit. The Bavarian State 
Library in Munich, for example, even had to cancel a subscription to the London Times 
which had been uninterrupted since 1852.102  
The boycott was never complete, though, and the Rockefeller Foundation was 
one of the key organisations subverting it. The German cultural relations elite explicitly 
acknowledged this.103 The Kulturabteilung desired to see the boycott’s final demise, 
especially as German diplomacy took a more conciliatory turn once membership in the 
League of Nations became an option. Since good relations with foreign cultural elites 
became ever more important in the era of Locarno, the Ministry of External Affairs 
encouraged German scholars to resume membership in international scientific 
associations.104 Foundation officers had their own reasons for opposing the boycott. On 
the one hand, they highly regarded the quality of Germany’s scientific output and felt 
obliged to give “a stimulus to productive scholarship which may offer a contribution to 
us all”.105 On the other hand, they feared that an isolated Germany might develop, as 
James T. Shotwell put it, “a rival line of European history based upon German theories, 
especially those dealing with the origin of the war”. 106 Foundation officers did not 
doubt that Germany was ultimately to blame for the outbreak of the First World War.107 
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Nevertheless, they thought that isolation would only harden revisionist positions, and so 
the foundations embarked on a policy of engagement. 
 
Writing the German Carnegie History 
This policy meant that the former Central powers were invited to participate in one of 
the biggest philanthropic projects of the 1920s.108 Shotwell, who had originally planned 
to organise the monumental Carnegie History along thematic lines, treating subjects 
such as finance or railway transportation in single, border-transcending volumes, 
resolved in 1920 to establish several national series of volumes which would be directed 
by national editorial boards.109 Thus, the organisation of the Carnegie History became a 
metaphor for philanthropic internationalism itself: national viewpoints were encouraged 
but with the aim of uniting them all in the same project.  
Shotwell organised the German series relatively late in the process and started to 
assemble an editorial board in 1921. He secured the collaboration of Mendelssohn-
Bartholdy and Carl Melchior, a Hamburg banker. Both men had been expert counsels to 
the German delegation at Versailles, sharing the peacemaking experience of so many of 
Shotwell’s collaborators, albeit on the other side of enemy lines. In 1923, as a reaction 
to debates on the origins of the war, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and Melchior co-founded 
the Institut für Auswärtige Politik which became an institutional base for the Carnegie 
History. The Institute’s journal Europäische Gespräche was the first foreign policy 
periodical in the Weimar Republic and had a substantial subscription base abroad.110 
The Institute’s methodological approach to international relations was the same as that 
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of Chatham House and the Council of Foreign Relations. It relied heavily on 
documentation, the assembling of facts which was seen as a scientific way of dealing 
with questions of international politics.111  
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy himself was a liberal democrat with pacifist leanings. 
He did support the revision of the Versailles Treaty but in a multilateral framework.112 
Part and parcel of this strategy was cooperation with Britain and the United States, the 
two Allies most favourable to treaty revision. Thus, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy’s 
collaboration with American foundations did not contradict his role within German 
cultural diplomacy in the slightest. To Shotwell, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy described 
Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, the publication he was editing at the behest 
of the Ministry of External Affairs, as a “parallel undertaking” of the Carnegie History, 
probably implying that the History would be similarly authoritative and 
comprehensive.113 In reality, the German volumes of the Economic and Social History 
of the World War were also subjected to similar levels of government intervention. 
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and co-editor Melchior intended to base the volumes 
they were responsible for on official documents. However, the editors soon encountered 
difficulties when one of their authors was refused access to files held by the German 
Ministry of the Interior. Melchior and Mendelssohn-Bartholdy appealed to several 
ministries in an attempt to generate official support for the Carnegie project, describing 
its purpose as to “give an objective account of the effects of the war and to contribute to 
a balancing of the different evaluations of the World War that are still prevalent in the 
world”. For Germany this would be the first opportunity “to participate in a discussion 
on an entirely equal footing with other countries” as the “the German volumes [were] on 
a par with those offered by England and France and describe[d] the economic and 
                                                 
111 Haase, Pragmatic Peacemakers, 33. 
112 Gantzel-Kress, “Geschichte des Instituts für Auswärtige Politik”, 34-37. 
113 Shotwell, Autobiography, 150. 
  168
political aspects of the conduct of the war in an objective and convincing fashion, 
especially to the audience in the United States”.114 As Melchior explained in a letter to 
the influential State Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, Ago von Maltzan, the 
German volumes of the Carnegie History could “supplement and, where necessary, 
correct Belgian, French and Polish accounts”. Melchior also warned that the 
government’s refusal to cooperate with regards to the publication would be interpreted 
as “a guilty plea confirming the existence of highly compromising material”, especially 
in the United States.115 
In the Defence and Finance Ministries, these arguments fell on deaf ears. The 
Carnegie History was vilified as a “cloak” used by “foreign enemies” for the purpose of 
“vicious propaganda”.116 However, the arguments of the Carnegie editorial board had 
convinced officials in the Ministry of External Affairs who concluded that the German 
contribution to the Carnegie History was “politically important” and that the editorial 
committee should therefore be granted access to government files.117 Since the 
American public was the main target of propaganda orchestrated by German diplomats, 
and since the volumes would be published in an international series, the Carnegie 
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project neatly slotted into the general pattern of officially sponsored ‘pre-emptive 
historiography’.118 Nonetheless, government cooperation came at a price. Manuscripts 
prepared for the Carnegie History had to be submitted to the relevant authorities for 
review, while some topics were out of bounds.119 To ensure compliance with these 
conditions a governmental committee regularly met with the editorial board.120 By 
seeking government cooperation, Melchior and Mendelssohn-Bartholdy exposed the 
Carnegie History to the influence and censorship of state authorities. Some volumes 
were not published due to government interference, to the disappointment of Shotwell 
who thought that “the politicians were merely hurting Germany’s case by refusing to 
open up the economic and social costs of war”.121 There were also cases of self-
censorship, as Alfred Vagts, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy’s assistant at the Institut für 
Auswärtige Politik, recounted.122  
But then, it had never been Shotwell’s ambition to publish a history that would 
not pass official scrutiny. His surprise at a certain level of censorship and his outrage 
directed at “the politicians” seem slightly disingenuous. Any state has an interest in 
keeping secrets, and as the files of the Ministry of External Affairs make clear, career 
civil servants (not politicians) cautioned against releasing into the public domain war-
related information that might be used to Germany’s disadvantage. One concrete case 
involved a request for information on the requisitioning of goods by the occupying 
German army in war-time Poland, an issue that came before a mixed arbitral tribunal 
after the war, with Poland seeking substantial compensation. In the post-1919 
international order in which conflicts were increasingly decided by way of international 
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litigation, relevant information that might sway a legal case became precious. Thus, the 
Ministry of External Affairs had good reason to suppress a planned Carnegie History 
volume on war-time economic practices in territories which had been occupied by the 
German army, even if this had a negative impact on relations with an influential 
American foundation.123 Indeed, the fact that the German government had prevented the 
publication of some volumes was reported in foreign newspaper reviews of the 
Carnegie History.124 In more subtle ways, though, the German series of the Carnegie 
History also undermined Kulturabteilung propaganda, simply by offering a perspective 
on the war that did not revolve around the Kriegsschuldlüge. The Carnegie volumes on 
the impact of the Great War on crime or on public health did break new ground and 
broke the mould of the officially perpetuated discourse on the war’s origins.125 
 
Foundation Funding for National Institutes of Foreign Affairs in Germany 
After 1923 Mendelssohn-Bartholdy seems to have avoided much contact with the 
Ministry of External Affairs which failed to recruit him for “further influencing” the 
Carnegie Endowment.126 However, he secured the support of another American 
foundation for his work and his institute. From 1926 to 1930, the Institut für Auswärtige 
Politik received funding from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, totalling 
$20,000.127 In addition, staff at the Institute held Memorial fellowships. Alfred Vagts, 
who later became a well-known international historian, went to the United States for 
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one year in 1927.128 The Memorial grants were generally used for special research 
projects, for example on the League of Nations mandate system, the concept of the 
state, or the practice of diplomacy before 1914. Some money was used for work on 
Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette and towards publication costs. The Memorial 
grant also facilitated international contacts as it enabled the librarian of the Institut für 
Auswärtige Politik to study the methods of the Royal Institute for International Affairs, 
whose librarian in turn paid a reciprocal visit to Hamburg.129 Given the importance of 
the documentary approach, this type of exchange was highly relevant to spreading 
methodologies in the field of international relations. 
Beardsley Ruml seems to have been satisfied with the work of the Institut für 
Auswärtige Politik as he intended to expand it with Rockefeller support. Just before the 
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial was merged with the Rockefeller Foundation, 
Ruml proposed it as a “splendid opportunity” for further involvement, and suggested 
building an institute “to house all of the social sciences”.130 However, this plan faltered 
because of a lack of support from the relevant authorities in Hamburg who would have 
had to co-finance such an institution. Nevertheless, if it had been possible to move the 
Institute away from the relatively provincial Hamburg, and possibly to Berlin, 
Rockefeller support may have continued.131 The grants ended in 1930 but Mendelssohn-
Bartholdy remained a member of the philanthropic network and participated in 
Rockefeller-sponsored research projects. The Rockefeller Foundation also assisted him 
when he had to emigrate to Britain in 1934 as a refugee from Nazism.132 Carnegie and 
Rockefeller support for the Institut für Auswärtige Politik remained narrow as, given its 
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small size and location, the Institute could only have a limited impact on the political 
and academic culture of the Weimar Republic. Another institution became more 
prominent in the policies of both foundations, the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik.133 
Founded in 1920, the Hochschule loosely collaborated with the Institut für 
Auswärtige Politik in Berlin. Nonetheless, their objectives were quite different. While 
the Hamburg institute had been designed as a research institute from the start, the 
founders of the Hochschule stressed the educational role of their school. Thus, the 
Hochschule cannot be classified as a foreign affairs institute but should be seen in the 
tradition of elite education pioneered in the 1870s by the French École libre des 
sciences politiques which aimed to provide specialist knowledge for administrative and 
political elites. The Berlin school tried to do the same for the Weimar Republic but also 
offered general courses for a lay audience under the label ‘citizen’s education’. From 
the mid-1920s the number of courses at university level was increased. The school 
established permanent professorships and professional academics replaced politicians 
and civil servants as teachers. In 1930, parts of the curriculum were accredited as 
university courses. Yet although the Hochschule was able to enhance its academic 
reputation over time, the overall emphasis remained on teaching.134 
The founders of the academy emerged from the ‘national-liberal’ milieu around 
Friedrich Naumann. They supported the constitutional consensus of the Weimar 
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Republic, even if most of them were Vernunftrepublikaner, ‘republicans by reason’, 
who lacked a firm commitment to parliamentary democracy as such.135 They aimed to 
create an institution that was above party lines. By fostering a political elite the 
Hochschule hoped to contribute to a national renewal after the lost war.136 Some 
members of the founding generation were politically on the right, for example the 
conservative historian Otto Hoetzsch. Young scholars like Herrmann Heller, Hajo 
Holborn and Sigmund Neumann represented the liberal left. From 1927, there was an 
influx of anti-democratic scholars from the radical right, a development that threatened 
the Hochschule’s original maxim to remain open to all parties, except those on the 
extremes.137 
The Hochschule had excellent links with the political and administrative elites of 
the Republic. Ernst Jäckh, its well-connected director and president since 1930, was a 
compulsive networker. He had made a name for himself as a publicist and expert on 
Turkey before the war, and had acted as an advisor to the Ministry of External Affairs. 
During the Weimar era, Jäckh maintained an informal relationship with the ministerial 
bureaucracy and also held prominent positions in countless professional and political 
associations, notably the German League of Nations Union (Deutsche Liga für 
Völkerbund). Tirelessly seeking official backing for his Hochschule, he managed to 
recruit a number of illustrious people for its Board of Trustees, for example Chief 
Justice Walter Simons, the industrialist Robert Bosch and the banker Hjalmar 
Schacht.138 
Jäckh was crucial for establishing the Hochschule’s international contacts, 
especially with regards to bringing in the support of American foundations. In the 
winter of 1924/1925 he travelled to New York where he met Nicholas Murray Butler, 
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the president of the Carnegie Endowment.139 Jäckh’s visit occurred at a time when 
Butler himself was seeking to establish official relations between the Carnegie 
Endowment and the German government. A letter from Butler to Foreign Minister 
Gustav Stresemann in April 1925 was followed by several conversations between Butler 
and Ago von Maltzan, who had left Berlin in 1925 to take up the post of German 
ambassador in Washington.140 Maltzan saw clear advantages in a stronger relationship 
between the Endowment and German government circles:  
Because of its large assets—since 1913 the Endowment has spent on average 
more than half a million dollars, in some years significantly more—the Carnegie 
Endowment has remarkable opportunities to influence public opinion in all 
countries, especially in intellectual circles. We must not miss this opportunity to 
achieve a more favourable attitude towards Germany.141 
 
Of course, the Endowment, mainly through the Dotation, had already established links 
with German pacifists in 1921. These, however, were often highly critical of 
government policies, especially with regard to Germany’s attempts to circumvent 
rearmament restrictions. It is no accident that, shortly after Butler conferred with 
Maltzan, the Endowment attempted to sever its relations with the pacifists.142 
Jäckh succeeded in using his official contacts to ensure that prospective 
benefactors of the Hochschule were welcomed in Berlin. When Butler visited in June 
1926 he was treated to a high-profile dinner. The numerous guests included several 
business leaders, politicians, professors, the U.S. ambassador and Stresemann 
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himself.143 Jäckh asked Maltzan to ensure that other Endowment representatives were 
also received well.144 The efforts paid off and in March 1927 the Carnegie Endowment 
created a “Carnegie Chair for International Relations and History” at the Hochschule. 
As in Paris, the Carnegie Chair offered a series of public lectures, most of which were 
on current affairs. In Berlin, however, there was no permanent incumbent at first. The 
lectures were given by an international roster of academics, members of international 
organisations or former government officials. Scholars who lectured on the Carnegie 
Chair included the German philologist Ernst Robert Curtius, the Dutch historian Johan 
Huizinga, and the well-known French commentator on North America, André Siegfried. 
Albert Thomas, the head of the International Labour Organisation, spoke on Franco-
German relations in 1928. William Rappard gave a lecture on the League’s mandates 
system, and Alfred Zimmern, who had recently been appointed as the Montague Burton 
Professor of International Relations at Oxford, spoke in his capacity as an international 
relations specialist.145 The character of the Chair changed slightly in 1931 when a 
permanent professorship was established by the Endowment in response to concerns at 
the Hochschule that the existing format was not academic enough. Hajo Holborn, a 
diplomatic historian, was the first (and only) incumbent.146  
Even after Holborn’s appointment the guest lectures continued. The Endowment 
favoured this format as it brought foreign scholars to Berlin and generated a significant 
amount of news coverage.147 From the beginning, Butler had impressed on Jäckh the 
importance of international cooperation, suggesting that he “establish friendly relations 
and cooperation both with the British Institute for International Affairs … and with the 
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Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales in Paris”.148 Using the contacts of the 
Endowment, the Hochschule succeeded in becoming part of a network of institutes, the 
Conference of Institutes for the Scientific Study of International Relations.149 This 
association also included the Institut für Auswärtige Politik, the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs in London and the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études 
Internationales in Geneva. Its first meeting was held in Berlin, with the participation of 
Earle Babcock for the Dotation Carnegie. Jäckh dutifully reported this achievement to 
the Kulturabteilung in the German Ministry of External Affairs.150 
The collaboration between Endowment and Hochschule was cemented by 
cordial relations between Butler and Jäckh. After a trip to Berlin in 1930, Butler 
declared that this visit had been “the high-water mark of my European experiences 
during more than forty years”.151 Butler may have enjoyed this particular sojourn so 
much because Jäckh had involved him in a new project for international conciliation, a 
foundation commemorating the recently deceased Gustav Stresemann. Mission and 
organisational structure of the planned Stresemann-Memorial-Foundation bore a 
striking resemblance to those of the Carnegie Endowment. The new foundation’s aim 
was to “examine the real conditions and requirements for peaceful relations between 
states and nations in all areas and to disseminate the results of these inquiries”.152 An 
associated “Peace Academy” would conduct scientific research on peace, disseminate 
knowledge, encourage international understanding, offer a space for international 
collaboration and educate public opinion.153 
What Butler did not know was that the Academy’s original name had been “War 
Academy” and not “Peace Academy”, and that Jäckh had hatched the plan with Julius 
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Curtius, the acting Minister of External Affairs.154 The late 1920s saw a number of 
projects that attempted to institutionalise peace research and Jäckh’s proposal was an 
attempt to take part in an international competition for funds and influence. The 
Ministry of External Affairs listed several such “competing plans from abroad”: a chair 
for peace science at the University of Lyon, an “École de la Paix” planned by Louise 
Weiss, publisher of the influential French journal L’Europe Nouvelle, and a “Plan 
Shotwell” for an “Institute of Europe” in Geneva.155 Indeed, as the new head of the 
American Social Science Research Council’s Advisory Committee on International 
Relations, Shotwell had launched a plethora of ideas for new foreign affairs institutes 
and mechanisms that would coordinate their activities on an international level, 
accompanied by a frenzy of activity in 1930 and 1931.156 But Jäckh, possibly acting 
with official encouragement, had persuaded Shotwell to give up his Geneva plans in 
favour of the new Peace Academy.157 Butler conducted the fundraising effort for the 
Stresemann Memorial in the United States, putting together an American support 
committee. The Carnegie Endowment itself pledged 100,000 marks.158 
Designated president of the Stresemann Memorial was Julius Curtius, the 
Minister of External Affairs. He announced the creation of the Memorial and the Peace 
Academy on American radio on 21 June 1930.159 Only four days after his radio 
appearance, Curtius demanded “full political freedom and equality of rights” for 
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Germany in the Reichstag, marking a move towards a more assertive foreign policy.160 
Those who watched German politics closely had strong misgivings about Curtius’s role 
as a patron of peace research. The former Agent General for Reparation Payments S. 
Parker Gilbert refused to join the American support committee for the following 
reasons: 
I had the greatest admiration for Dr. Stresemann and his work and would be happy 
to share in a movement to honour his memory. But I have some fear that the 
German mind would regard an Academy of this kind as an instrument of German 
foreign policy rather than as a memorial to Dr. Stresemann, and there are many 
indications nowadays that German foreign policy is no longer the foreign policy of 
Dr. Stresemann.161 
 
Butler encountered further setbacks during his fundraising campaign for the Stresemann 
Memorial. Potential donors were struggling with the impact of the Depression and 
proved unwilling to give. More than a year after Curtius’s announcement, the 
Stresemann Memorial still only existed on paper.162  
Jäckh’s ambitious plans and hopes for the Stresemann Memorial in Berlin were 
left unfulfilled, despite Butler’s best efforts in New York. Nevertheless, the project was 
of interest to Rockefeller representatives in Paris and New York. The plan created 
sufficient momentum to bring the Hochschule back into the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
network of grant recipients. The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial had already 
supported the Hochschule with emergency grants in 1926 and 1928.163 However, on the 
grounds of the Rockefeller Foundation’s German fellowship adviser’s reports, 
subsequent applications had been rejected. The fellowship adviser had described the 
Hochschule as an innovative, promising institution but also, correctly, identified its 
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main activity as teaching.164 The Rockefeller Foundation, however, was only willing to 
support research activity.165 
The first two years after taking over from the Memorial in 1929 served as a time 
of reorientation for the Rockefeller Foundation’s Social Science Division. Thus it did 
not commit any institutional funds to Germany but considered a number of projects. 
Under Beardsley Ruml, the Memorial had followed an interdisciplinary, relatively 
eclectic social science programme which was oriented towards basic research and only 
implicitly cited international relations as a special interest. The newly created Division 
of Social Sciences, however, singled out three areas of concentration, namely 
international relations, economic stabilisation and public administration.166 To some 
extent, this focus reflected the impact of the world economic crisis which had decreased 
the income of foundations and highlighted the practical importance of certain fields of 
research.167 Rockefeller officers now also explicitly announced their intention to create 
“strong national centers” for the study of international relations, parallel to their 
involvement in Geneva.168  
One idea floated among Rockefeller officers harked back to Ruml’s original plan 
for a social science research institute in Germany, and entailed expanding the Kaiser-
Wilhelm-Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (Kaiser-Wilhelm-
Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht) in Berlin into a research 
centre for international law and international relations. The Rockefeller trustees 
earmarked $750,000 for this venture, significantly more than the Memorial had ever 
given to any other institution in Europe, with the exception of the London School of 
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Economics.169 However, the project never got past the stage of informal discussions and 
the announcement of the Stresemann Academy as a rival project caused the Rockefeller 
Foundation to shelve the plan.170 
Once it became clear, though, that the Stresemann Memorial had not made any 
progress, Rockefeller Foundation officers became more receptive to new proposals in 
the area of international relations. Again, personal relationships between foundation 
representatives and long-term collaborators were crucial. Schmidt-Ott, head of the 
Notgemeinschaft and also member of the Stresemann Memorial’s governing board, 
approached Ruml with the idea of requesting Rockefeller funds for the stalled Peace 
Academy. Schmidt-Ott, Ruml and Jäckh agreed on the wording of a grant application 
made to the Rockefeller Foundation. As a result, a grant of $25,000 was awarded to a 
‘Notgemeinschaft-Committee for Research in International Relations’ in December 
1931.171 The Hochschule itself received an even larger grant. In April 1932, the 
Rockefeller Foundation awarded $90,000 over three years for its research 
programme.172 
What had caused this change of heart? First, once Jäckh realised that the 
Foundation would only support research-oriented institutions, he and the new director 
of the Hochschule, Arnold Wolfers, tailored grant applications accordingly. From the 
late 1920s, research activities at the Hochschule had indeed increased, and the 
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requirements of the Rockefeller Foundation may have accelerated this process.173 
Second, to present their case more convincingly, Jäckh and Wolfers increasingly 
arranged personal meetings with Rockefeller officers in Paris, often organised through 
the Dotation Carnegie.174 Thereby they were able to bypass local advisers of the 
Rockefeller Foundation whose opinions were still taken seriously, even though the 
Rockefeller Paris office had assumed full responsibility for the awarding of fellowships 
and smaller grants in 1929.175 Rockefeller policy changed, too. Worried by the tense 
political situation in Germany, foundation officers put more and more emphasis on what 
they perceived to be a “liberal spirit” at the Hochschule. Selskar M. Gunn, the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s vice-president in Europe, was under no illusion that the 
quality and quantity of research projects conducted at the Hochschule were limited. 
Regardless of these concerns, he viewed the institution as “an extremely significant and 
important center in a country whose importance it is unnecessary to discuss”. 
Favourable comments by British scholars who had described the Hochschule as “a real 
ray of light in Germany, as far as an objective attitude in connection with international 
affairs is concerned” also influenced Gunn’s judgment. He concluded that the 
Hochschule should be supported, even if only to strengthen a liberal institution in an 
academic landscape that was increasingly affected by assaults from the extreme right: 
“The very existence of an institution in Germany which has the objective attitude and 
scientific spirit in problems in the social sciences is an encouraging fact, and, in my 
opinion, the chief argument for aid from the Foundation.”176 
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Thus the Rockefeller Foundation ended up pursuing a two-fold strategy for its 
international relations programme in Germany: some research took place within a 
collaborative framework set up by the Notgemeinschaft, and some was conducted, less 
successfully, at the Hochschule. The Notgemeinschaft Committee was composed of 
virtually the same members as the corresponding Stresemann Committee.177 Initially, its 
meetings were dominated by Julius Curtius, whose proposals for research topics 
exhausted themselves in German reparations, international migration and settlement, the 
Polish Corridor and limits of arbitration, reflecting the tendency of the Ministry of 
External Affairs to use scholarship for power political aims. The committee adopted two 
of the suggestions (the Polish Corridor and reparations) as part of a long list of research 
topics. These topics included international economic relations, tariffs, the concept of the 
state and political science terminology, thus reflecting the multi-disciplinary and 
eclectic nature of the field of international relations at the time.178 
Gunn admitted to “some forebodings” regarding the research on the Polish 
Corridor but decided that this would be a test for the committee. “It will be interesting 
to see how objective the Germans can be in this investigation.”179 During the second 
year of the committee’s existence, Curtius’s suggestions had vanished from the agenda, 
and some promising interdisciplinary approaches had developed, for example that of 
Alfred Weber’s research group at the University of Heidelberg which combined 
political science, sociology and psychology in a study on foreign policy.180 Research 
conducted at the Hochschule, however, did not meet Rockefeller expectations. “During 
the past year it has taken the form of unsystematic, individual research by members of 
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the staff, according to their several interests and inclinations.”181 Interestingly, 
foundation officers did not comment on the fact that many Hochschule teachers writing 
on international questions did not espouse the supposed “liberal spirit” there. A striking 
example was Max H. Boehm, an explicitly anti-Weimar irredentist.182 
It is difficult to give a rounded assessment of the Rockefeller Foundation’s work 
in international relations in Weimar Germany, as the collaborations ended prematurely 
and abruptly. After Hitler came to power in 1933, it soon became clear that the 
Hochschule would cease to exist in its original form. Jäckh tried to convince the 
Rockefeller Foundation not to withdraw its funding but by obscuring the real situation 
at the Hochschule, he made himself look increasingly suspicious. His short-lived 
attempts to act as a mediator between Nazi Germany and other countries equally 
damaged his credibility with the Foundation.183 In May 1933, the Rockefeller 
Foundation finally decided to terminate its support. In June, the Carnegie Endowment 
followed suit, although it was never able to recuperate the money it had donated to the 
Stresemann Memorial Foundation.184 The Rockefeller grant to the Notgemeinschaft 
ended in 1934, coinciding with Schmidt-Ott’s forced resignation.185 
Most of the Hochschule staff lost their appointments and emigrated. Many ended 
up at the New School for Social Research in New York. A plan developed by Arnold 
Wolfers, which had envisioned transferring some of the Hochschule work to the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs in London, came to nothing. This would have allowed 
Hochschule staff who had lost their jobs to remain in Germany while working under the 
auspices of Chatham House. The Rockefeller Foundation’s Paris office supported the 
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plan and was willing to co-fund it, especially since the collaboration with Chatham 
House, which had received a substantial Foundation grant in 1932, was going well. 
After it became clear, though, that the German authorities demanded a say in the 
selection of researchers working under this scheme, the plan was abandoned.186 Wolfers 
himself emigrated to the United States, where he took up a position at Yale and later 
became a prominent figure at the Yale Institute of International Studies.187 Jäckh moved 
to Britain where he became involved with the New Commonwealth Institute, a private 
research and propaganda institute which advocated the establishment of an international 
police force. He also came back into the fold of the Rockefeller Foundation which first 
topped up his salary at the New Commonwealth Institute and then supported a research 
project of Jäckh’s when he moved to the Graduate Institute in Geneva.188 
The Hochschule itself came under the direction of Goebbels’ Ministry for 
Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda. Teaching continued on a smaller scale and 
according to Nazi guidelines. In 1940, the Hochschule became part of the University of 
Berlin and was transformed into the Deutsches Auslandswissenschaftliches Institut 
(German Institute for Foreign Studies), a research and teaching institute designed to 
deliver relevant knowledge to the Nazi war effort. The Institut für Auswärtige Politik in 
Hamburg suffered a similar fate. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy had to give up his chair at the 
University of Hamburg in September 1933, and in March 1934 was forced to resign as 
the director of the Institute. A former staff member of the Hochschule called Friedrich 
Berber took over and in 1937 moved the Institute to Berlin, where it became an 
instrument of Nazi propaganda.189 
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A Watershed in 1933? 
Of course it seems opportune to terminate the story of foundation involvement with 
German foreign affairs institutes in 1933. After all, the experience of a Nazi takeover of 
supposedly objective and scientific institutions must have been eminently sobering for 
foundation officers, maybe even inducing them to question their policies. Moreover, 
one would assume that further transnational intellectual exchange was not encouraged 
by a totalitarian regime. Except that to conclude here would leave out the end of the 
story. As is well known, Rockefeller involvement with Germany did not stop in 1933. 
In the natural sciences, Rockefeller grants to institutions continued to flow until the late 
1930s, albeit accompanied by much internal debate and recrimination within the 
Foundation itself. In the social sciences, ostensibly much more vulnerable to 
politicisation, grants to institutions stopped, but individual scholars from Nazi Germany 
could still receive fellowships.190  
In purely financial terms, certainly, there was a definite break, as even individual 
fellowships to German scholars could not make up for the end of large-scale 
institutional funding. Other European institutions, notably the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs in London, attracted the philanthropic funds which might have 
gone to Germany in the course of the 1930s.191 Chatham House had been on the 
Rockefeller radar from 1927, when John D. Rockefeller, Jr. provided the Institute with a 
private gift to enable it to develop its Study Group programme. In May 1932, this was 
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followed by a Foundation grant of $150,000 over five years.192 The disappearance of the 
Berlin and Hamburg institutes as potential recipients of funding in 1933 strengthened 
Chatham House’s position with philanthropic backers. 
Nevertheless, for Rockefeller Foundation officers, Germany was not out of the 
picture. Neither were the Carnegie Endowment’s links to Germany cut off after 1933. 
As will be seen in the next chapter, both foundations encouraged the continued 
participation of German scholars in the transnational networks they had started to build 
up in the course of the late 1920s and early 1930s. As before 1933, philanthropic 
networks were exploited by revisionist powers to push particular foreign policy aims. 
The momentary rupture caused by the Nazi rise to power should not detract from the 
continuities that mark the relationship between foundations and official cultural 
diplomacy. 
 The case of the Stresemann Academy illustrates how foreign ministries 
attempted to harness and exploit popular movements for international conciliation and 
how foundations, in their role as mediators between state power and nongovernmental 
organisations, were the unwitting instruments of these attempts. German government 
officials saw the presence of philanthropic foundations as an important asset in 
Germany’s cultural relations, which could be exploited to reach foreign policy aims. 
The Ministry of External Affairs tried to manipulate the relationships between 
foundations and collaborators, influencing their form and outcome and effectively 
limiting transnational agency. After all, the announcement of the Stresemann Academy 
had an impact on the transnational contest between several models of international 
affairs institutes as it blocked similar ventures. 
Occasionally, foundation officers were uneasy with the closeness between those 
engaged in research in international relations and policy makers, for example in the case 
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of the Notgemeinschaft Committee on International Relations and its research on the 
Polish Corridor. But that did not make them question the fundamentals of their own 
approach. By the early 1930s, foundation policy had evolved and become increasingly 
sophisticated. Moreover, organising objective international relations research along 
national lines at first seemed to be entirely possible due to the methodological 
dominance of the documentary approach which had been developed in the Anglo-
American foreign affairs institutes. Another influential approach was that of the Study 
Group, pioneered by Chatham House, a process of distilling scientific knowledge into 
policy-ready reports.193 Foundation officers were convinced that they had found a 
mechanism of organising research and discussion of international affairs that would 
satisfy both scientific and political aspirations and fuse the national and international 
dimension in a more satisfactory way than that followed by the international institutes 
which had been established in the early and mid-1920s. 
A Rockefeller Foundation staff conference in which the international relations 
programme was discussed summed up this approach:  
[There are t]wo conceptions of desirable development, one involving the creation 
of [a] great international organization with branches in different countries for [an] 
objective scientific approach to international problems, the other that of starting a 
considerable number of national institutes, analyzing and discussing international 
problems under strictly national auspices with an idea that these institutes might 
subsequently come together in some sort of conference or union.194 
 
The “conference or union” was to become the International Studies Conference on 
which many of the hopes of Rockefeller and Carnegie officers rested during the 1930s 
and which is the subject of the next chapter. 
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4 
Competing Internationalisms: American Foundations and the 
International Studies Conference 
 
In July 1936, José Castillejo, the Spanish member of the League of Nations’ 
International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, favourably remarked on a 
scholarly association called the International Studies Conference. It was, Castillejo 
claimed, evolving into a “League of Public Opinion”, an independent body which 
exercised an increasing influence on policy.1 The International Studies Conference 
(ISC) had begun its life as the clumsily labelled Conference of Institutes for the 
Scientific Study of International Relations before adopting a more elegant name in 
1933.2 However, the original label denoted exactly what it was, a federation of 
institutions dedicated to a ‘scientific’ approach to international relations. The ISC held a 
series of annual meetings on international affairs which in the mid-1930s hosted 
delegates from twenty-six nations.3 In the course of its existence, the ISC developed a 
sophisticated mechanism for the multidisciplinary study and discussion of questions that 
were of immediate relevance to international politics. Although assessments of the 
ISC’s importance vary, it is certain that the name of almost any renowned scholar 
writing on international relations in the interwar years can be found on its lists of 
conference attendance or its publication records.4 
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The International Studies Conference, even though it had started out as a League 
initiative, came under the complete control of American philanthropic foundations. In 
particular, the foundations and with them the American cultural relations elite furthered 
the politicisation of the ISC in an attempt to turn it into a para-diplomatic entity. The 
Rockefeller Foundation paid for administrative costs and bankrolled many of the 
participating institutions. The Carnegie Endowment did the same, although on a much 
smaller scale. A considerable number of conference delegates were alumni of 
Rockefeller and Carnegie fellowship programmes. At one point, the director of the 
Dotation Carnegie presided over the ISC’s programme committee. Supporting the 
International Studies Conference represented the culmination of both the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s and the Carnegie Endowment’s joint efforts to build up institutions for the 
study of international relations in Europe, both on a national and on an international 
basis. As has been outlined in previous chapters, in the course of the 1920s and early 
1930s Rockefeller and Carnegie funds had been channelled to such institutions, 
including the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik in Berlin, the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales in 
Geneva and the Academy of International Law at The Hague, all of which were 
constitutive ISC members.  
The ISC was founded in 1928 under the auspices of the International Institute of 
Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) in Paris, one of the organs of the League of Nations’ 
Intellectual Cooperation Organisation. The IIIC acted as a secretariat to the ISC and 
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organised its annual conferences. Rockefeller and Carnegie funds towards the running 
of the ISC were channelled through this body, which, by virtue of its League 
association, had its origins in an intergovernmental agreement. Thus, coordinating the 
scientific study of international relations through the mechanism of the ISC had the 
foundations deeply involved in the complexities of intergovernmental and League 
politics. In addition, from the mid-1930s, the ISC was also the target of aggressive 
cultural diplomacy from the dictatorships, in particular Germany. All of the questions 
pertinent to philanthropic internationalism in the interwar years came to the fore in the 
ISC. Was a ‘scientific study’ of international relations possible? If yes, what would it 
look like? To what extent did the funding of the study of international relations in 
foreign countries, and the foundations’ involvement in the cooperation of scholars and 
intellectuals across national borders, constitute cultural diplomacy? Could transnational 
nongovernmental agencies like the foundations successfully cooperate with 
intergovernmental institutions? Is the opposition between intergovernmentalism and a 
transnational civil society supposedly free from government intrusion even a valid one 
to make? This chapter will examine these questions by analysing the origins and 
outcomes of the foundations’ support for the ISC. It will assess the importance of this 
first, and understudied, international association for the study of international relations 
which, without foundation support, would not have thrived in the way it did. 
 
Foundations and Intellectual Cooperation under the League of Nations 
In order to understand the foundations’ stance towards the ISC, it is necessary to 
examine American involvement in League initiatives for intellectual cooperation in 
general, an area in which the foundations also played a crucial role. American 
philanthropy was indirectly connected even to the first attempts to institutionalise 
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international intellectual cooperation in a League context.5 While the League Covenant 
did not mention intellectual matters, the issue was pushed onto the international agenda 
from 1920 by francophone civil society groups which happened to be recent 
beneficiaries of the Dotation Carnegie. Paul Otlet and Henri La Fontaine, leaders of the 
Brussels-based Union des associations internationales, lobbied the League Council and 
Assembly with a proposal to turn their own organisation into the League’s technical 
body for intellectual work. At the same time, the French League of Nations Association, 
the Association française pour la Société des nations, presented Secretary-General Eric 
Drummond with an alternative outline for the organisation of intellectual cooperation 
under the League. French government officials within the Ministry for Public 
Instruction recognised the importance of these nongovernmental initiatives and set out 
to harness them for the benefit of France, traditionally the leading nation in matters 
cultural and intellectual and a pioneer in the field of bilateral cultural diplomacy. 
Although a sceptical Quai d’Orsay feared that intellectual internationalism under 
League auspices would interfere with France’s national educational system, the Belgian 
competition in the form of the Union des Associations Internationales finally convinced 
the Foreign Ministry that France would be better off co-opting new multilateral League 
initiatives rather than opposing them.6  
Thus, despite its initially reticent attitude towards organised international 
intellectual cooperation, the French government set out to dominate it once the League 
Assembly adopted a resolution for the creation of the International Committee on 
Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) in September 1921. France tried to safeguard its 
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influence by ensuring that a majority of the new commission’s members would be 
sympathetic to the French point of view, even though the League Secretariat prevailed 
in an argument over whether ICIC members should represent governments or be 
appointed by virtue of their intellectual distinction. The ICIC was set up as a 
consultative organ of the League Council and met in Geneva only for a few days per 
year. Thus, in 1924 the French government offered to fund a permanent executive organ 
of the underfinanced ICIC. The International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) 
was thus established in Paris and inaugurated in January 1926. Its director Julien 
Luchaire had previously been inspector-general of public instruction in France and 
presided over a largely French staff at the Institute.7 Luchaire had ambitious plans for 
his organisation and hastily expanded its employee numbers and projects. He sought to 
turn the IIIC into the global centre of intellectual life, removed from the oversight of 
Geneva. Moreover, under his leadership, the IIIC also drifted towards being an 
extension of French cultural diplomacy. This, as well as the vagueness and 
inefficiencies of the IIIC’s programme, brought him into open conflict with the ICIC in 
1929 which led to a reorganisation of the League’s intellectual cooperation work and to 
Luchaire’s replacement by Henri Bonnet, a member of the League Secretariat, in 1930.8 
 American foundations became directly involved with the new League 
institutions for intellectual cooperation. The Dotation Carnegie established relations 
with the IIIC in Paris even before the institute officially opened its doors. Along with 
several international nongovernmental organisations such as the International 
Federation of League of Nations Societies, the Girl Guides and the International 
Organisation of Secondary School Teachers, the Dotation was invited to form the 
Comité d’Entente des Grandes Associations Internationales under the auspices of the 
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IIIC in December 1925.9 In collaboration with the IIIC, the Comité d’Entente promoted 
international educational cooperation, especially with regard to education in the aims of 
the League of Nations.10 The inclusion of the Dotation, which was, after all, neither a 
professional association nor a grass-roots based nongovernmental organisation, in the 
Comité d’Entente indicated on the one hand that the Carnegie Endowment was regarded 
as an important player in the field of intellectual cooperation by the IIIC and on the 
other hand how eager Luchaire was to foster a cordial relationship with American 
foundations. Thus, he aided the Dotation’s work, for example by publishing an article 
on Dotation events in the very first edition of the IIIC’s journal.11 
Endowment officers in New York reciprocated the good will extended to them 
and invited Luchaire to a Carnegie-sponsored conference in the United States.12 In the 
following years, the two organisations frequently collaborated on various projects, for 
example an investigation into school history textbooks.13 By 1929 Babcock was able to 
praise the “bonne collaboration” between IIIC and Dotation.14 However, his reports to 
the Carnegie Endowment’s trustees in New York also contained plenty of negative 
remarks on the Institute which he thought was poorly organised and led.15 It is a 
testimony to Babcock’s diplomatic sensibility that he found it wise as the representative 
of an American foundation in Paris to maintain good relations with a powerful, 
government-backed institution of which he was nevertheless critical. 
                                                 
9 Luchaire to Babcock, 5 December 1925, CEIP CE, box 28, folder 3. 
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International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, UNESCO Archives, Paris (hereafter IIIC), B.IV.5. 
12 Luchaire to Butler, 12 February 1926; Samuel McCune Lindsay to Luchaire, 19 March 1926, both IIIC, 
B.IV.15. 
13 Babcock to Luchaire, 26 July 1928, CEIP CE, box 28, folder 2. 
14 Babcock to M. Coste (IIIC), 26 January 1929, IIIC, B.IV.5. 
15 See e.g. Babcock’s verdict on the Institute in 1932: “After an intimate acquaintance with the I.I.I.C. of 
some seven years, I must confess that I went to attend the Geneva meetings without much enthusiasm.” 
Report on ICIC meeting, July 1932, CEIP CE, box 29, folder 4. 
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Relations between the IIIC and the Rockefeller Foundation were less close, even 
though Luchaire tried hard to cultivate the goodwill of Paris’s second American 
philanthropic outpost. An offer of collaboration to the president of the Rockefeller 
Foundation was rebuffed with the note that the Foundation had a narrow interest in 
public health and medicine and therefore was not able to be of any assistance to the 
Institute.16 Even after the Rockefeller Foundation turned its attention to the social 
sciences in 1929, its view on the IIIC remained negative. A staff member at the Paris 
Office commented on the “French” character and “redness” of the institute and 
concluded:  
It is well to keep it under observation, owing to the fact that it occupies, 
inadequately but blockingly, the position of that central clearing-house or 
‘exchange’ between European countries which should be of the utmost value to 
our sort of work: - and which, but for this pre-existence, it might have been our 
first aim to create in more respectable form.17 
 
This quote reveals an underlying rivalry between the foundations and the IIIC 
which has to be understood in the context of the peculiar legal status of Luchaire’s 
Institute. Although its activities were overseen by the League’s International Committee 
on Intellectual Cooperation in Geneva, the IIIC, as a largely French-sponsored 
organisation, was a curious hybrid between an intergovernmental and a state-sponsored 
quasi-nongovernmental organisation. This ambiguous status allowed it to collaborate 
with nongovernmental organisations, for instance in the form of the Comité d’Entente.18 
The ICIC in Geneva, a fully-fledged League body, faced more limitations in this regard 
as Article 24 of the Covenant, which regulated the attachment of international bureaus 
to the League, only opened League affiliation to organisations created by 
                                                 
16 George Vincent to Luchaire, 12 May 1926, IIIC, B.IV.23. 
17 G. Winthrop Young (RF Paris Office), confidential report, “Intellectual Cooperation”, June 1929, RF, 
RG 1.1, series 100, box 105, folder 952. 
18 Renoliet, Unesco oubliée, 60, 84. 
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intergovernmental agreements.19 Thus, the hybrid nature of the IIIC allowed it to 
become active within both the intergovernmental and the private, nongovernmental 
sphere of intellectual cooperation. Moreover, the IIIC could take advantage of the 
prestige that its link to the League automatically bestowed. This turned the Institute into 
a formidable competitor of private initiatives which were also interested in organising 
international intellectual life. The foundations clearly belonged in this category, as the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s Paris Office implicitly recognised. Hence, the Rockefeller 
officer’s disparaging analysis of the IIIC’s work contained a hefty tinge of envy. 
 Nevertheless, the Foundation’s assessment also accurately reflected 
contemporary criticism levelled at Luchaire who was politically on the left and certainly 
aimed to further French foreign policy through the work of the IIIC. Especially the latter 
led to tensions between the IIIC and the ICIC in Geneva as well as with the semi-
official National Committees for Intellectual Cooperation which had been formed in a 
number of countries from 1923. Both the Commission and the National Committees 
opposed how the IIIC deviated intergovernmental and administrative aspects of the 
League’s intellectual cooperation work from Geneva to Paris, and in 1929 both 
supported a reorganisation of the League’s entire intellectual cooperation work. This 
was achieved in 1931 when the IIIC, the ICIC and the National Committees were 
incorporated into the new Organisation for Intellectual Cooperation which the League 
formally recognised as a technical body. Originally, the National Committees for 
Intellectual Cooperation had come into existence in an unregulated process. Their 
funding and composition ranged from entirely private to entirely governmental and 
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staffed by members of ministerial bureaucracies. Often, ICIC members stimulated the 
creation of National Committees in their respective countries.20  
This was also the case in the United States, a country which was from the very 
beginning represented on the ICIC. In 1925, the American representative, Robert A. 
Millikan, a professor of physics at the California Institute of Technology, successfully 
pushed for the creation of the American National Committee for Intellectual 
Cooperation. He also managed to secure the Carnegie Corporation’s financial support.21 
The American philanthropic elite was heavily represented on the committee by 
Raymond Fosdick, Elihu Root and Henry Pritchett, president of the Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Members of the American private 
cultural relations network also joined, for example Stephen Duggan of the Institute of 
International Education, Librarian of Congress Herbert Putnam and Leo S. Rowe of the 
Pan-American Union.22 Compared to other National Committees for Intellectual 
Cooperation, the American committee was remarkably well organised, administering a 
number of subcommittees and conducting large-scale, nationwide surveys. With an 
annual budget of $10,000, it also disposed of significant financial resources, in contrast 
to the ICIC which remained chronically underfunded.23  
As with other instances of American participation in so-called technical 
activities under the League of Nations, American non-membership in the League was an 
                                                 
20 Northedge, “International Intellectual Co-operation”, 401-415. An illustration of the loosely defined 
role of these National Committees is the British case. Apparently, the Foreign Office toyed with the idea 
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22 Memorandum, 6 November 1928, Shotwell Papers, box 134/5, folder “Membership American National 
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23 Report on first meeting of the American National Committee of Intellectual Cooperation, 5 January 
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October 1932, CEIP CE box 29, folder 4, and Financial Statement, 30 September 1935, CEIP CE, box 31, 
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  197
incentive for certain circles in the United States to become doubly active. Millikan 
regarded it as “very important that we are as well represented within the [intellectual 
cooperation] organization as is possible” and hoped the committee “may be able to exert 
an important influence”.24 This sentiment was echoed by James T. Shotwell, who took 
over from Millikan in 1931: “With the United States out of the League, Intellectual 
Cooperation is an open door to the kind of helpful cooperation with the League itself 
which must be included in the picture of the National Committee.”25 In a personal letter 
to Harold Butler, director of the International Labour Organisation, Shotwell made a 
similar point: “The fact that we are not in the League makes this quasi-official 
connection with the League organization perfectly possible without raising any of the 
political questions that would bother an administration at Washington.” But, he also 
said, the ICIC’s programme was wanting—what was needed was “a program with some 
practicality about it”, and Shotwell was determined to lobby for that.26 
The American National Committee managed to exert a significant influence on 
the League’s intellectual cooperation work, thanks also to its strong link with the 
foundations. According to the IIIC’s historian, Jean-Jacques Renoliet, the prospect of 
future foundation funding played a large role among those League officials who pushed 
for a reorganisation of the intellectual cooperation work in the late 1920s. Gilbert 
Murray, who, as the ICIC chairman from 1928, spearheaded the move for reform, was 
aware of the foundations’ doubts about the League’s intellectual work in its current 
state, especially as the ICIC was increasingly morphing into an intergovernmental body 
instead of an elite intellectuals’ club. He anticipated that a move towards more technical 
                                                 
24 Millikan to Wickliffe Rose (International Education Board), 26 February 1926, Shotwell Papers, box 
134/5, folder “Membership American National Committee”. 
25 American National Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, minutes of meeting, 27 October 1932, 
CEIP CE, box 29, folder 4. 
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work and away from inter-state cultural diplomacy would attract foundation funding.27 
But the foundations’ stance towards political work and technical work in the League of 
Nations was a complex one and cannot be captured in a simplistic opposition of 
‘neutral’ technical work versus ‘political’ multilateral diplomacy, as Renoliet seems to 
suggest when he claims that an IIIC “de moins en moins politique” ensured the 
collaboration of the foundations in the 1930s.28 On the contrary, the foundations and 
with them the American cultural relations elite furthered a politicisation of the League’s 
intellectual cooperation work, all while they were claiming to be merely interested in 
nongovernmental and technical cooperation. As Shotwell’s comments make clear, the 
extension of technical work simply meant increasing U.S. influence in Geneva. 
Shotwell was one of the most active American scholar-politicians in the field of 
international relations at the time. As has been discussed in the previous chapter, he 
devoted much of the early 1920s to the editing of the Carnegie History but he also 
became involved in the creation of the International Labour Organisation and the 
drafting and popularising of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Shotwell also became active in 
the Institute of Pacific Relations which had been formed in 1925.29 In the spring of 1931 
Shotwell was recruited as the chairman of the Social Science Research Council’s 
Advisory Committee on International Relations. The Council strengthened its 
international relations programme at the time, in accordance with the wishes of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, its main sponsor.30  
Shotwell spent the summer of 1931 travelling all over Europe and sizing up 
various European initiatives for the study of international relations. In Austria, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and Poland he encouraged the formation of national committees for the 
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study of international relations, harking back to his old plans for Danubian economic 
federation.31 A stopover in Geneva, where Murray offered him a seat on the ICIC, 
convinced Shotwell of the necessity to reform the committee. Shotwell wanted to see 
the likes of Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy or the Hungarian Count Pál Teleki as 
ICIC members, instead of Marie Curie or Albert Einstein.32 He also insisted that the 
committee should engage with social and political problems instead of pure science and 
literature.33 In a protracted correspondence with Gilbert Murray, Shotwell used the 
question of his affiliation with the ICIC as a bargaining chip in his quest to open the 
committee to more political, or as he would have put it, “practical” work. The 
discussion between Murray and Shotwell went to the heart of the ICIC’s purpose and, 
by extension, of that of the League’s intellectual cooperation work in general. 
Shotwell’s proposal to staff the ICIC exclusively with “representatives of 
Political and Social Science” did not convince Murray who insisted that the committee 
should “promote co-operation between men of science and scientific associations in the 
different countries, so that mathematicians, physicists, librarians, and curators of 
museums are as much in place upon it as publicists”. Murray’s implication that the 
social scientists which Shotwell wanted to have on the ICIC were “publicists” almost 
led to a breakdown in the correspondence. Clearly, Shotwell was very self-conscious 
about the scientific credentials of his own discipline—for he, even though a historian by 
training, clearly regarded himself as a social scientist—which he insisted did not lack 
any of the intellectual rigour commonly ascribed to the natural sciences.34 This was 
confirmed by his attacks on those ICIC members who, in Shotwell’s opinion, could 
make few claims to scientific or intellectual distinction. Murray did not disagree and 
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conceded that “many of them are politicians, others are put on chiefly for political or 
diplomatic motives and not because they represent either genuine learning in the 
political and social sciences or constructive ideas”. Nevertheless, he asked Shotwell to 
understand that an intergovernmental body like the ICIC would always have political 
appointments. “The mischief is that the Council of the League, consisting of practical 
politicians, is not much interested in intellectual co-operation itself but has discovered 
that a seat on the Committee is a compliment highly valued by various countries or 
interests which have from time to time to be appeased.” To transform the ICIC into a 
body of social scientists which would provide political consultancy to the League 
Council was, as Murray remarked in a letter to Millikan, “impracticable”: “The Council 
consists of governments and all Governments (however regrettably) think politics their 
own business; they will hear the various specialists and then decide. They will not take 
advice on Politics.”35 
In the end, Murray and Shotwell reached a compromise. Shotwell confirmed his 
nomination as new ICIC member, even if the composition of the committee remained 
unchanged otherwise. In return, the ICIC drafted a resolution to include the social 
sciences in its remit, acknowledging “today’s importance of the collaboration of men of 
thought and men of action for the solution of urgent problems pertaining to the current 
world situation”.36 The League Council and Assembly adopted the resolution in 1933.37 
In terms of concrete projects, Shotwell’s démarche yielded an international inquiry on 
the problem of mechanisation.38 This was a compromise topic, adopted in the place of 
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Shotwell’s own suggestion for a simultaneous public opinion survey in a number of 
countries.39 Via the IIIC, he did manage to stimulate the compilation of studies based on 
the model of the American National Committee’s own output. In France, such a national 
survey on the study of international relations was eventually conducted by the 
Rockefeller-sponsored Centre d’études de politique étrangère as a result of an IIIC 
request in 1935.40 
Shotwell’s more radical proposals were neutralised by his co-optation onto the 
ICIC. Nevertheless, Murray’s and Shotwell’s basic ideas were not that far apart. Murray 
noted in a letter to Babcock that “the C.I.C. is moving in the direction which Shotwell 
and I have long wished, but the actual application of his ideas presents problems”.41 
Murray himself was a prominent member of the British League of Nations Union and 
drawn to the nongovernmental internationalism which aimed at a modernisation of 
foreign policy making, that embraced by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. In 
1928, he had already outlined his plans for the ICIC in a letter to his son-in-law Arnold 
Toynbee, who, from 1924, occupied the post of director of studies at Chatham House: 
“And if the ICIC develops as I wish it to, into an international research organization, it 
will be a good deal akin to the RIIA.”42 Like Shotwell, Murray saw “the need of 
bringing into the sphere of the League some greater element of objective, scientific, 
constructive thought in international politics”. But, he concluded, perhaps the ICIC was 
not the ideal place for that:  
Where are we to look? I seemed to see the most promising place some years 
ago when studying the British Institute of International Affairs. There you 
have a purely scientific and objective organ for the study of international 
problems; only it is British, and what we want is international study. But there 
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are similar bodies in other countries: the Hochschule für Politik, the Ecole des 
Hautes Etudes Politiques, etc.43  
 
By 1932, these bodies were increasingly collaborating through the ISC, a process that 
Murray had furthered by encouraging Toynbee to position Chatham House as a driving 
force behind the extension of the conferences.44 Murray was not the only person who 
came to the conclusion that the best way of internationalising the field of international 
relations was to coordinate the activities of several national institutions. Debates within 
the foundations circled around the same question in the early 1930s and a number of 
models were discussed. At the same time, the International Studies Conference also 
underwent a process of transformation, largely initiated by its constituents. In the 
following section, the origins of the ISC will be discussed, before moving on to an 
analysis of the relationship between this organisation and American philanthropic 
foundations. 
 
Beginnings and Transformation of the International Studies Conference 
The International Studies Conference had its origin in a plan to establish an 
international university, which came before the ICIC and was passed on to the IIIC in 
May 1926.45 Luchaire reframed the idea and proposed to establish a federated system of 
national institutes with a head office in Paris. According to an internal memorandum in 
the Dotation’s files he even considered turning the École des hautes études en sciences 
sociales in Paris into the hub of this network, possibly attracting French government 
support. In the end, however, the project was developed on a smaller scale. Remarkably, 
though, Luchaire’s plan completely omitted international law, as that discipline was, in 
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his opinion, already amply provided for. The new academic network would focus on 
social, moral, historical, economic and financial questions.46  
Within the IIIC, Alfred Zimmern, the head of the General Affairs section, took 
steps to put Luchaire’s vague scheme into practice, a matter that received renewed 
urgency once the ICIC asked the Paris institute in 1927 to convene an international 
meeting of experts in international studies.47 Zimmern had only recently established a 
connection with the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik and secured Ernst Jäckh as a 
speaker for the 1926 session of his Geneva School of International Relations. For the 
Hochschule, the link to the IIIC was an important means to further its own international 
standing and so it made a bid to host what became the first meeting of the International 
Studies Conference in March 1928. Thanks to its excellent relations with the German 
Ministry of External Affairs, the Hochschule also received an official subsidy for the 
conference.48 Luchaire, who habitually mixed intellectual and diplomatic relations, had 
previously ensured German official support for the conference during a meeting with Dr 
Soehring of the Kulturabteilung.49 
Despite (or maybe because of) this intergovernmental background, the Berlin 
ISC meeting resulted chiefly in steps towards greater administrative collaboration 
between the participants.50 These consisted of delegates from Chatham House, the 
Geneva School of International Relations, the recently created Geneva Graduate 
Institute of International Studies, the Academy of International Law at The Hague, the 
Ecole libre des sciences politiques and other institutes in Paris, as well as several Italian 
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universities.51 The only American representative at the conference, apart from the 
Dotation Carnegie, was the Institute of Politics in Williamstown, a shoe-in for the 
Council on Foreign Relations. In subsequent years, however, the Council became an 
ISC member itself.52 Earle Babcock joined the ISC’s Executive Committee and the 
Dotation occasionally made modest grants to meet publication costs and other small 
expenses. Between 1928 and 1930, the work of the ISC was limited to practical 
collaboration such as the exchange of information and the compilation of handbooks.53 
A suggestion to embark on joint research projects had been opposed by the British 
delegation in 1928.54 Nevertheless, the meetings and discussions were conducive to the 
dissemination of institutional models and thus a certain amount of standardisation. 
Isaiah Bowman noted the strong interest displayed in the Council on Foreign Relations’ 
“Survey of American Foreign Relations” and estimated that future conferences would 
help spread the Council’s working methods.55 This was not mere self-flattery as the 
Council’s publication activity was indeed regarded as a model to emulate by other ISC 
participants.56 A similar move towards standardisation through the comparison of 
different national approaches occurred in the field of university teaching of international 
relations, an issue that remained an ISC concern throughout its existence.57 Moreover, 
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the conference stimulated increased activities in countries not originally affiliated with 
it.58 
As the ISC expanded—by 1930, eleven national members were affiliated as well 
as five self-designated international institutions, namely the Hague Academy, the 
Dotation, the Geneva School, the Geneva Graduate Institute and the IPR—the issue of 
collaborative research projects returned to the agenda.59 In December 1929, the ISC 
Executive Committee asked Zimmern and F.B. Bourdillon of Chatham House to 
prepare a report on methods for collaborative study. Zimmern and Bourdillon passed on 
this task to John B. Condliffe (1891-1981), a young economist from New Zealand who 
was also the first research secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR).  
The IPR had been established in 1925 as a private organisation for the promotion 
of mutual understanding among the nations of the Pacific Rim. It received substantial 
personal funding from John D. Rockefeller, Jr. as well as from the Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment. The 
IPR conducted its affairs through autonomous national councils, each with committees 
of research and education. By the mid-1930s, national councils had formed in the 
United States, Japan, China, Korea and the Philippines. Britain and the Dominions were 
also represented. So were the continental European colonial powers France and the 
Netherlands, signifying that the IPR did not challenge colonial rule, even if non-
sovereign nations such as the Philippines had a voice in its meetings. An international 
governing body based in Honolulu, the International Secretariat, coordinated the work 
of the national councils and organised the IPR’s biannual conferences, the 
                                                 
58 It seems that Toynbee who mentioned the 1928 conference in a speech he gave in Poland was 
responsible for the affiliation of that country to the ISC. Picht to Hans Simons, 15 May 1928, GStA PK, I 
HA Rep. 303 Dt. HS für Politik, Nr. 2116 (Internationales Institut für geistige Zusammenarbeit, Paris, 
alte Signaturen: 347). 
59 Report on the Third Conference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations, Paris, 
12-14 June 1930, C.89.1930, CEIP CE, box 28, folder 4. 
  206
organisation’s main tool for the construction, promotion and dissemination of expert 
knowledge.60 
Condliffe attended the 1930 ISC meeting in Paris on behalf of the IPR and gave 
an influential paper which deftly summed up current thinking on the state of 
international relations as a scholarly endeavour.61 Condliffe repeated common 
epistemological tropes, such as a presumed lag between the natural and the social 
sciences, and that in the study of international relations “the ordinary academic 
distinction between the social sciences” should be ignored. He also remarked on the 
democratisation of foreign policy-making after the First World War which, in an age of 
successful nationalisms, made the transition from nation state building to international 
cooperation difficult. Exhibiting a distrust of public opinion clothed in a confirmation of 
the principles of the ‘new diplomacy’, Condliffe pronounced that “post-war diplomacy 
must strive to base itself on the popular will, and must also contrive in some way to 
carry popular opinion along with the negotiated compromises of experts and 
statesmen”.  
The question was how this triangulation between the masses, the experts and the 
policy makers could be ‘contrived’. Unsurprisingly, Condliffe put forward the IPR as 
the ideal solution, but with a nod to other flourishing models. He lauded Williamstown 
which, by including non-American speakers, was an “important means for the 
presentation of foreign points of view to the American people”. The Council on Foreign 
Relations and Chatham House were successful research institutions, even if limited by a 
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membership restricted to nationals, and a “national approach” in their research. Only the 
IPR could provide “face-to-face discussion” with foreign opinion.62 
Condliffe’s paper galvanised the ISC Executive Committee into action. At a 
meeting in January 1931, it was agreed that the agenda of future sessions should include 
the study of “concrete problems of international relations”. To garner support for this 
decision, the committee arranged for Toynbee to give a paper at the 1931 ISC 
conference which took place at the Copenhagen Institute for Economics and History 
(Institutet for Historie og Samfundsøkonomie).63 Toynbee’s speech was crucial for 
determining the future direction of ISC. That the organisation would adopt an IPR-
inspired model in the future was not in question. In fact, Toynbee had himself 
participated at several IPR conferences. What was unclear, however, was whether the 
ISC would continue to function under IIIC auspices. Henri Bonnet, the IIIC’s new 
director from 1930, wanted to keep the organisation close to the IIIC. Others, most 
importantly Shotwell, preferred reorganising the ISC outside the League’s orbit. One of 
the many ideas that Shotwell had developed in the early 1930s was an “Institute of the 
Atlantic”, with the North American, British and German foreign affairs institutes at its 
nucleus. This scheme enjoyed the backing of Beveridge, Jäckh, Rappard, Wolfers and 
members of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, according to Edward Carter 
of the IPR who visited the Copenhagen ISC meeting on Shotwell’s behalf. Carter 
believed that Bonnet saw in ISC “a new lease of life” for the IIIC and, moreover, had a 
tendency to “see world problems as essentially Europe-centered”. This was not the view 
of Carter, who felt that “There is a certain loose grouping of problems which are of 
primary concern to the peoples in the area stretching from Vancouver to Moscow. It is 
                                                 
62 J.B. Condliffe, “International Collaboration in the Study of International Relations”, C.89.1930 Annex 
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63 Chalmers-Wright, International Studies Conference, 20. Chalmers-Wright’s account is corroborated by 
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possible that these could be better studied viewing the Atlantic as the center, rather than 
Europe as the center.”64 
In the end, though, Bonnet succeeded in keeping the ISC tied to the IIIC. As he 
revealed in a letter to the American consul in Geneva, Toynbee had planned to suggest a 
new institute along Shotwell’s lines but could be persuaded to propose instead that the 
ISC meetings should become a permanent instrument for the scientific study of 
international relations, possibly along IPR methods.65 Given that Bonnet wrote a overly 
friendly letter to Shotwell soon after, in which he announced Toynbee’s volte-face, it is 
likely that the IIIC director was the persuasive origin of Toynbee’s change of heart.66 
The ISC might have been pushed to develop along the lines of the American-dominated 
IPR but League officials, in particular Bonnet, managed to prevent an Atlanticist 
outlook in the new research organisation. It was firmly tied to the League’s Intellectual 
Cooperation Organisation, and so were the foundations who decided to support the 
venture, which shelved Shotwell’s plans for a new institute.67 
Apart from confirming its allegiance to the IIIC, Toynbee’s speech itself did not 
provide many surprises. It repeated truisms about the interdependence of nations which 
was pioneered by economic forces and now came to pass in the political and cultural 
spheres. Toynbee also expanded on “the tendency for private people to enter the field 
(hitherto monopolised by Governments) of international politics” and interpreted it as “a 
healthy and reassuring symptom”, especially since governments in return had recently 
started to discover the realm of culture for their policies. The future research 
                                                 
64 Copy of letter to Shotwell from Carter, reporting on his study of possibility of a European or Atlantic 
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organisation which the ISC was to become would “provide the private people of the 
world, who have become alive to the crucial importance of international politics, with 
the means for scientific study; to enable them to learn the facts of international politics 
with accuracy and to discuss the issues of international politics with the least amount of 
passion and prejudice and recrimination that is humanly possible”.68  
Yet, in one important aspect Toynbee’s vision differed from that of Shotwell 
who had planned a network of regional institutes in the mould of the IPR. In his speech, 
Toynbee underlined that European affairs were still of world importance. Thus, even 
though the ISC was based in Europe, membership was open to non-Europeans, too; in 
fact, their participation was “indispensable”. This of course was a barely veiled attack 
on American political isolationism and the “illusion that the non-European world can 
safely leave Europe to cope with her own troubles”. However, Toynbee’s speech was 
also a self-confident affirmation of Western, and in particular European, cultural 
superiority. Post-war dislocations may have pushed European powers to the sidelines, 
Toynbee admitted, but not entirely. “Even if Europe was to lose its economic and 
political importance, Europe will then have lost the kingdom and the power, but, it is 
submitted, she may retain her cultural leadership for an indefinite time to come.”69 So 
while the ISC adopted the blueprint of a regional organisation for itself at Copenhagen 
in 1931, its pretensions remained universal.  
Over the next few years, the ISC transformed itself from an annual meeting 
where academics leisurely discussed administrative matters into scholarly conferences 
with a common theme. After the Copenhagen meeting, the practice of two-year study 
cycles was adopted, emulating the IPR’s biannual conferences. From 1933, a 
programme committee, on which Rockefeller Foundation officer John Van Sickle took 
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a seat, determined the subjects of study. These had to conform to a number of criteria. 
Apart from practical considerations such as being manageable in the time available, 
original and of interest to all ISC members, the subject had to be accessible from a 
number of disciplines, be neither completely practical nor theoretical, and result in a 
publication capable influencing public opinion. Moreover, the ISC conferences were to 
treat topics on which there was no unanimity of opinion. Especially this latter 
requirement was lifted from the model of the IPR, as were the practices of not allowing 
votes to be taken at study meetings, and of not requiring conclusions, recommendations 
or unanimous decisions.70  
The topics chosen for the biannual study cycles were closely related to current 
international problems; between 1932 and 1933, state management of the economy was 
discussed; the 1934/1935 conferences were on collective security; in 1936 and 1937 the 
problem of peaceful change was addressed; and in 1938/1939 economic policies were 
on the agenda again. Even the choice of the conference venues—Madrid in 1936, 
Prague in 1938—uncannily ensured that the ISC remained close to current international 
crises. The programme for 1940 and 1941 on international organisation had to be 
aborted because of the Second World War. In 1940, the ISC counted thirty-one 
members. Six of these were international institutions, comprising the five which have 
already been mentioned as well as the Geneva Research Center, a private research 
institute funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment. The other 
twenty-five delegations represented thirteen European countries and twelve non-
European countries, among them the British Dominions, China, India, Egypt, Mexico, 
Chile, Argentina and the United States.71 
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Debates on Foundation Policy in the Early 1930s 
As has already been implied, internal discussions within the foundations also influenced 
the gradual transformation of the ISC. What was the fundamental problem that the 
foundations were trying to solve? Shotwell put it most clearly when he urged ICIC to 
give more attention to the social sciences. Shotwell’s rationale for internationalising the 
social sciences pointed to the role that these disciplines had played in the creation and 
consolidation of the nation state, as they gave intellectual ammunition to those forces 
which promoted its “apotheosis”. Now, he concluded, it was time for the social sciences 
to “achieve for the community of nations what they have already achieved for the nation 
state”.72 
It is important to note that Shotwell was not advocating a ‘de-nationalised’ 
discipline, or even a new, cosmopolitan science. The study of international relations was 
to be about nations, not about humanity. This is abundantly clear in the definition of 
international relations which Shotwell put forward in a lengthy memorandum written 
for the Social Science Research Council: “By “international relations” we mean literally 
what the phrase itself indicates, that is, the relation between the nations themselves. It 
does not include the incidental contact of individuals from different nations. … It is the 
overlapping and interpenetration of national activities beyond the frontiers of the 
country of origin.” As Shotwell understood it, the nation was a coherent entity which 
should not be broken up. Any attempt to create a super-state, as intimated by “radical 
liberals” in the early days of the League, would only lead to more instead of less 
international disorder. Shotwell’s perspective on public opinion also explains why he 
did not want to forego the ordering effects of national institutions. In his view 
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“representatives of the whole body of public opinion” were  “less instead of more liberal 
than the representatives of governments”. In difficult times such as during an economic 
depression, Shotwell thought, “The uninformed opinion of private citizens, who lack 
direct contact with the problems of citizens in other countries, and who now are chiefly 
responsible for any slowness of action at Geneva, would be more likely to put back the 
clock than to move it forward”. 
Thus, public opinion had to be shaped in a way that would leave national 
specificities intact. Shotwell was looking for “some instrument capable of educating 
public opinion in each of the countries concerned toward clearer thinking on 
international problems in which they are deeply concerned, while not yet interfering in 
any way with their own natural bent in culture, economics, or politics”. He found it in 
“a federated system of national institutes, each adjusted to its own native soil and yet 
with a purpose and program that would render it capable of articulation with similar 
institutes in other countries, to work out objectively and scientifically the problems 
which are common to them all”.73 International bodies, such as the Graduate Institute in 
Geneva, were problematic “for then the different national units tend to be suspicious of 
international direction and control”.74  
Shotwell, and also his colleagues in the Rockefeller Foundation, saw the way 
forward in a European version of the IPR, an organisation which operated on the 
assumption that the dissemination of facts could influence an elite public opinion and, 
by extension, policy makers. Rockefeller support for the organisation was strong from 
the beginning. In 1930, the head of the Social Science Division gave the IPR a glowing 
assessment:  
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The program of objective research which the Institute is developing has unusual 
promise. Projects are being critically appraised and carefully matured. General 
direction of the program is in thoroughly competent hands. Unusual 
opportunities are presented for stimulating scientific and scholarly work over a 
wide area in which relatively little has thus far been done.75  
Foundation officers were also aware of Shotwell’s proposal to adapt the IPR 
model for Europe. They considered it among several approaches in a debate on the 
direction of the Rockefeller Foundation’s policy towards international relations which 
took place in 1931 and 1932. After consolidating the Graduate Institute in Geneva and 
appointing the Notgemeinschaft Committee for International Relations, Rockefeller 
officers were asking themselves “What should we do next?”.76 The early 1930s were a 
transitional period for the Rockefeller Foundation’s Social Science Division, also due to 
the Depression-induced drop in foundation income which necessitated a concentration 
in policy. From 1935, the Social Science Division pursued three narrow fields, namely 
social security, public administration and international relations.77 Nevertheless, a 
special interest in international relations always existed, continuing a trend already 
visible during Memorial times.78 Another continuity represented the foundation’s 
explicit linking of academic research with a practical peace project, as was stated in one 
of its annual reports: “The expert and the statesman need to develop the habit of fruitful 
collaboration. Only so can research in the field of international relations fully justify 
itself.”79 
Despite being aware of Shotwell’s plans and the activities of various national 
institutes, it took a hint from the Carnegie Endowment for the Rockefeller Foundation 
to get involved in the ISC. An internal document dates the first contact to March 1932, 
when Earle Babcock forwarded the plans for the ISC’s Milan meeting to Selskar M. 
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Gunn, the Rockefeller Foundation’s Associate Director in Europe.80 Without realising 
it, the Rockefeller Foundation had been giving grants to ISC members for several years. 
Gunn, who, at the suggestion of the Carnegie Endowment, visited the Milan conference 
in May, noted that he “was rather surprised at the number of people present who are 
connected with institutions of one kind or another which are receiving aid from us at the 
present time”. In his opinion, the ISC had the potential to fulfil a task that the 
Foundation had pursued for a while: “This may possibly develop into the organization 
in Europe which would bring about a coordination of research programs in studies of 
international questions.”81 Ever since Luchaire’s departure from the IIIC in 1930 and 
the connected perceived waning of French governmental influence, a grant to the 
Institute for the ISC became a much more attractive option to both the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment.82 
In the following years, Rockefeller officers at the Paris office and in New York 
closely observed the development of the ISC. Starting with a small Paris Office grant of 
$1500 in 1932, the Rockefeller Foundation entered into a substantial financial 
commitment. Contributions to the ISC via the IIIC steadily rose from a further $3500 in 
Paris Office funds between 1932 and 1935 to substantial contributions in 1935 
($30,000) and 1936 ($40,000). A $100,000 grant awarded in 1937 and complemented 
by another $5000 grant-in aid in 1938 finally turned the ISC into the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s European flagship programme in international relations.83 Between 1935 
and 1937, the foundation also made individual, smaller grants to national groups or 
institutions affiliated with the ISC, a task which the IIIC took over in 1938. But of 
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course the Foundation was no passive source of money. In collaboration with the 
Carnegie Endowment, which, despite its feebler financial muscle, had again acted as a 
scouting organisation for its fellow philanthropic foundation, the Rockefeller 
Foundation moulded the ISC into an organisation which barely betrayed its beginnings 
under the auspices of the IIIC.  
 
Foundations and the International Studies Conference: Early Achievements 
In what ways did the foundations influence the direction of the International Studies 
Conference? As has been shown, the foundations indirectly contributed to the 
discussions on the transformation of the ISC in 1931 and 1932 via Shotwell’s 
foundation-funded Social Science Research Council activities. The most obvious impact 
that especially the Rockefeller Foundation had on the ISC was, of course, financial. 
Between 1932 and 1938, the Rockefeller Foundation appropriated altogether $180,000 
to the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation for supporting the ISC, with the 
last grant running out in 1940.84 Apart from the Geneva Graduate Institute, the 
foundation spent more on the ISC than on any other item of its international relations 
programme in Europe.85 Support from the Rockefeller Foundation came at a critical 
time for the IIIC. In 1931, the League of Nations had cut the budget of the Institute by 
forty percent, and France, as the principal donor, followed suit the same year. As 
contributions from official sources dwindled, the Rockefeller grants increased. In 1938, 
funding from the Rockefeller Foundation exceeded that of the French government.86 To 
both the Foundation and the IIIC the International Studies Conference represented a big 
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investment. For Rockefeller officers, the ISC was a flagship project, and for the Institute 
failure or success of the ISC determined its survival. 
 Between 1932 and 1935, the foundations and the International Institute of 
Intellectual Cooperation collaborated more or less harmoniously in developing the ISC. 
Foundation resources paid for additional staff at the Institute so that it could function as 
a secretariat for the ISC and liaise between the ever growing number of national groups. 
Foundation officers sat on the executive and programme committees and, through their 
Paris offices, coordinated their work. Thus, the ISC became a catalyst for the increasing 
collaboration between Rockefeller and Carnegie philanthropy. On several levels, the 
foundations were pleased with the progress the ISC made. First, despite the initial 
misgivings about using the IIIC to coordinate the cooperation between the national 
institutes, foundation officers recognised that the IIIC’s status was helpful as that 
enabled it to make more influential suggestions than a national body could.87 Moreover, 
the foundations’ qualms about supporting a League-affiliated body were allayed when 
the ISC declared itself an independent and autonomous organisation in 1934, a move 
that was probably a result of foundation pressure, as later discussions within the 
Rockefeller Foundations indicate.88 Second, foundation officers noted with pleasure that 
the ISC seemed to be moving in the “general direction of the set-up of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations”.89 Third, the ISC stimulated the formation of national institutes for 
the study of international relations in several countries along lines that the foundations 
favoured.  
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The Rockefeller Foundation’s preferred model for national institutes was 
Chatham House, which had, from 1932, benefitted from considerable philanthropic 
largesse. Prior to 1933, the British and German ISC groups were regarded as the most 
significant ones, but with the demise of the German infrastructure for the study of 
international relations after the Nazis came to power, British initiatives and notably 
Chatham House became a veritable blueprint for the development of Rockefeller 
international relations work in other countries.90 After the 1933 International Studies 
Conference in London, one Rockefeller Foundation officer noted that the meeting 
“exercised a considerable influence upon the thinking of the scholars from other 
European countries. It was a revelation to many of them to see the organization of 
Chatham House, the quantity and quality of its research work and the prestige and 
influence which Chatham House exercises upon public opinion and political leaders 
generally.” 91 Chatham House represented the model for national foreign affairs 
institutes for the Rockefeller Foundation. Since the ISC helped to spread this model, it 
was regarded as very useful by foundation officers. The Rockefeller Foundation even 
asked Chatham House to provide an assessment as to what extent a transfer of its own 
model to other European countries would be possible, “notably France, Holland, 
Belgium, Poland, Roumania (Gusti), Czechoslovakia (Lev Winter) and the 
Scandinavian countries”.92 
One country that was particularly high on the agenda was France. Despite the 
existence of a loose association of French scholars with an interest in international 
relations, the Commission française de coordination des hautes études internationales, 
there were no coordinated institutional structures, a state of affairs which E.E. Day, 
director of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Social Science Division, came to refer to as 
                                                 
90 Gunn to Day, 22 June 1932, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 952. 
91 Van Sickle to Day, 8 June 1933, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 952. 
92 Van Sickle, Memorandum, 22 May 1934, “JVS, EED conversations at Chatham House, London, May 
22, 1934”, RF, RG 1.1, series 401, box 77, folder 1014. 
  218
“the French gap”.93 At the ISC, France was mostly represented by Louis Eisenmann, a 
Sorbonne professor with a specialism in the history of the Slavic countries, who was 
also on the programme committee. The 1933 International Studies Conference in 
London seems to have motivated the French coordinating committee to develop a plan 
for a permanent institute in the mould of Chatham House.94 Consequently, John Van 
Sickle, the Rockefeller Foundation’s Assistant Director in Europe, entered into 
discussions with “key people” in Paris.95 As a result, the Centre d’études de politique 
étrangère (CEPE) was founded in Paris in 1935.  
Its programme resembled that of Chatham House closely, featuring study 
groups, an information service, review and monograph publications as well as 
individual and collective research projects. Half of the funding came from French 
sources but the Rockefeller Foundation supported the venture with two major grants of 
$70,000 and $102,000 respectively. Interestingly, Bonnet was one of CEPE’s vice-
presidents. Etienne Dennery, a professor at the Ecole libre, and Louis Joxe, a former 
teacher and civil servant who worked at Havas, France’s oldest press agency, were 
responsible for the running of the new institute. The Dotation-affiliated Pierre Renouvin 
was in charge of its information service.96 These informal links to the Carnegie 
Endowment became more definite in 1938 when CEPE started to administer the 
Carnegie Endowment’s French side of its recently resurrected International Relations 
Club programme.97 The CEPE directors were quite aware of the foundations’ priorities. 
In conversation with Rockefeller Foundation officers Joxe affirmed that their goal was 
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to build “a French equivalent of Chatham House”.98 As had happened in Britain, the 
French IPR group effectively became part of CEPE in 1936. In its major field of 
interest, colonial studies, CEPE also embarked on collaborative studies with Chatham 
House.99 
The Rockefeller Foundation’s plan to spread the Chatham House model also 
bore fruit in Northern Europe. Before 1936, the ISC only had one Scandinavian member 
organisation, the Institute for Economics and History in Copenhagen, a recipient of 
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and Rockefeller Foundation funding since 
1928.100 Sydnor Walker, assistant director of the Foundation’s Social Science Division 
and chiefly responsible for the international relations programme, regarded the 
Copenhagen institute as “one of the best prospects for a national center” for 
international relations.101 The situation was less promising in Norway and Sweden 
where there were no equivalent institutions. After a plan for a Scandinavian research 
programme in international relations did not succeed, the Rockefeller Foundation used 
the ISC mechanism to encourage the formation of national coordinating committees for 
international studies in those two countries, both of which contributed to ISC research 
programmes. Ultimately, the foundation’s prompting led to the launch of two foreign 
affairs journals and the foundation of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in 
1938.102 Again, the ISC helped the Rockefeller Foundation to achieve its goal of 
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creating a network of foreign affairs institutes all over Europe. Similar developments 
took place in Poland and Romania.103 
But the Rockefeller Foundation’s ultimate motive for supporting the 
International Studies Conference and with it the International Institute of Intellectual 
Cooperation was always clear: it was “the promotion of better international 
relations”.104 “Better international relations” was of course a loaded and yet vague term 
which could mean different things to different foundation officers. They rarely spelt out 
what they meant by it themselves. Most of them, though, would have agreed that a 
reversal of protectionist trade policies would have been a good thing, as well as a 
containment or even moderation of fascist aggression, and the acceptance of liberal 
values. What is clear, however, is that foundation officers had long moved away from 
promoting intellectual cooperation for intellectual cooperation’s sake. Tracy B. 
Kittredge of the Rockefeller Paris office communicated this point of view rather bluntly 
to IIIC staff, explaining that “The RF while interested in the Studies Conference looked 
upon it as a means rather than an end.”105  
Therefore, the Foundation was keen on attracting foreign policy elites, namely 
policy makers and those around them, to the conferences. It was for this reason that 
Kittredge had underlined in one of his reports on CEPE that the institution had 
successfully recruited businessmen, journalists, diplomats and politicians.106 This 
constituency corresponded to that of the IPR, which is why one continuous question 
asked by foundation officers was when the ISC would move on from intellectual 
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cooperation to para-diplomatic conferences. The minutes of a 1935 staff meeting 
illustrate this:  
[E.E. Day:] “[The IIIC grant] relates to a program in Europe which is coming 
to parallel a bit the program of the Institute of Pacific Relations. They are 
holding conferences of organizations interested in research in international 
relations.” [Thomas B. Appleget] asks “Over and beyond the field of scholarly 
co-operation? (EED) So far on the academic and research side, but they are 
gradually drawing in men of affairs, just as the Institute has. It is very 
promising thus far.”107 
 
This stance left its mark on the ISC which, by 1937, described its work as having three 
objectives, namely to “develop a system of technical collaboration among its affiliated 
institutions”, to “organise collective research on specific problems in international 
relations” and “place … an objective machinery at the disposal of the statesmen, 
politicians, diplomats, journalists and others concerned with the practice of international 
affairs”.108 
Before the Rockefeller Foundation decided to allot its first substantial grant to 
the ISC in September 1935, there were indications, as noted in the quotation, that the 
conferences would be able to reach out to foreign policy elites. At the 1934 and 1935 
sessions statesmen like Edouard Herriot and Austen Chamberlain were present.109 
However, official interest in the ISC brought its own problems, as discussions at the 
conferences were often used by national groups to present the policy positions of their 
respective governments, instead of scholarly opinions on a particular issue. One 
Rockefeller Foundation officer described the split between delegations from the liberal 
democracies and authoritarian states that came to the fore at the 1934 Paris meeting:  
The discussion revealed the increasing difficulties arising out of the presence 
in a single Study Conference of representatives coming from States with 
authoritarian governments and others coming from States where freedom of 
research still prevails. The English group tried in vain to secure recognition of 
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the principle that at the big Conference next year, the attending scholars 
should remain free to express their individual convictions. The Italian and the 
Polish representatives made it plain that as far as they were concerned their 
delegates would have to voice the opinions formulated in their respective 
countries in the course of their internal studies.110 
 
The Rockefeller Foundation hoped to solve this problem by improving the mechanism 
of the conferences in order to achieve a higher degree of liaison between the national 
groups. This plan became apparent during the grant discussions with Bonnet in summer 
1935. The Rockefeller Foundation requested that its grant be used to pay for increased 
travel expenses of IIIC staff and to facilitate frequent meetings of the representatives of 
the national organisations.111 The Rockefeller Foundation regarded the ISC as its best 
hope of  fulfilling the aims of its international relations programme. The grant to the 
IIIC was seen as an experiment, to see whether the ISC mechanism could develop. 
However, the collaboration between the foundations and the IIIC soon turned sour. 
 
Foundations and the International Studies Conference: Doubts and Conflicts 
A major source of dissatisfaction lay in the very nature of the IIIC as an international 
organisation with a highly developed bureaucracy and complex administrative 
processes. As such, it was unable to produce the efficient mechanism for the 
coordination of the national group efforts which the Rockefeller Foundation desired. 
The completion of preparatory reports progressed slowly, meetings were unproductive 
and when Bonnet remarked that it might not be possible to complete all the necessary 
work in time for the 1937 conference, Sydnor Walker reacted angrily. Having lobbied 
forcefully to keep the ISC linked to Paris, Bonnet and the IIIC now had to accept much 
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of the blame for its failings. “The countries themselves have in a number of cases been 
slow in organizing, but some of the responsibility is clearly that of the central body”, 
Walker wrote. She was suspicious that the money intended to go to the ISC was really 
used to prop up the ailing IIIC. Nor did she have much sympathy for the explanations 
that Kittredge, who backed Bonnet, put forward, as she underlined that “there are a 
number of strategic reasons for trying to bring in a definite report on the subject in 
1937. The obvious importance of producing something tangible to focus the attention of 
the various governments of Europe is of primary concern.” If the ISC was unable to 
deliver, she implied, funding would be withdrawn.112  
Walker also criticised the bulky and, in her opinion, unreadable ISC 
publications.113 This criticism was justified to some extent as the conference 
proceedings as such certainly lacked popular appeal and lacked the reader-friendly 
design of, for example, the Foreign Policy Association’s Headline books. Whether and 
with what intensity the ISC publications were consulted by foreign policy makers is 
hard to assess.114 However, sometimes the transition from ISC discussion to 
intergovernmental policy was made successfully. Charles Kindleberger, for example, 
has observed that the Tripartite Monetary Agreement of 1937, arguably one of the bases 
for the post-1945 world economic system, was inspired by a suggestion made by Danish 
economist Jørgen Pedersen at the 1933 International Studies Conference in London. 
The proceedings of that conference had been distributed to the delegates of the World 
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Economic Conference which took place at the same time and place, and in that case, the 
transfer from academic discussion to policy had been successful. 115 
Other reports from Kittredge were even more disquieting. In a bid to make the 
ISC more efficient, the subject for the 1937 conference, peaceful change, had been 
divided up into four subtopics, to be prepared by international expert committees on 
colonial questions, population problems, raw materials and Danubian questions.116 Each 
of these preparatory studies, in effect a synthesis of the studies of the national groups, 
was coordinated by a secretary-rapporteur. In the case of the colonial studies group, this 
was a Norwegian former Rockefeller social science fellow, H.O. Christophersen. He 
complained to Kittredge that his work was made more difficult by the ISC mechanism, 
as correspondence was diverted through the IIIC. Moreover, it seemed that the national 
groups were not keen on disinterestedly sharing information, as had been the idea, but 
on pushing national colonial claims. “The national groups themselves are very jealous 
in many cases of their prerogatives, and instead of turning over the enquiry to qualified 
experts often prepare themselves the reply, giving not the information desired by 
Christophersen, but the information which the national groups, as such, think it would 
be wise for him to have.” Walker replied dryly that she was “not surprised to hear that 
the individual countries view the colonial question from the point of view of national 
interests” but again put the failures of the colonial group down to the IIIC’s 
inadequacies, claiming “that the machinery for research set up by the ISC is not yet 
functioning smoothly”.117 
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Maybe it was for this reason that Malcolm Davis, the director of the Dotation 
Carnegie, assumed the chairmanship of the Danubian studies group, to ensure that a 
question which had been an enduring concern for the Carnegie Endowment, would be 
treated with the appropriate objectivity. The main focus of this group was to prepare a 
basis for the discussion of Danubian economic integration, and a number of statistical 
and documentary studies were produced.118 The Danubian group seems to have 
progressed satisfactorily, as the Rockefeller Foundation supported the continuation of 
this work beyond the scope of the ISC with another grant in 1937.119 
Increasingly, the Rockefeller Foundation doubted whether the IIIC was really 
capable of integrating cross-national collaborative research programmes. Some of the 
criticisms, mostly those related to the bureaucratic inefficiencies of an essentially 
intergovernmental body such as the IIIC, were most probably justified. Other problems 
that the foundation encountered went to the heart of the entire ISC project. Foundation 
officers increasingly perceived the International Studies Conference as an appropriate 
venue for discussion and the dissemination for information but not for collaborative 
research; smaller research institutes with an international staff but attached to the ISC 
were seen as better equipped for that function. Just as general doubts in the efficacy of 
the ISC mechanism became apparent, the issue of another foundation-supported venture 
came up which enabled the foundations to sideline the IIIC and to develop alternative 
structures for administering the ISC. At the foundation’s initiative, more and more 
coordinating functions were displaced from Paris and moved to Geneva, to a private 
research institution named the Geneva Research Center. 
The Geneva Research Center was formed in 1930 by a group of American 
expatriates in Geneva. They included American staff at the League such as Arthur 
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Sweetser and Benjamin Gerig, representatives of American nongovernmental 
organisations such as the League of Nations Association representative Felix Morley, as 
well as American scholars who taught at the Institut de Hautes Études Internationales, 
namely the international organisation specialist and former assistant to James Brown 
Scott Pitman Potter, and the economist Jacob Viner. The purpose of the centre was to 
keep Americans informed about the League of Nations, mostly via two publications, the 
monthly newsletter Geneva and the so-called Geneva Special Studies. The Geneva 
Research Center also completed special assignments for the Council on Foreign 
Relations and the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences. A personal gift 
by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. to Arthur Sweetser helped fund the centre while the 
Carnegie Endowment provided the salary for its director Malcolm Davis from 1931.120  
Davis was a journalist who had been introduced to Shotwell and Butler by 
Sweetser, a former colleague at the provincial newspaper for which Davis had written 
prior to the war. Davis was a typical American elite internationalist, even if not from a 
wealthy background. A Yale graduate with a Committee on Public Information war 
record, he ran an unsuccessful monthly foreign affairs magazine before becoming 
executive director of the Council on Foreign Relations between 1925 and 1927. He then 
moved to Yale University Press but still worked as a contributing foreign affairs editor 
for Outlook. The Carnegie Endowment recruited him as the director of the Geneva 
Research Center but mainly to write reports on the Disarmament Conference due to 
assemble in Geneva in early 1932.121 Butler and Shotwell, who seem to have regarded 
Davis’ services as those of a  personal research assistant, valued his insights into League 
politics so much that they distributed his missives as confidential reports for the 
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Carnegie Endowment Trustees.122 Although the level of Davis’ inside knowledge was 
disputed by the Carnegie Corporation, which, at that time, funded a significant number 
of Endowment activities, he seems to have been very well-connected within the 
‘Geneva scene’, at least according to the American consul Prentiss Gilbert, who passed 
Geneva Research Center publications on to the State Department.123 In 1933, Gilbert 
claimed that the centre “By virtue of the position of some of its members … has access 
to [League] Secretariat information unequalled perhaps by any other private 
organization”.124 
 It was also on the strength of the centre’s “objective” publications that the 
Rockefeller Foundation started supporting it in 1933 with a three-year grant of $24,000. 
This was increased in 1935 to compensate for the U.S. dollar’s depreciation and two 
additional appropriations of altogether $53,350 followed in 1936 and 1937.125 Mostly, 
however, the Geneva Research Center served the American community in Geneva and 
organisations in the United States. Kittredge recognised that the centre did not really 
link up with the rest of the Foundation’s work in Europe.126 When Malcolm Davis left 
Geneva to assume the directorship of the Dotation in 1935, however, the centre was 
reorganised under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Association (FPA), a private 
foreign affairs think tank, with the tacit approval of the Rockefeller Foundation. The 
FPA had already collaborated with the centre occasionally, and issued joint 
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publications.127 At the time of the reorganisation, the Rockefeller Foundation also gave 
substantial subsidies to the FPA.128 Its president, Raymond Leslie Buell, was an 
alumnus of the Rockefeller philanthropic network. Buell wrote a magisterial study on 
colonialism in Africa under the auspices of the Bureau of International Research of 
Harvard and Radcliffe College, an institution entirely dependent on Rockefeller 
funding. He was also a protégée of Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial trustee 
Colonel Arthur Woods who took a special interest in Buell’s African field research.129 
 In August 1935, Buell temporarily moved to Geneva. He endeavoured to turn 
the Geneva Research Center into an overseas liaison hub for the FPA, through which it 
would be able to distribute its publications in Europe. To that end he proposed to 
internationalise the centre, putting Europeans onto the hitherto exclusively American 
board and cooperating with foreign affairs institutes such as Chatham House and the 
newly-formed CEPE. Buell specifically intended to utilise the distribution channels of 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs as well as the subscription base of L’Esprit 
International for FPA purposes. Finally, Buell sought to rupture the centre’s links with 
the League Secretariat and the American League of Nations Association which the 
centre informally represented.130 This was a thinly veiled attack on Sweetser, the 
centre’s most important link to the League. Buell labelled the previous activities of the 
Geneva Research Centre as League propaganda. However, the Foreign Policy 
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Association engaged in wide-ranging publicity campaigns in the United States itself, 
even if it, just like the Geneva Research Centre, always professed non-partisanship. 
Coincidentally, just as Buell became active in Geneva, the FPA was about to launch a 
new popular education programme with its Headline books series—the first was 
published in 1936.131 Thus, Buell’s move against the old board members of the centre 
seems to have been motivated more by rivalry than by a difference in approach, as has 
been claimed previously.132  
 Malcolm Davis and the Rockefeller Foundation officers backed Buell. They also 
suggested an association between the International Studies Conference, hitherto 
unknown to Buell, and the Geneva Research Center. Malcolm Davis made the necessary 
inquiries in Paris and, together with Kittredge, drew up a plan that set up the centre as 
an international clearing house that was to assist the national groups of the ISC and 
provide a meeting place for informal discussions. In accordance with the wishes of 
Sydnor Walker, a permanent director was also appointed in the person of John B. 
Whitton, a Princeton economics professor. Malcolm Davis secured an additional grant 
of $8000 from the Carnegie Endowment. Finally, a reluctant Sweetser also agreed to a 
new, international board which included Bonnet and representatives of the several ISC 
members, such as William Rappard of the Institut de Hautes Études Internationales, 
Etienne Dennery of CEPE and Ivison Macadam of the RIIA. The new board also 
included a German jurist, Friedrich (Fritz) Berber, whom Buell had recruited on a trip to 
Berlin during his extended European sojourn.133  
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To Kittredge, the reorganisation of the Geneva Research Center held exceptional 
promise. Finally, it might provide a suitable mechanism for more direct foundation 
leadership within the ISC: “Perhaps the most encouraging fact of all is the tendency, 
already evident, that the national centers will look to us for leadership and 
inspiration.”134 The Geneva Research Center started to host ISC subgroup meetings 
from 1937. In the same year, and due to Rockefeller pressure, a special programme 
committee independent of the IIIC and under the chairmanship of Malcolm Davis was 
created for the supervision of cross-national, long-term studies. This was a further 
attempt to change the ISC structure.135 The Rockefeller Foundation’s continuous 
interventions, also with regards to the nomination of general rapporteurs, finally led 
Bonnet to accuse Kittredge of wanting to take over “the complete control of the 
mechanism and program of the Conference”.136 But despite the increasingly strained 
relationship between the IIIC and the foundation, a major grant was awarded in 
December 1937. In the grant resolution, the Rockefeller Foundation held on to the idea 
that the ISC was, for better or for worse, the only way to fulfil the purposes of its 
international relations programme. “There is no other unofficial organization which has 
the opportunity of the International Studies Conference to provide for the study and 
discussion by representatives of many nations of the problems which to-day complicate 
both national and international life.”137 
However, even the fraught reorganisations of the ISC in 1937 could not improve 
its outcomes, at least in the view of the Rockefeller Foundation’s New York office. 
Kittredge who was based in Paris was a lot more optimistic about the ISC’s results than 
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his colleagues in New York. In one of his reports, he explained that “While the tangible 
results of the Conferences are difficult to appraise, it does undoubtedly represent a 
vigorous effort to improve the processes by which scientific knowledge of international 
problems can be increased, and this knowledge disseminated for the enlightenment of 
public opinion in all of those countries where public opinion still plays an effective role 
in the determination of foreign policy.” The short and sceptical comment that Walker 
scribbled on the margin was: “How?”138 
Of course, the New York officers were the ones who had to justify Rockefeller 
support for the ISC to the Trustees of the Foundation, and the international atmosphere 
of the late 1930s certainly did not inspire confidence in the possibility of peaceful 
cooperation among nations. This was not the fault of the International Institute of 
Intellectual Cooperation or the ISC but it eroded the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
commitment to intellectual cooperation in the cause of peace. As Walker noted, “There 
is increasing distrust of the results to be expected from conferences carried on by 
academic or near-academic people. We are rather afraid since the political tension has 
so increased that the ISC will become less realistic and more academic.”139 By July 
1939, shortly before the last International Studies Conference in the inter-war period, 
the Rockefeller Foundation had lost almost all enthusiasm for a project it had embraced 
so wholeheartedly just a few years before. Walker confessed to a colleague that she 
could hardly begin to brace herself to attend the next conference in Bergen which took 
place between 27 August and 2 September 1939.140 Although Walker had already 
decided in May 1939 not to appropriate another large grant to the ISC for the time 
being, the outbreak of the Second World War terminated Rockefeller commitment to 
this particular project for good.  
                                                 
138 Kittredge to Walker, 6 Sep 1937, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 955. 
139 Excerpt letter Walker to Kittredge, 13 April 1938, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 958. 
140 Walker to Gunn, 24 February 1939, excerpt, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 105, folder 959. 
  232
 In the eyes of Rockefeller Foundation officers, the ISC had been a failure. After 
all, it had not been able to prevent a new war in Europe. Even more embarrassingly, 
foundation lobbying had actually ensured the participation of scholars from the 
dictatorships in the ISC. The most vocal and influential one, Fritz Berber, even 
proposed to take over the direction of the IIIC after the fall of France as the Third 
Reich’s commissioner for intellectual cooperation. Between 1935 and 1937, Berber also 
continuously pressured the Rockefeller Foundation to weaken the link between IIIC and 
ISC as it made German participation in the conferences more difficult.141 Shortly after 
Germany left the League in October 1933, German membership in the ISC ended, too, 
after consultations between the German coordinating committee and the Ministry of 
External Affairs in Berlin concluded that the link to the IIIC made further participation 
impossible.142 However, Berber only a year later attended the 1935 International Studies 
Conference as an observer. The research institute he directed, the Deutsches Institut für 
Außenpolitische Forschung, became a corresponding member of the ISC in 1936.143 
What had caused this reversal, and why were the foundations not more puzzled by it? 
 
National Socialist Participation in the International Studies Conference 
Berber had originally been on the staff of the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik where he 
had led the research division. It was here that he had first come into contact with the 
foundations. In 1935 he took over the directorship of the Hamburg Institut für 
Auswärtige Politik, and oversaw its transfer to Berlin where it was renamed the 
Deutsches Institut für Außenpolitische Forschung (German Institute for Foreign Policy 
Studies). The move was ordered by Joachim von Ribbentrop, Hitler’s foreign policy 
adviser and later Minister of External Affairs, who took Berber under his wing and got 
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him to work for his own foreign policy brains trust, the Dienststelle Ribbentrop.144 The 
Dienststelle Ribbentrop was a sophisticated cultural relations operation outside the 
German Ministry of External Affairs, and thus fitted into the plurocratic system of 
foreign policy-making in the Third Reich. It worked on ad-hoc tasks given to it by 
Hitler but also developed a method of using the internationalist rhetoric on international 
conciliation of the 1920s for the purposes of the Third Reich. To that end, it maintained 
a division for organising Franco-German meetings of Great War veterans. Staff of the 
Dienststelle Ribbentrop forged relations with influential elites in selected countries and 
used them to create positive propaganda for Germany. A favourite strategy was the used 
of targeted indiscretions designed to make foreign interlocutors believed that they were 
being taken into their confidence and were able to influence the formation of Nazi 
foreign policy.145  
This is precisely what Berber started to do at the ISC, as well as create goodwill 
for Germany. During a debate on regional pacts at the 1935 conference, Berber 
explained why Germany was not in favour of them, referring to a recent speech by 
Hitler. “But it was impossible for him to go in detail into the reasons why Germany felt 
as she did so long as the Third Reich remained ‘terra incognita’ and so long as outsiders 
continued to regard it, as they did quite wrongly, as a fascist state, as a totalitarian state 
or as a dictatorship. It was none of these things.”146 He continued his publicity effort for 
Nazi Germany with a lecture held at the Dotation Carnegie in May 1936, and he 
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published an article in the Dotation’s journal.147 The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs was also targeted. Berber gave a lecture there and managed to invite several 
Chatham House members over to Berlin, among them Arnold Toynbee. His speech, 
which advocated colonial possessions in Africa for Germany, was warmly received in 
Berlin and harshly criticised in London.148  
Although assessments of Berber in the secondary literature remain vague—he 
never became a Nazi party member and could apparently secure a modicum of 
intellectual freedom for his staff—it is certain that he used his international contacts to 
support the regime and to undermine the ISC.149 A journey he undertook in March 1936 
to participate at an ISC administrative meeting had been instigated by Ribbentrop 
personally.150 It is likely that Berber’s participation in the subgroup on colonial 
questions in which he lobbied intensely for German access to colonies was also directed 
by Ribbentrop whose idée fixe was German colonial expansion in Africa.151 
Foundation officers were not unaware of Berber’s connections to the Nazi 
foreign policy elite. However, Berber also possessed certain intellectual credentials 
which made it easier for him to participate in the ISC’s structures.152 His ideas on 
international law and international politics were actually taken up by other ISC 
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participants, notably by E.H. Carr.153 Carr, a former diplomat and member of the British 
delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, had left the Foreign Office to take up the 
Woodrow Wilson Professorship of International Politics at the University of Wales, 
Aberystwyth, in 1936. He was profoundly critical of liberal internationalism and a vocal 
supporter of appeasement. Carr attended the 1937 conference, as a member of the 
British Coordinating Committee, and cited Berber in his well-known Twenty Years 
Crisis.154 In that study, Carr refuted the legal positivism which had inspired at least 
some of the philanthropic backers of the ISC and returned to Austinian command theory 
which held that international law did not actually exist. To be fair to Carr, though, he 
did not adopt Berber’s völkisch conception of law, but used it to underline that 
international law had to be based on a strong international community of values. As 
long as these were absent, international law was weak, and it was, Carr argued, futile to 
depend on it for the maintenance of peace.155 
Berber also received the stamp of approval from émigré scholars who were 
trusted sources of information for the Rockefeller Foundation. One of them was Arnold 
Wolfers, a former colleague at the Hochschule, who classified Berber as a ‘moderate’ 
and thus worthy of Rockefeller support against more extreme forces within Germany. 
Wolfers also told the Foundation about a book by Berber on Locarno which had 
received positive reviews in the London Times and specifically encouraged the 
Foundation to work with Berber.156 Wolfers was certainly not a Nazi sympathiser. He 
aided German scholars who had to flee the Third Reich and asked for his assistance in 
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procuring academic jobs in the United States.157 However, his positive appraisal of 
Berber had consequences which Wolfers had probably not been able to foresee. 
Berber and his German collaborators, many of whom worked at institutions 
which had been supported by the Rockefeller Foundation before 1933, profited 
materially from his good standing with the foundations. Not only was Berber able to 
access ISC funds which the Rockefeller Foundation had granted to the IIIC for the 
national groups, the Deutsche Institut für Außenpolitische Forschung also received a 
donation of several hundred foreign-language books from the Dotation Carnegie, which 
might have been difficult to procure otherwise.158 Malcolm Davis and Tracy B. 
Kittredge specifically asked IIIC officers to provide generous grants for German ISC 
studies under Berber’s direction.159 
 In the mid-thirties, some Rockefeller Foundation staff members, in particular 
Kittredge, came to the conclusion that scholars from Italy and Germany, and possibly 
even from the Soviet Union, should be included in the ISC because in these countries 
experts supposedly had “even greater influence in the councils of government than 
scholars in the liberal countries”.160 What the ISC could do was to convince these 
individuals of “the political nature of present national dissatisfaction and of the 
revisionistic claims of certain of the powers”.161 Therefore, influential experts such as 
Berber were welcome at the ISC, precisely because they were close to governments. 
Kittredge’s superiors in New York partly agreed with him, even though they were more 
open to German than Soviet participation in the ISC.162 Neither Fosdick nor Walker 
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completely shared Kittredge’s assumptions, though, as their handwritten comments on 
his reports indicate. They remained wary of Berber.163 Nevertheless, they did not order 
Kittredge to nudge Berber out of the ISC, or the Geneva Research Center, not even after 
the Rockefeller Foundation had been criticised publicly in the United States in 
November 1936 for a grant given to a German physics research institute.164 This is all 
the more remarkable as leading ISC participants, notably Alfred Zimmern, repeatedly 
voiced their objections to Berber’s attendance of ISC meetings.165 
 Berber left his mark on the ISC not just by participating in study meetings but 
also by becoming the Third Reich’s special envoy for the IIIC after the fall of France, in 
August 1940. The building which housed the Institute had been taken over by the 
German army during the occupation of Paris.166 In a final confrontation with Malcolm 
Davis in Geneva in August 1940, Berber again managed to convince a foundation 
officer that his intentions for the IIIC were benign and that he would prevent worse 
things from happening—and Davis later flattered himself that it was due to this 
conversation that the IIIC survived the war.167 However, while the Institute survived, 
much of its archive was looted during the German occupation. Specifically, the card 
index detailing correspondence regarding the ISC as well as the entire stock of reports 
on the last study cycle vanished.168 While it is not clear whether Berber was implicated 
in this archival theft, the looting of the files of international organisations and the 
systematic gathering of information on international networks by the Nazi propaganda 
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ministry’s Central Conference Office was part of the Third Reich’s military intelligence 
operations during the Second World War. The fact that Nazi authorities were interested 
in the workings of international organisations and networks has only recently attracted 
the attention of historians, as it seems to contradict the existing historiography of the 
Third Reich.169 
Berber used the contradiction between National Socialist rhetoric, which linked 
the term ‘international’ to a lack in patriotism and the presumed ‘Jewish world 
conspiracy’, and the promotion of internationalism by the Central Conference Office 
and the Dienststelle Ribbentrop to his advantage. In his conversations with foreigners he 
managed to style himself as a dissenter from official German foreign policy who, by 
participating in international activities such as the ISC took a personal risk and could 
therefore be trusted, a pose which he also adopted in his autobiography.170 However, in 
the Ministry of External Affairs under Ribbentrop, Berber analysed the contents of 
foreign archives for the benefit of German policy makers. This is exactly what he did 
with files that were transported to Germany from Austria after the Anschluss—Berber 
was the head of the commission in charge (Leiter der Kommission für die 
österreichischen Akten) and his interpretations of their content is still preserved in 
German archives, along with his hints as to which member of the Ministry of External 
Affairs might be interested in which file.171 In retrospect, Berber was certainly not a 
protégé that the foundations could be proud of.172 
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What conclusions can be drawn from this engagement of private American foundations 
in a scholarly association under the patronage of an international organisation? First, 
contrary to Jean-Jacques Renoliet’s assessment, American foundations were not 
interested in technical collaboration at the expense of more ‘political’ projects. In fact, 
the story of the ISC is one of the politicisation of an international organisation through 
an outside agency, notably the Rockefeller Foundation. In particular, the Foundation’s 
decision to engage in an intellectual struggle with the totalitarian powers made the ISC 
and also the IIIC extremely vulnerable. Fundamentally, the foundations were less 
concerned with theoretical developments or the disciplinary formation of international 
relations. They were interested in a reform of international politics with experts as 
protagonists. Consequently, the institutions they supported were foreign affairs 
institutes, modern-day think tanks, and should properly be classified as 
nongovernmental organisations. The Anglo-American model of a foreign affairs think 
tank was arguably spread effectively through the ISC. 
Second, did the foundations fulfil a role as mediators between international 
organisations and local groups? To some extent, the case of the ISC confirms such a 
thesis. The overlap between the ISC and institutions supported by or close to the 
Rockefeller and Carnegie philanthropies is striking. Without Rockefeller support, it is 
also questionable whether so many new members would have sprung up or affiliated 
with the ISC. However, the transformation of the conference mechanism also suggests 
that, rather than mediating between the IIIC and ISC members, the Rockefeller 
Foundation tried to undermine intergovernmental structures by taking over the IIIC’s 
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coordinating functions. Thus, the Foundation became a transformative force rather than 
a mediator. 
Finally, how should we evaluate the history of the ISC? The foundations’ 
involvement with the International Studies Conference was brief, and to them it seemed 
that the conferences were a promise that was never fulfilled. The lack of sustained 
foundation support after 1945 was one of the factors which ‘killed’ the ISC. Certainly, 
if the benchmark was to change the course of European history in the 1930s, the 
International Studies Conferences were a failure. But, in a way, the story of the ISC is 
also the story of a missed opportunity. The most recent work on the International 
Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, by Renoliet, dismisses the ISC because of its lack 
of impact—and here Renoliet uncritically adopts the view of foundation officers in the 
late 1930s.  
This treatment is much too harsh. The International Studies Conferences had a 
scope that the discipline of international relations lacked after World War II. Its 
multidisciplinarity, for example, could have provided an alternative direction to the path 
the discipline took in the 1940s and 1950s. In the interwar period, the international and 
interdisciplinary academic exchange offered by the ISC was truly unique. After 1945, 
American realist IR scholars, especially Hans Morgenthau, argued that the ISC should 
not be revived because IR was fundamentally a branch of political science.173 But 
maybe Morgenthau should have acknowledged that the International Studies 
Conferences had played a role in shaping realism in the 1930s. Even in a classic text of 
realism, E.H. Carr’s Twenty Years’ Crisis, we can trace, in the section on Peaceful 
Change, the discussions that took place at the 1937 International Studies Conference. It 
is perhaps also interesting to note that Carr quoted Fritz Berber’s 1934 study Sicherheit 
und Gerechtigkeit in the text, and directly adopted key concepts such as the fundamental 
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inequality of states. Carr would not be the only self-styled realist to have taken elements 
of the critique that German international lawyers who were ideologically close to the 
Nazis mounted on interwar internationalism. Carl Schmitt’s influence on Hans 
Morgenthau is by now well-established.174 The irony is that post-1945 realism became 
so attractive because it could claim for itself that it had a better answer to the question 
of how to deal with aggressive regimes like Nazi Germany than any of the so-called 
idealist projects. Moreover, it is not true that the Conferences had no impact on policy 
whatsoever, as the example of the Tripartite Monetary Agreement of 1937 
demonstrates. It is possible to argue that the foundations torpedoed similar transfers by 
being so eager to include ‘experts’ from the dictatorships in the conferences—but that 
was the price they paid for their pretensions of scientific objectivity, bipartisanship and 
the assumption that a community of scholars without borders really existed.
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5 
Epilogue 
 
The advent of the Second World War precipitated a rupture in American philanthropic 
networks in Europe. Shortly after the outbreak of war, the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
Paris office was transferred to La Baule, a seaside town on the Atlantic coast where 
Malcolm Davis also had a residence.1 The Dotation, having disbanded its European 
Advisory Council in May 1939, ceased all activities once war broke out. Its offices were 
shut down when the German army invaded Paris.2 Those foundation officers who 
participated in the ISC’s Bergen conference (27 August to 2 September) heard the news 
of the German invasion of Poland as the conference was wrapping up. Sydnor Walker 
returned directly to New York.3 Malcolm Davis did not even come back to his post in 
Paris but went straight to Geneva as the freshly recruited representative of the American 
Red Cross. Switzerland became his base for a number of missions he carried out on 
behalf of civilian refugees in Europe in the early phase of the war. It was also here that 
he had his final conversation with Fritz Berber.4 
Many accounts that deal with international expert networks or with the 
disciplinary history of international relations stress that the advent of the Second World 
War rang in the end of an era.5 Although this dissertation also ends with the closure of 
the foundations’ branch offices and the German takeover of the IIIC in 1940, this 
epilogue intends to point towards continuities that link the interwar years to the post-
war period. These continuities complicate conventional narratives and open up research 
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perspectives that are beyond the scope of this study. Hence, this chapter will trace the 
war-time relationship between the foundations and what was left of the International 
Studies Conference, an organisation which was revived after 1945.  
 
The Impact of War on Philanthropic Funding Patterns 
By the end of 1939 the Rockefeller Foundation’s Social Science Division had pulled out 
of most of Europe, apart from Britain, France and Switzerland.6 But despite the 
outbreak of war, work on the International Studies Conference continued. At the Bergen 
meeting, a new study topic, international organisation, was chosen. Pitman Potter, the 
renowned specialist on international organisation, became the general rapporteur, 
operating out of Geneva. At least in the eyes of Kittredge, war had not made the ISC 
obsolete but even more necessary.  The Geneva Research Center was to “provide [the] 
secretariat to assure contact with groups in Europe that may now begin studies of [the] 
basis for [a] new peace, and for [a] new development of international organization”.7 
And although the Rockefeller Foundation had decided not to award another major grant 
to the ISC in May 1939, smaller appropriations were certainly considered. As a 
memorandum in the foundation’s archives indicates, draft dockets for grants were 
drawn up in March 1940, and an appropriation was made to the Norwegian ISC 
committee, even if it was not paid out due to Norway’s invasion by the Germans.8 In 
1940, the Rockefeller Foundation even awarded a grant of $11,000 to the newly created 
Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm. Another such grant was made 
in 1942.9 
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 The Rockefeller Foundation also continued to direct support to France, in 
particular to CEPE, which, as soon as war broke out, started a war programme on the 
conditions of a future peace settlement.10 For the new programme, CEPE also continued 
the collaboration with Chatham House.11 Kittredge’s evaluation of CEPE’s activities 
was very positive. “Its independence and autonomy has been maintained, but close 
cooperative relations have been established with government agencies in Paris or with 
persons now charged by the government with investigations related to post-war 
problems.”12 When the centre’s financial base became precarious due to the fall of the 
franc, the Rockefeller Foundation even diverted funds from other recipient institutions 
in Paris, to ensure the independent running of the Centre. According to Selskar M. 
Gunn, this was done to prevent “ the Centre [from being] driven to the necessity of 
attempting to get government money for the studies now in hand. Certainly one wants to 
foster local appropriations, but in terms of the subject matter of these studies, it is wiser 
that the government should not contribute.”13 
 The Rockefeller Foundation took a similar stance in Britain. The Royal Institute 
of International Affairs moved most of its operations to Oxford at the outbreak of war 
and put them at the service of the British government. The Oxford operation, known as 
the Foreign Research and Press Service (FRPS), was directed by Arnold Toynbee and at 
least eight former Rockefeller Social Science fellows were on its staff. When news of 
the Foreign Research and Press Service reached the Rockefeller Foundation, it decided 
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to end its grant as it could not subsidise government work.14 During a full staff 
conference, Joseph Willits, the new director of the Foundation’s Social Science 
Division from 1939, gave a harsh verdict: “[Chatham House] is joining the war machine 
and its position is pretty much compromised.”15 Ever skilful at managing its relationship 
with the foundation, Chatham House picked up on the “embarrassment” that its 
government work was causing across the Atlantic, and promised to separate the FRPS 
from the rump Chatham House in London, which was to become completely 
independent again and have the exclusive benefit of Rockefeller grants.16 However, as is 
clear from the archival record, this separation was contrived entirely “for Rockefeller 
purposes” and not maintained in reality.17 In 1943 the FRPS was merged with the 
Political Intelligence Department to form the Foreign Office Research Department.18 
 The second phase of the war brought the termination of almost all foundation 
funding for institutes of international affairs in Europe. The IIIC was taken over by the 
German army. Bonnet went into exile in the United States. CEPE was shut down as the 
Germans advanced towards Paris and its offices were occupied by the Gestapo. Some 
CEPE staff temporarily regrouped in Clermont-Ferrand but soon had to abandon their 
work. Louis Joxe and Etienne Dennery, the two directors, went into exile, eventually 
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working for the Free French.19 The German invasion of France, Scandinavia and the 
Lowlands also induced the Rockefeller Foundation to create a new Emergency Program 
for European Scholars which was similar to the Aid for Deposed Scholars which the 
Foundation had extended to scholars persecuted under fascism since 1933. Thus the 
Rockefeller Foundation became instrumental in procuring university posts in the United 
States for almost sitxy scholars who had to flee France, a vital contribution considering 
the strict American immigration policies. Many social scientists who were aided found 
posts at the New School for Social Research in New York.20  
The American staff of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Paris office also left France, 
save for one Rockefeller officer who was stationed in Lissabon and assisted exiled 
scholars with their journey to the United States.21 Kittredge, who must have been aware 
of Berber’s government connections, wrote him a semi-reproachful letter in July 1940: 
“I trust that your local representatives in Paris and La Baule are treating our offices with 
appropriate respect.” Kittredge had seen Berber in person as recently as April and still 
included him in ISC work.22 It is possible that Kittredge regarded Berber as a valuable 
source of inside information and therefore kept in touch with him just until the United 
States entered the war. In a rather awkward manner, Kittredge requested Berber to 
forward the publications of his institute to the Geneva Research Center, giving 
Kittredge an “opportunity to familiarize myself with recent literature in Germany 
related to problems of world organization”.23 
Meanwhile, the Geneva Research Center continued to function, even though 
Pitman Potter decided to pack up its archive and send it to the United States in the case 
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of a German invasion. Due to Rappard’s insistence, the Graduate Institute also 
continued its work, although some professors left for the United States.24 However, with 
regard to the ISC the centre of gravity was shifting westwards. Bonnet, who had set up a 
makeshift New York office in the building of the Carnegie Endowment, argued that the 
ISC secretariat be transferred to the United States where it was to oversee a new 
grouping representing the democracies. This plan, however, seems to have come to 
nothing, due to lack of enthusiasm on the part of Malcolm Davis, and from late 1940 
ISC work was effectively terminated for the duration of the war. Potter himself finally 
returned to the United States permanently in autumn 1941.25 In accordance with the 
wishes of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Geneva Research Center was merged with the 
Graduate Institute in 1942.26 
One initiative which had been heavily associated with the Geneva Research 
Center was kept alive even once the institutional structures had disappeared. The 
Danubian study, a project which had always enjoyed strong foundation backing, 
survived the war thanks to former ISC delegate Allen Dulles who insisted the study was 
of high value “to both scholarship and government”. Dulles, who was stationed in Berne 
working for the OSS, kept up the communication with the study’s secretary and, after 
granting a personal advance, transmitted Rockefeller and Carnegie funds to him 
throughout the war.27 The Danubian inquiry continued after 1945 and its reports found 
their way to the American State Department.28 Dulles, of course, became a key 
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protagonist in the post-1945 movement for European integration as a founder member 
of the American Committee on United Europe.29  
Other initiatives to revive the ISC or those foreign affairs institutes which had to 
close down were not encouraged by the foundations. A proposal by Joxe and Dennery 
which would have revived CEPE under the auspices of French anti-Vichy and anti-Nazi 
resistance was rejected with the justification that “the RF isn’t a political body and can’t 
use its funds to wage war no matter how we as individuals feel” and that “we no longer 
live in the days of a Santa Claus budget”.30 Similarly, when Chatham House proposed a 
plan for an International Research Institute which would have united research groups 
composed of representatives of governments in exile, foundation officers criticised that 
“some intellectuals … feel that RF is a Santa Claus”.31 Curiously, though, the actual 
working methods of the proposed institute strongly resembled the ISC and the IPR 
templates. National groups studying post-war reconstruction would discuss their 
research under the auspices of the institute, not, according to the Dutch representative, 
to “formulate inter-Allied policy” but to provide “an interchange of information” as “in 
the world as it exists to-day the purely national field of research is too narrow”. 
Nevertheless, most of the groups, apart from Chatham House, were obviously 
sponsored by their governments-in-exile and openly admitted that they would be 
interested in the project as a way of helping them formulate national policies.32 
But while Kittredge cited budgetary constraints and a reluctance to support 
refugee groups as reasons for rejecting the proposal during a conversation at Chatham 
House, the Rockefeller Foundation’s president Raymond Fosdick felt uncomfortable 
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with supporting an initiative that was so obviously related to government policy.33 
Recounting an interview with Ivison Macadam and Sir Frederick Whyte of Chatham 
House, Fosdick expressed these doubts to Willits: “Sir Frederick Whyte obviously 
speaks for the British Foreign Office. To what extent do the Foreign Office and our 
State Department see eye to eye? In the second place, Whyte’s proposal is predicated on 
the restoration of the ante-bellum status in Europe. Who can guess what the post-bellum 
status will be?”34 A little over a month after the Atlantic Charter had been signed, 
Fosdick remained cautious. It was clear to him that this would not be a quick war and a 
sure Allied victory, and he was loath to embroil the Rockefeller Foundation in a 
diplomatic tangle. Moreover, since the late 1930s, the foundations’ relationship with the 
State Department had also undergone a change with the result that foundation officers 
became more mindful of the needs of the American government. 
 
At the Service of Government: Wartime Commitments of the Rockefeller Foundation 
and the Carnegie Endowment 
The relationship between the foundations and the State Department, although never 
remote, did undergo a change in the late 1930s, along with the rest of American cultural 
diplomacy. In July 1938, the State Department created its Division of Cultural 
Relations, as a reaction to propaganda activities by the Axis countries in Latin America. 
The new division implemented what Frank Ninkovich has called a “voluntarist” concept 
of cultural relations. This entailed, supposedly, little change in the way American 
cultural diplomacy was conducted, namely by private organisations such as 
philanthropic foundations, and with minimum interference from the state. The only 
difference, according to Ninkovich, was that an existing system for the conduct of 
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cultural relations finally received state approval and support.35 This assessment, 
however, may underestimate the amount of pressure that was now exerted on the 
foundations. Whereas before 1938 the initiative mostly lay with private organisations 
and individuals and not the State Department, this relationship flipped after the Division 
of Cultural Relations was created. The impact of Axis propaganda in Latin America 
produced an attitude within the State Department which changed the perception of 
foundations from facilitators to executors of U.S. foreign policy. 
A despatch from Alexander W. Weddell of the American Embassy in Buenos 
Aires complained about the “distressing indifference” that both the Carnegie 
Endowment and the Rockefeller Foundation displayed towards Latin America.36 
Presenting an analysis of the Rockefeller Foundation’s annual report, the diplomat 
launched a diatribe:  
On the other hand, ignoring the huge appropriations going to England, France and 
other European countries, I cannot but feel that out of  
the $154,000 to Japan (actually paid out of an appropriation of nearly $900,000),  
the $172,000 allotted to Rumania,  
the $53,000 earmarked for Munich,  
the $6000 spent at Melbourne,  
the $90,000 to be expended in Denmark,  
the $60,000 set aside for Siam,  
the $15,000 which the Soviet Ministry of Public Health is to expend,  
the $27,000 to go to Leipzig, 
the $112,000 for the University of Leiden,  
the $12,000 to the University of Sofia, Bulgaria,  
the $175,000 to the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures in 
London,  
the $26,000 to the Prussian State Library, Berlin, for the preparation of a catalogue 
(this in a land where books are being burnt today),  
the further appropriation of $45,000 for research in African linguistics,  
some small sum might have been deducted without damage to the high programs 
pursued, and used in helping some of the struggling universities and libraries and 
cultural groups in Latin America, especially in this country, and thereby 
counterbalance in part the substantial amounts being expended by European 
countries, not alone in legitimate cultural activities but in positively harmful 
propaganda.37 
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Weddell not only communicated his dissatisfaction with philanthropic policies to the 
State Department, he also contacted the Rockefeller Foundation itself and received a 
reply from its Executive Council which promised that Rockefeller policies were about 
to change and give much more attention to Latin America.38 A similar promise was 
made by Sydnor Walker during a formal meeting in March 1939 with the head of the 
Cultural Relations Division and representatives of other voluntary organisations 
involved in cultural relations.39 In the course of the Second World War, the foundations’ 
subservience to government authority became ever stronger: it only took an irate letter 
from the American embassy in Buenos Aires for the Rockefeller Foundation to pledge a 
complete reversal of policy in 1938. Foundation officers, however, had trouble 
reorienting their programmes as quickly as the State Department would have liked them 
to and were reminded of their promises by official visits from Cultural Relations 
Division staff “with no particular object in mind except to talk over problems of Latin 
America”.40 
The State Department’s Cultural Relations Division may have intended to 
continue the old system of voluntary initiatives and informal cooperation but the 
relationship between policy makers and foundations did change. Throughout the 
interwar years, foundation officers exhibited a willingness to adjust their policies to the 
needs of American foreign policy as they perceived them. When the foundations were 
finally and openly asked to do what the State Department deemed necessary in the late 
1930s, they complied without complaints and, it seems, pleased that finally government 
fully recognised the importance of their programmes. In 1943, at a time when the State 
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Department ran a vetting process of the Rockefeller Foundation’s entire fellowship 
programme in Latin America, a solicitous foundation officer summed up his employer’s 
stance towards Washington: “we wish to work in complete harmony with the State 
Department”.41 Similarly, Malcolm Davis of the Carnegie Endowment thought about 
how best to aid the State Department’s efforts in the cultural relations field. In a letter to 
Philip Jessup he proposed that “we should work out plans relating to our own purposes 
and supplementing those of the Division in the Department and of the Coordinator’s [of 
Inter-American Affairs] Office and the American Library Association”.42 
The outbreak of war also changed the relationship between the State Department 
and the Council on Foreign Relations which from October 1939 assembled four study 
groups to work on the confidential War and Peace Studies. Some of the studies became 
highly influential in the formulating of wartime U.S. policy, notably with regard to the 
decision to declare Greenland part of the Western hemisphere. The Rockefeller 
Foundation provided altogether $300,000 for the project and financed other research 
that was used in the State Department during the war.43 Calling on George Messersmith, 
Assistant Secretary of State and main official contact for the Council of Foreign 
Relations, Joseph Willits was keen on finding out what the State Department thought of 
other civil society organisations the foundation was also supporting, in particular the 
IPR.44 Clearly, the Rockefeller Foundation realised that the American government was 
increasingly willing to commission and utilise outside expertise instead of relying on 
the uncoordinated osmosis that took place in the realms cultivated by the foreign policy 
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establishment. If the Foundation was able to pay for some of this expertise, all the 
better. 
The Carnegie Endowment also backed several war-related initiatives, mostly those 
connected with the movement for the United Nations. James T. Shotwell became 
particularly active in planning the post-war world organisation and in November 1939 
formed the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace. Sticking to a familiar 
format, the Commission conducted research and issued recommendations. The 
Endowment provided the major financial backing for the venture.45 As the project for a 
new world organisation acquired a more definite shape after the Moscow Declaration of 
October 1943, the Rockefeller Foundation also started to support a group led by Manley 
O. Hudson, former director of the Harvard Research, whose scheme was discussed at 
the Dumbarton Oaks meeting.46 While the Foundation had stopped supporting Hudson’s 
international law research in the early 1930s, now that he was leading an effort that was 
taken seriously by government officials, he came back into the Foundation’s orbit. As in 
the Great War, the Carnegie Endowment’s International Law Division acted as 
something of an ad hoc research bureau for various government departments.47 John 
Condliffe, who had become the assistant director of the Endowment’s Division of 
Economics and History, also coordinated campaigns that promoted international trade 
with State Department officials.48 He thus ensured that a long-standing interest of the 
Carnegie Endowment could be pursued with government approval. 
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and American entry into the war, the 
Council on Foreign Relations study groups lost some of their influence as the State 
Department expanded its own planning structures. However, study group participants 
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were recruited into government service, either as technical advisers or into the OSS.49 
Malcolm Davis also joined this forerunner of the CIA.50 
 
The Foundations’ International Relations Programme in the Aftermath of War 
The wartime experience had a profound impact on foundation officers. During the final 
phases of the war, they took stock of the programmes they had supported in the past and 
tried to come up with policies fit for new circumstances. In 1945, Joseph Willits 
produced a memorandum that revealed how difficult this process was for the 
foundations. While Willits acknowledged that educating public opinion was still an 
important task, he advocated retreating from that field in favour of other ventures. The 
first and foremost of those was aiding the American government “in every legitimate 
way to develop a mature and integrated foreign policy”. Other concerns that had already 
been present during the interwar years such as economic policy or population were also 
cited by Willits. Another area of future interest was listed as “Studies of a few countries 
about which knowledge is most important”, which pointed towards the massive amount 
of money that the new field of Area Studies would receive from philanthropic 
foundations in the post-war years.51 Europe also ceased to be the principle objective of 
the foundations. With the advent of the Cold War and the prospect for a rapid 
decolonisation of former imperial possessions, Soviet Russia and “backward countries” 
received more attention.52 
Foundation policies in the field of international relations did change after 1945, 
not least due to publications that shaped the discipline internally, such as The Twenty 
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Years’ Crisis, or Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations. However, interwar 
experiences also seemed to have played a role. While one complaint in the days of the 
International Studies Conference had been that there were too many studies containing 
too much detail and not enough synthesis, a differentiation took place after 1945. In the 
1950s, the study of international relations was divided into the fields of international 
politics and Area Studies, a country-specific approach with less emphasis on theory. 
With the advent of a new president at the Rockefeller Foundation in 1953, Dean Rusk, 
social science spending was significantly reduced. The Ford Foundation took over the 
dominant position that the Rockefeller Foundation had hitherto enjoyed in that field.53 
The old philanthropic network that had been forged in the interwar years to some extent 
helped to smooth that transition, for example when Arnold Wolfers brought the 
Graduate Institute in Geneva to the attention of a Ford Foundation officer.54 
The Graduate Institute proceeded to receive substantial funding from the Ford 
Foundation. Many other recipients of foundation funding in the interwar years were able 
to profit from continued philanthropic largesse after 1945, for example Chatham House 
but also CEPE. Funding for these foreign affairs institutes was only phased out in the 
1950s. The same is true for the International Studies Conference which was revived 
after 1945, with some foundation help. The contributions were very small and may have 
been intended as an opportune way of slowly but definitively withdrawing funding 
completely, even if some foundation officers retained a personal interest in the ISC. 
 
Who Killed the ISC? 
According to David Long, the ISC’s final demise in 1954 was due to a number of 
factors. First of all, it was a European-dominated organisation and the evolving 
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American perspective on international relations was not in tune with it. Moreover, there 
was competition in the form of the academic International Political Science Association, 
founded in 1949. After 1952, UNESCO, an organisation which was not fond of inter-
disciplinarity, stopped funding the ISC. This was unfortunate for the ISC as American 
philanthropic backers had also lost interest.55 
There are several gaps in that story, however. In the aftermath of the Second 
World War, the ISC was only revived with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation 
and the Carnegie Endowment, a fact which underlines that the foundations had, in 
principle, still an interest in the concept of the ISC.56 Malcolm Davis still attended ISC 
meetings after the war.57 Then, as the ISC affiliated with UNESCO, the foundations 
backed away. Instead of continuing support for the ISC, the Carnegie Endowment set up 
an entirely informal association of foreign affairs institutes in 1950. The Rockefeller 
Foundation paid for a conference where the constituent institutes met in 1953. As they 
had in the interwar years, the foundations undermined intergovernmental structures. 
Conference participants included many ISC alumni, for example H.O. 
Christophersen, Margaret Cleeve and Ivison Macadam of Chatham House, Vera 
Micheles Dean of the FPA, William Holland of the IPR, Stacy May (who had moved 
from the Rockefeller Foundation to the Council on Foreign Relations) and Georg 
Schwarzenberger of the New Commonwealth Institute.58 Just like in old times, the 
national institutes all embarked on studies, each describing the politics and the attitudes 
of a nation towards the United Nations. These were then synthesised in a volume by 
another ISC alumnus, Maurice Bourquin. In his foreword to the volume, Joseph 
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Johnson, the Carnegie Endowment’s new president, outlined the scope and purpose of 
the volume: it was to provide a study of international organisation from the national 
point of view, as any international organisation depended on an accord between national 
ideas, interests and politics. Naturally, Johnson wrote, private bodies were best suited to 
represent national viewpoints which were not necessarily the views of governments.59 It 
remains open to speculation whether Johnson consciously offered this insight as a 
justification for the delegation of the ‘national’ study on Russia to the conservative 
Hoover Institution in Stanford. Thus, while the ISC as an organisation may have been 
dead by 1954, it lived on in spirit.
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Conclusion 
 
The story of philanthropic support for the ‘scientific study’ of international relations in a 
transatlantic context sheds light on a range of major problems that affected the 
American-European relationship before the Second World War. The construction of 
transatlantic networks of experts which started off as a form of elite internationalism 
before the Great War and became a large-scale philanthropic enterprise in the interwar 
years involved American foundations not just in the construction of a new academic 
discipline but also in cultural diplomacy and intergovernmental politics. Pivotal to 
understanding the foundations’ activities is the role they assigned to experts and to 
expertise in the creation of foreign policy and how this intersected with philanthropic 
notions of the nation as the basis of political life. In the following sections, previously 
discussed material will be summarised and suggestions for further research will be 
presented. 
After the Great War, philanthropic foundations were actors in a new 
international politics which they also sought to rationalise. The new international 
politics was marked by the intertwining of bilateral diplomacy, multilateral 
governmental structures and nongovernmental activity. This dissertation has attempted 
to untangle the complexity of philanthropic involvement in international relations by 
using a methodological approach inspired by histoire croisée and other transnational 
perspectives on the writing of history. Instead of focusing on the activities of the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment in one particular country or at the 
League of Nations, the preceding chapters have captured the different facets of a 
specific philanthropic project, the support for a ‘scientific’ approach to international 
relations. As a whole, the dissertation has focused on crossings, circulations and the 
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dynamics that this project initiated in several contexts and on several scales, influenced 
but not predetermined by national structures. 
As became clear in an analysis of the origins of philanthropic internationalism, 
this project was based on certain unspoken assumptions and had its own internal 
contradictions. As a response to progressive reform movements, philanthropic 
internationalism aimed to reorganise the world using American institutions as a 
blueprint, for example for an international court or for regional integration. The legal 
positivism of American international lawyers with its emphasis on the power of public 
opinion was a distinct contribution to contemporary transatlantic theorising on 
international relations. At the same time, the protagonists of philanthropic 
internationalism participated in a transatlantic exchange of social models and extolled 
the benefits of European inventions, be it the elite peace society or European police 
systems.  
Most importantly, philanthropic internationalism contained the fundamental 
tension that bourgeois internationalism faced in general, namely, how to square patriotic 
duty with the compromises that were necessary for any form of international society to 
function. The protagonists of philanthropic internationalism were too close to the nation 
state’s corridors of power to seriously consider that it be abolished. Indeed, through 
their training, either in law or the social sciences, and their professional occupations as 
educators, publicists and administrators, they had been key players in the nationalising 
of societies which was coupled with the beginnings of the 20th century welfare state. 
The internationalist dilemma was met with a boundless optimism with regard to the 
possibility of scientific objectivity, especially in the social sciences. Legal positivists 
took a similar route and became fellow disciples in this ‘cult of the fact’. 
Methodologically, the approach found its expression in an emphasis on empirical 
knowledge, documentation and analysis. Incontrovertible facts would, it was assumed, 
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speak for themselves. It is important to note that foundation officers were not alone in 
the belief that sophisticated analysis of international phenomena would be an impetus to 
policy coordination between states, as this notion was also held by international civil 
servants, for example in the Economic and Financial Organisation of the League.1 
The impact of the Great War on European societies opened up a number of 
opportunities for philanthropic internationalists and, although there had been a 
philanthropic presence in Europe before the war, their activities increased. In the course 
of the foundations’ relief and reconstruction work, they also directly negotiated with 
foreign governments for the first time. At home, the wartime cooperation between 
scholars and government convinced foundation officers of the influence that outside 
expertise could have on policy making. Those who participated in the Paris Peace 
Conference also learnt that the pronouncements of experts, in particular those working 
in the fields of history and geography, could shape the territorial outcomes of peace 
negotiations. For many, this was a formative experience which led to the creation of the 
first foreign affairs institutes. After all, as Glenda Sluga has argued, Paris 1919 marked 
the birth of “the new scientific peace”.2 International lawyers had been the first who by 
virtue of their scientific training acquired expert authority within governments and 
others in different disciplines followed suit. 
For some experts, however, the promise of the scientific peace remained 
unfulfilled. Politicians, they felt, still had too much influence and had failed to agree on 
a truly expert-crafted peace at Paris. Consequently, politicians received most of the 
blame for the problems associated with the Versailles Treaty. Importantly, experts on 
both sides of the Great War’s enemy lines could agree with the notion that the peace 
was imperfect. Throughout the interwar years, self-styled experts sought to recover the 
imaginary ground they had been forced to cede to the politicians at Paris. American 
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foundations made it their task to help them in this endeavour. This motivation lay at the 
root of philanthropic programmes for the scientific study of international relations. 
Noting down his impressions of a discussion between Shotwell, Zimmern and von 
Mises at the 1936 International Studies Conference in Madrid, Tracy B. Kittredge 
observed that “It was generally agreed that the Peace Conference of 1919 failed largely 
because political decisions were taken by the statesmen responsible for the conduct of 
negotiations entirely independently of the recommendation and advice of the technical 
experts in their respective delegations.”3 Kittredge himself implicitly agreed with this 
statement and promoted the ISC as a probate remedy. 
But how did the foundations determine who was an expert? Was he—for only in 
rare cases were international relations specialists female—an accomplished scholar, or 
were political influence and proximity to power more important?4 In the interwar years, 
the foundations rarely had to make this choice as the field of international relations was 
dominated by scholar-politicians and expert-administrators. Alfred Zimmern, an 
incumbent of the very first university chair in international relations was scholar, 
internationalist educator and international civil servant. Arnold Wolfers, one of the most 
influential IR scholars in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s and a long-time 
Rockefeller protégé, regarded his discipline as the archetypal ‘policy science’. 
Rockefeller Foundation officers held Wolfers in higher esteem than Ernst Jäckh whose 
excellent political connections were not matched by equal intellectual brilliance. 
A more important element of the foundations’ definition of the international 
relations expert was active participation in transnational networks. While the Carnegie 
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Endowment’s conception of transnational networks was indebted to the pre-1914 ideal 
of an elite network of notables, the Rockefeller philanthropies consciously developed 
the concept of a network of experts. In practice, of course, the foundations’ networks 
overlapped, and in the course of the 1930s, the Carnegie Endowment and the 
Rockefeller Foundation cooperated ever more closely in the field of international 
relations. In the view of the foundations, an international relations expert was somebody 
who led a roundtable discussion at Williamstown, who gave a lecture at the Hague 
Academy or at the Dotation Carnegie, who sat on the board of the Geneva Research 
Center or wrote a paper which was circulated at the International Studies Conference. A 
budding international relations expert might have received his training at the Graduate 
Institute in Geneva and internationalised his own academic biography with the help of a 
Rockefeller or Carnegie fellowship or a visit to a foundation-sponsored summer school. 
Being an expert meant functioning in the transnational structures that foundation 
philanthropy supported. These structures gave international relations experts a space 
where they could define themselves as a group and where newcomers were socialised. It 
also provided a source of legitimacy. In this way, and not by promoting a coherent 
ideology, the activities of philanthropic foundations became constitutive of expertise in 
the field of international relations. 
It would be reductive to describe the group of foundation-affiliated international 
relations experts as a transnational “epistemic community”, as the notion of knowledge-
based expert communities does not give adequate consideration to the social and 
political realities which shaped this particular group. Neither was another fundamental 
characteristic of an epistemic community, consensus with regard to cause-and-effect 
relationships, a given in the discussions that took place within the philanthropic 
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network.5 Nevertheless, foundation networks did manage to set the terms of 
international debate. The International Studies Conference in particular introduced 
terms like “collective security” and “peaceful change” into the everyday vocabulary of 
foreign policy elites, as was acknowledged by foundation officers.6 And it is also 
remarkable how vigorously experts from countries that challenged the core assumptions 
of the post-1919 world order attempted to change these terms of debate. When 
Francesco Coppola of the Centro Italiano di Alti Studi Internazionali urged ISC 
participants at the 1934 session in Paris to rethink the concept of collective security and 
to accept that wars were a legitimate way of adjusting the status quo, he was not making 
merely a point on terminology but attempting to influence what was thinkable and 
ultimately doable in international politics.7 
Some of the foundations’ activities represented attempts to forge closer-knit 
subgroups of international relations experts which were indeed knowledge-based and 
capable of defining a problem and drawing up policies in particular areas, for example 
the Danubian Studies group of the ISC and the study groups clustered around the 
Geneva Research Center. But even here, foundation representatives and their 
interlocutors insisted on the participation of scholars from the dictatorships.8 The 
openness of philanthropic networks in particular to scholars from Nazi Germany who 
were not just intellectual allies of the regime but quite literally agents of the Nazi 
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6 Kittredge to Walker, 20 March 1939, RF, RG 1, series 100, box 106, folder 959. 
7 Conférence permanente des hautes études internationales, Conference d’études préparatoire sur la 
“sécurité collective”, Paris, Mai 1934 (Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, 1934), 
246. Fritz Berber’s intervention at the 1935 ISC served a similar purpose. Conférence permanente des 
hautes études internationales, Conference générale d’études sur la “sécurité collective”, Londres, Juin 
1935 (Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, 1935), 83. 
8 John B. Condliffe, in particular, was keen on German participation in a study on economic policies and 
accepted that such participation could also serve German propaganda: “This, I am sure you will agree, 
presents an admirable opportunity to explain Germany’s economic case and policies.” Draft letter 
Condliffe to Berber, 13 April 1938, IIIC, A.II.28 ter. 
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government remains puzzling. One possible explanation is that since Germany had been 
such an important country in the network during the 1920s, the foundations were 
reluctant to cut off support completely. After all, scholars like Berber—multilingual, 
close to policy makers and comfortable with the sociability cultivated by the 
international expert elite—seemed to ‘fit in’. Another explanation is that in the 1930s 
many liberals became disenchanted with liberal democracy and capitalism and thus 
developed a more sympathetic attitude to authoritarian models.9 One only needs to 
recall James T. Shotwell’s disparaging remarks on an ill-informed public or the 
assumption voiced at the ISC that experts could have a greater influence on policy 
making in the dictatorships than in democratically governed states. Finally, 
ideologically, the philanthropic network had always cast its net wide. It could 
accommodate the most radical free-market critics of state interventionism, such as 
Ludwig von Mises, as well as adherents to state planning, even if most foundations 
interlocutors were self-described liberals.10 Thus, it is not entirely surprising that 
apologists for the fascist economic order, or at least those experts able to rationalise it, 
were included.11 
Important sites for expert policy making were, of course, the League of Nations 
and other international organisations established after the Great War. As has been 
observed in the recent historiography, while the political achievements of the League 
may have been slim, its remit for technical work enabled it to define the nature of 
international problems and to offer the expertise to solve them. Thus the League and the 
International Labour Organisation were able to export their expert-generated solutions 
back onto the national level where they were implemented, a process which some 
                                                 
9 Mazower, Dark Continent, 23. 
10 On foundation networks and planning see Kenneth Bertrams, “Une inspiration tout en contrastes. Le 
New Deal et l’ancrage transnational des experts du planning, 1933-1943”, Genèses, no. 71 (2008): 71-74. 
11 Note, though, the Rockefeller Foundation’s lackluster response to the prospect of Soviet participation 
in the ISC. 
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historians regard as analogous to the politics of development in the ‘Third World’ after 
the Second World War.12 American foundations fully recognised the importance of this 
aspect of the League’s work as well as the potentially transformative innovation of 
assembling a multi-national body of dedicated personnel in the League’s technical 
organisations. The foundations acknowledged that the League was a breeding ground 
for a new type of policy maker, the international civil servant. While the League of 
Nations has commonly been analysed as a mere bargaining forum in which diverging 
national interests competed with one another, more recently historians who have 
focused on the League’s personnel have claimed that staff did not further the interests of 
their originating nation-state, at least not in the technical organisations, and that 
nationality played a minor role in the choice of the policies which were advocated.13 
International civil servants at the League did develop a distinct identity and it was this 
identity that foundations sought to connect with and to shape. Thus they established 
institutions with multinational constituencies and the capacity to integrate with the new 
international politics.  
Sometimes these institutions were the direct outcome of the pre-1914 
internationalism, for example in the case of the Hague Academy whose advocates were 
the mostly European jurists organised in the Institut de droit international. Yet this first 
systematic attempt to promote the rules of international law through an international 
academy was integrated into the new, post-1919 multilateral order as its target audience 
were the judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice as well as the 
government bureaucracies which sent their diplomats to The Hague for training. They, 
too, were to be instructed in the scientific principles of foreign policy making and 
international litigation, as the organisers of the Hague Academy recognised that national 
governments were still the site where crucial decisions in international politics were 
                                                 
12 Kott, “Une “communauté épistémique” du social”: 31. 
13 Clavin and Wessels, “Transnationalism and the League of Nations”: 491. 
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made. The Graduate Institute in Geneva was founded both as a training institution for 
international civil servants and as an institution which would endeavour to make the 
knowledge accumulated in international organisations available to a broader audience. 
Crucially, it also moved away from a conception of an international expert elite entirely 
made up of lawyers, instead combining instruction in international law with history and 
economics.  
Of course, the foundations continued to support international law as a discipline 
in the interwar period, notably through the Carnegie Endowment’s International Law 
Division. The enormous philanthropic support for the codification of international law 
in the form of the Harvard Research’s draft conventions was, however, chiefly an 
attempt to shape the rules of the international order under League of Nations auspices. 
Like other foundation-funded activities in the orbit of the League, the Harvard Research 
was heavily supported because it presented an opportunity for American participation in 
League work without all of the encumbrances that official membership would have 
brought with it. Crucially, the Harvard Research also had the approval of the State 
Department. It fell to the foundations to finance the United States’ unofficial 
participation in the League which ensured that Americans could, according to Malcolm 
Davis, “eat our cake and have it too”.14 
Similarly, the Dotation Carnegie served as a hub for the American expatriate 
community in Paris, even though it had been designed as an international cultural centre 
ever since its previously largely French governing board and staff were internationalised 
in the mid-1920s. The Dotation itself interpreted its mission as providing a meeting 
place for European and American intellectual elites and as disseminating scientific 
knowledge about nations, with a particular emphasis on the new nations in Eastern and 
Central Europe. Thus, it participated in the consolidation of national characteristics in 
                                                 
14 Davis Oral History, ii, 164. 
  267
the imagination of its patrons. As it secured the contributions of a roster of 
internationally renowned intellectuals to its public lectures and its journal, the Dotation 
did become involved with several other efforts for international conciliation in the 
sphere of culture and education, for example Prince Rohan’s Kulturbund and the Comité 
d’Entente, but it always styled itself as a scientific enterprise. 
The Dotation’s activities also serve as an interesting spotlight onto the 
foundations’ attempt to connect with popular internationalism and grass-roots 
movements for peace in the interwar years. The Dotation certainly represented a 
resource for these movements, as did the summer schools which were supported by the 
Rockefeller and Carnegie philanthropies. The foundations’ interest in popular education 
manifested itself for example in their support for the Foreign Policy Association or in 
the public lectures offered by the Dotation. But the foundations’ approach to 
internationalist education was top-down and they certainly did not seek to support a 
transnational “advocacy network”.15 This of course complicated their self-appointed 
task of influencing public opinion. But then, the definition of public opinion which the 
foundations and many of their collaborators embraced was very limited. As Sydnor 
Walker explained to Edward Carter of the IPR, she “was not thinking at all of the 
general public but of those in public life and commerce”.16 It is telling that one of the 
Carnegie Endowment’s most successful programmes in the sphere of popular 
internationalism, the International Relations Clubs, were scaled back instead of 
expanded in 1931, even though they evoked a remarkable level of interest in a number 
of European countries. Yet, the programme had been labelled by foreign scholars as 
American propaganda activity and had thus become too controversial. Moreover, the 
entire approach of the foundations to internationalism as a movement was marked by 
                                                 
15 Margareth E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1998). 
16 Walker to Carter, 9 December 1936, RF, RG 1.1, series 200, box 356, folder 4227. 
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the push towards academicisation, as shown, for example, in the case of the Geneva 
Research Center’s reorganisation and eventual merger with the Graduate Institute in 
Geneva. Internationalism as a science, however, could hardly be expected to be mass-
compatible. 
Being perceived as agencies for propaganda, a term associated with influencing 
the masses, was a big fear of the foundations during the interwar years as it would have 
seriously compromised their place within the broader framework of American cultural 
diplomacy. The latter may not have been institutionalised and been the object of official 
policy making before 1938—but to not have a policy is a policy, too. As has been 
argued in chapter three, the foundations did fulfil certain functions in the broader 
context of U.S. foreign policy, even if those depended heavily on informal structures. 
By ostensibly conducting their programmes disconnected from the state, the foundations 
made it possible to construct an image of the American nation as an impartial and 
disinterested arbiter in international affairs. The ‘non-political’, private status of the 
foundations was part and parcel of official foreign policy, and the distinction advanced 
in much of the scholarship on the Cultural Cold War between free-flowing, organic 
intellectual processes organised by civil society groups and one-directional state-led 
cultural efforts which exclusively promote the national interest is too reductive.17 The 
example of the International Studies Conference, where the involvement of private 
American groups led to an increased politicisation of an intergovernmental body, is 
instructive here and acts as a reminder that the usefulness of the public-private 
distinction should continue to be questioned. 
                                                 
17 See, e.g. Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters 
(New York: The New Press, 1999), 5; some scholars have questioned the opposition between autonomy 
and co-optation; see W. Scott Lucas, “Beyond Freedom, Beyond Control: Approaches to Culture and the 
State-Private Network in the Cold War”, in The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-1960, ed. 
Hans Krabbendam and Giles Scott-Smith, Special Issue of Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 18, 
no. 2 (2003), 56. 
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As the case of the foundations’ involvement in Germany illustrates, 
philanthropic programmes were received as cultural diplomacy abroad and became the 
target of state manipulation, often precisely because the foundations were eager to 
ensure the approval of foreign governments for their programmes. Again, it is useful to 
distinguish between the Carnegie Endowment, which was more willing to openly 
collaborate with the political elites of recipient countries, as the case of the Stresemann 
Academy illustrates, and the Rockefeller Foundation, whose approach was more 
discreet but nevertheless ensured that foreign governments were kept abreast of 
philanthropic programmes. But while foundation philanthropy was a target for 
government propaganda, it was not always an easy target. The censoring of certain 
volumes of the Carnegie History damaged Germany’s reputation in the foreign press 
and the History’s entire approach subtly challenged the fixations of German ‘pre-
emptive historiography’. The Notgemeinschaft international relations committee also 
changed its approach over time and the influence of government officials, especially 
Curtius, actually diminished. As with most of the foundations’ activities abroad, 
programme outcomes were determined by a complex process of negotiation as 
foundations, governments, international organisations, academic institutions and the 
individuals caught up between them all wielded their respective forms of soft power. 
As in the United States, the key interlocutors of the foundations were scholars 
with good connections to foreign policy elites—and this remained the case after 1933, 
when most but not all of the foundations’ partners had to leave Nazi Germany. What is 
remarkable here is that philanthropic networks withstood these ruptures and continued 
to exist as German émigré scholars remained within the foundations’ orbit for years, 
sometimes decades, to come. It is also noteworthy that the Rockefeller Foundation 
considered transplanting entire research programmes abroad which suggests that, while 
the focus on institutions supported by foundations is useful, especially as it captures a 
  270
large part of the financial dimension of foundation support, it can only convey parts of 
the story and it is individuals who must be followed. This dissertation has only been 
able to do this to a certain extent and a more systematic collective biography of 
members of philanthropic networks would be a desirable project for future research. 
Some progress in this direction has been made by historians who have investigated the 
fellowship programmes of the Rockefeller Foundation.18 However, fellowships are only 
one avenue of philanthropic support and do not convey adequately the patterns of 
inclusion and exclusion which structured philanthropic networks. 
 One motivation behind the foundations’ habit of seeking out interlocutors in 
European countries which belonged or had good connections to political elites was the 
hope that official approval would facilitate the implementation of philanthropic 
programmes. As the “safari” of Shotwell, Ford and Coss has illustrated, this represented 
a common approach all over Europe. But a more fundamental conviction which 
underlay the entire project of philanthropic internationalism played an even stronger 
role and this was the foundations’ search for an authentic national point of view. In the 
minds of foundation officers, the nation was the irreplaceable foundation of world 
politics. Of course, some nations were more advanced than others. Colonised nations 
remained outside the circle of those who could lay claim to fully developed nationality. 
The young nations of Eastern and Central Europe also remained an object for civilising 
efforts. But this differentiation did not change the underlying assumption that any effort 
to bring forth a peaceful world order would have to deal with the nation as the salient 
political entity. Thus, it was also foundation policy to establish strong national foreign 
affairs institutes and national editorial boards for the Carnegie History. This may also be 
why Albert Thomas, head of the International Labour Organisation, dedicated his 
                                                 
18 See in particular Ludovic Tournès, “Les élites françaises et l’américanisation: le réseau des boursiers de 
la Fondation Rockefeller (1917-1970)”, Relations Internationales, no. 116 (2003); Ludovic Tournès, “Le 
réseau des boursiers Rockefeller et la recomposition des savoirs biomédicaux en France (1920-1970)”, 
French Historical Studies 29, no. 1 (2006); Fleck, Transatlantische Bereicherungen. 
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Carnegie Chair lecture in Berlin to a discussion of French foreign policy, a puzzling 
choice for the leader of a major international organisation who would have been well 
qualified to speak on his work.  
 As a result of the privileging of the nation, foundation officers tended to 
emphasise the nationality of experts, too. Again, it is necessary to differentiate. In the 
early 1920s, as enthusiasm for the League project coloured the judgement of 
philanthropic leaders such as Ruml and Fosdick, an elite of de-nationalised experts was 
at least thought possible. This led to the foundation of the Graduate Institute in Geneva, 
an institution with a multinational staff. Nevertheless, cautious voices existed even then. 
Ultimately, Abraham Flexner argued that only “loyal nationals” would be able to 
translate the scientific findings of experts into national policy. Hence, the foundations 
strengthened their relations with national foreign policy elites, supporting such ventures 
as the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik. And, it must be admitted, from the mid-1920s, 
it seemed that the foundations yielded remarkable successes in terms of policy 
outcomes with this approach, notably in the form of the Kellogg-Briand pact which was 
fêted during the first lecture given by Shotwell under the auspices of the Berlin 
Carnegie Chair. By the early 1930s, foundation officers may have opposed the 
intergovernmentalism of such bodies as the ISC in the form of perceived government 
interference, but the principle of national representation in any body aiming at 
international policy coordination was firmly entrenched. 
Another question is whether foundation officers believed that solutions for the 
reform of domestic societies and the international society were essentially the same. 
Their progressive heritage would suggest that foundations interpreted international life 
as the sum of the different variants of national life. This was often the case, as is 
reflected by many ISC studies which essentially consisted of the comparing of different 
national approaches, for example in the field of colonial administration. On the other 
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hand, both the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment supported the 
work of David Mitrany, the inventor of functionalism, a theory of international 
organisation which proposes the border-transcending administration of social 
programmes as a way of ordering international life.19 Moreover, the foundations’ 
support for federalist projects, in particular Danubian economic integration, also points 
to a predilection for supranational solutions, albeit modelled on the American 
experience. A comprehensive assessment of the huge variety of intellectual projects 
which the foundations financed in the field of international relations has been beyond 
the scope of this dissertation but represents a fruitful area for future research. In 
particular, the role of non-émigré scholars in the ISC could be investigated. What can be 
said, however, is that the foundations located the potential for political solutions to 
international problems firmly on the national level and, therefore, the inclusion of 
national delegations from countries which threatened international stability in the ISC 
was important. 
Given their complex stance towards international experts, what was the 
relationship between the foundations and international organisations? Throughout the 
interwar years, there were manifold philanthropic links to both the League and the 
International Labour Organisation. As has been discussed in chapters one and two, 
Rockefeller family funds as well as foundation grants supplemented the League’s 
financial resources and also contributed to the social environment around the League, 
the famous Geneva scene. But the foundations also consciously enabled Americans to 
participate in the League’s work and made sure that the United States was the most 
important non-member state at Geneva. The Harvard Research’s draft conventions, the 
most significant contribution to the 1930 Codification Conference, were produced by 
lawyers who were quite conscious of the fact that this would be a specifically American 
                                                 
19 On Mitrany see Ashworth, Creating International Studies. 
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contribution to the reformulation of the world’s legal order. In the case of the League’s 
intellectual cooperation work, including the ISC, foundation activity actually weakened 
rather than strengthened League institutions. So even though the foundations were great 
benefactors to the League, it is also possible to take a critical stance with regard to this 
philanthropic largesse. Throughout the interwar years, philanthropic foundations 
undermined intergovernmental structures and sought to replace them with unofficial 
ones which were, nevertheless, dominated by American groups. This could happen even 
while philanthropic gifts were ostensibly directed at bolstering the League.  
Finally, to what extent did the philanthropic project to promote a scientific 
approach to the making of foreign policy extend American power in Europe or 
influence other aspects of the American-European relationship in the interwar years? 
The case studies explored in this dissertation confirm the findings of previous studies 
which emphasise that the outcomes and often even the design of philanthropic 
programmes are the result of complex negotiations which are highly contingent on local 
structures. As has been analysed in chapter four, intergovernmental structures were also 
a significant factor in such processes. There were instances when European partners of 
the foundations succeeded in pushing through their preferred solutions, as has been 
shown in the case of the ISC’s affiliation to the IIIC. However, the foundations were 
also able to exert a significant amount of power on the functioning of the ISC when they 
diverted essential coordinating powers away from Paris. With regard to bilateral 
relationships between the foundation and grant-receiving institutions, it must be 
concluded that foundation officers were often deceived as to the true nature of the 
projects they supported. The most salient case is obviously that of Fritz Berber and the 
Deutsche Institut für Außenpolitische Forschung, but the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs’ decision to use its grant for FRPS work also contravened the conditions under 
which the money had been appropriated.  
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To what extent did American foundations contribute to the Americanisation of 
Europe in a broader sense? One constant feature of philanthropic programmes in the 
field of international relations is the conscious attempt to increase American 
participation, whether with regard to student numbers at the Hague Academy and at the 
Graduate Institute in Geneva or American participation in collaborative endeavours 
such as the 1930 Codification Conference and the ISC. The Geneva Institute usually 
had at least one visiting American professor, often an academic with good foundation 
connections, for example Quincy Wright or Jacob Viner. The foundations also 
encouraged the use of English as a language of instruction at some European 
institutions, in particular the Hague Academy, where English was only given the same 
status as French after the Second World War. The Dotation’s abortive attempt to create 
an American cultural centre in association with the American Library in Paris also gives 
a distinctly American flavour to the foundations’ internationalist project. But looking 
for instances of Americanisation only captures some effects of foundation funding. In 
the case of the philanthropic international relations programmes, a circulation of 
institutional models within Europe and within a transatlantic and even global framework 
was furthered by the foundations. One only needs to recall the promotion of the 
Chatham House model in Europe or the support for transplanting the IPR. 
Williamstown, another foundation-supported institution, also found many imitators on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Finally, the foundation-created international institutions also 
increased the mobility of academics. 
As has been observed by other students of the European programmes of 
American foundations, notably John Krige, European interlocutors of the philanthropies 
tended to share points of view and basic political orientations with their American 
backers. Thus they were able to enter a relationship marked by “consensual hegemony”. 
This was also the case in the interwar years. Most of the foundations’ European partners 
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were self-described liberals and supporters of the post-1919 settlement who were 
interested in securing American participation in certain intellectual and institutional 
projects. Scholar-practitioners that they were, they realised that world political decisions 
would not be made without the United States. This, however, did not imply that they 
wished to invite American domination. Rather, they hoped that participation in 
transnational, foundation-funded networks would also transform ideas and opinions of 
elites in the United States. The basic promise of philanthropic internationalism, that it 
was possible to be a “loyal national” and a good internationalist, also appealed to many 
Europeans. This sentiment is captured in a letter by William Beveridge to Shotwell in 
which he argued for stronger American participation in the ISC: “We do not, of course, 
want the specifically American point of view but we want Americans to come and take 
an international view.”20 Squaring this circle was difficult for all kinds of experts in the 
interwar years. 
 
                                                 
20 Beveridge to Shotwell, 5 February 1932, CEIP CE, box 29, folder5. 
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